Burma's displaced people by Couldrey, M et al.
Published by the Refugee Studies Centre, University of Oxford
issue 30
April 2008
Burma’s displaced people
plus our general articles section
and regular contributors:
UNHCR, Brookings-Bern, 
RAISE Initiative, NRC, 
IDMC and RSC
 from 
the 
editors
FMR encourages organisations and individuals to share their expertise and experience so that others 
might benefit. But how do you share research findings, lessons and examples of good practice when  
any dissemination of information might put you, your staff and your partners – and other local people –  
at risk? 
FMR is no stranger to this problem but this issue’s feature section on Burma has, not surprisingly, proven 
more sensitive in this respect than any other we have worked on. We are therefore all the more grateful  
to our authors for their contributions and to all those who are helping to disseminate this issue around  
the world. 
Special thanks go to Inge Brees, guest editor for the Burma feature section, whose assistance has been 
invaluable. We would also like to thank those agencies that have provided funding specifically for this 
issue: DanChurchAid, DFAIT Canada, International Rescue Committee, UK Department for International 
Development and ZOA Refugee Care.
We are publishing this issue in Burmese as well as our usual four languages: English, Arabic, French and 
Spanish. If you would like more copies or could help distribute copies in any of these languages, please 
email us at fmr@qeh.ox.ac.uk. 
The English edition of this issue is online at www.fmreview.org/burma.htm. We would be very grateful if you 
could forward this link to anyone you think might be interested – and include details of this Burma issue in 
any relevant resource listings. Many thanks.
All other language editions can be found via our website at www.fmreview.org 
We understand that unfortunately some of our regular readers did not receive the last issue of FMR, with 
its feature theme on humanitarian reform. If you did not receive that issue but would still like us to send it 
to you, please let us know. Alternatively, it is available on our website.
Forthcoming issues:
FMR 31: feature theme ‘Climate change and environmental displacement’, 
due out September. Details at www.fmreview.org/climatechange.htm.
FMR 32: feature theme ‘Statelessness’, due out January 2009. The call for articles is at 
www.fmreview.org/statelessness.htm. Deadline for submissions: 6 October 2008.
FMR 33: feature theme ‘Protracted crises’, due out May 2009. The call for 
articles will go online in due course at www.fmreview.org/forthcoming.htm 
As usual, each issue will have space for a range of articles in addition to the feature theme. We welcome 
articles on any subject relating to forced migration and are particularly keen to publish more articles 
reflecting the perspectives of individuals and communities directly affected by displacement. Please email 
us with your proposals.
If you would like to receive email notification of new calls for articles and posting of latest issues, email us 
to request our occasional email alerts.
With our best wishes for your work.
Marion Couldrey & Maurice Herson 
Editors
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With the ‘Saffron Revolution’ 
of September 2007, Burma was 
catapulted into the centre of 
international attention. It was 
briefly headline news as people 
monitored the regime’s response 
and watched for hints of progress 
towards democracy and the 
restoration of rights. With little 
action on either front (and no 
visible resurgence of violence or 
protest), interest has since waned. 
The September protests, led by 
Buddhist monks, were sparked 
by a sudden increase in oil prices 
which had a serious impact on the 
already impoverished population. 
After a few days, the government 
violently ended what it called 
the “disruption of stability”. 
Governments around the world 
condemned the crackdown and the 
UN Secretary-General sent Special 
Representative Ibrahim Gambari to 
negotiate with the Burmese rulers. 
At the same time, however, China 
and Russia used their right of 
veto in the UN Security Council to 
block discussion of matters which 
they considered to be internal to 
Burma, no ‘threat to international 
security’ – and therefore outside the 
mandate of the Security Council. 
Most reports on Burma explain that 
the conflict started in 1988 when 
the Burmese junta cracked down on 
nationwide demonstrations. But is 
that really when it all started? How 
about the moment when the army 
took power in 1962? Or before that, 
after independence from the British 
in 1948, when some of the ethnic 
minorities were granted autonomy 
while the plight of others was 
ignored – who then, predictably, 
took up arms to fight this inequality? 
Stating that conflict only started in 
1988 ignores the call for (cultural) 
autonomy by the ethnic minorities 
that started decades earlier. What 
is certainly true is that refugee and 
IDP numbers rose considerably at 
the end of the 1980s, in the aftermath 
of the demonstrations of 1988, and 
with the loss of territory by the 
ethnic armies and the country’s 
growing economic emergency. 
Today, displacement is widespread. 
In June 2007, the ICRC issued a rare 
public condemnation of the Burmese 
military government’s actions, 
saying that they have “helped to 
create a climate of constant fear 
among the population and have 
forced thousands of people to join 
the ranks of the internally displaced, 
or to flee abroad.” Close to half a 
million people have been displaced 
internally over the last decade on the 
eastern border alone. In addition, 
Forced displacement  
of Burmese people   
Inge Brees
This issue of FMR aims to help bring the crisis of forced 
displacement of Burmese people back into the  
international spotlight. 
Population: 48 million
Ethnic groups: Burman (68%), Shan 
(9%), Karen (7%), Rakhine (4%), 
Chinese (3%), Indian (2%), Mon (2%), 
other (5%) 
 Naypyidaw, administrative capital
[source: Burma Campaign UK]
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millions of Burmese have crossed into 
neighbouring countries. In Thailand 
there are an estimated two million 
Burmese trying to make a living. 
If they are fleeing armed conflict 
or political persecution, they can 
receive protection and assistance 
in refugee camps. Those who fled 
after November 2005, however, are 
ineligible for protection, due to the 
moratorium on refugee registration. 
They have no choice but to stay 
outside the camps, where they 
are considered illegal migrants, 
subject to arrest and deportation. 
There are good reasons why Thailand 
maintains such a strict demarcation 
between refugee and migrant status. 
Those inside the camps not only 
get protection and assistance but 
also have access to resettlement 
programmes – a recognised pull 
factor. Thailand has had to carry 
the burden of refugee inflows from 
neighbouring countries for decades 
and prefers to keep tight control 
on its ability to respond according 
to its own interests. That is why 
Thailand has still not signed the 
Geneva Convention and why they 
call refugees ‘temporary displaced 
persons fleeing fighting’, to emphasise 
that their stay in Thailand will come 
to an end as soon as conditions in 
Burma are conducive to return.
The exact number of Burmese 
refugees in other countries bordering 
Burma is unknown but Bangladesh, 
India, China and Malaysia have all 
had to deal with substantial influxes 
of Burmese citizens. As Thailand 
receives the bulk of the refugees and 
is the base for the vocal Burmese 
opposition, many of the articles in 
this issue of FMR focus on the Thai 
situation and the ethnic Karen. This 
should not be seen to underplay the 
plight of Burmese refugees in other 
countries or IDPs in other areas 
inside Burma. There is simply less 
information available on them – a 
gap that needs to be addressed. 
In terms of durable solutions for 
this refugee population, the current 
focus is on resettlement. As a form 
of responsibility sharing, several 
Western countries have agreed 
to accept groups of Burmese 
refugees. This is resulting in large-
scale movements from the Thai 
camps to the West, with some 
additional cases from Bangladesh 
and India. Several articles in this 
issue explain how resettlement, 
while ensuring protection for the 
refugees concerned, raises issues 
for community management of 
the camps and is causing tensions 
within the refugee population. 
Thoughts on other durable solutions, 
such as repatriation or local 
integration, are missing, however. 
Even if repatriation is currently 
impossible, agencies should at least 
consider the possibility of unexpected 
changes in Burma which would lead 
to massive population movements. 
Early planning is imperative. At the 
same time, more thought should 
be given to the alternative solution 
of local integration. Although most 
host countries are against this 
option, my own research indicates 
that many Burmese people are 
already integrating, against the 
odds, and are an economic asset 
to their host countries. An open 
debate on all durable solutions and 
immediate improvements to the 
‘closed’ camps are urgently needed 
for the sake of both the Burmese 
refugees and their host populations. 
Given that Burmese people are 
displaced throughout the region, 
this humanitarian crisis will require 
regional solutions. UNHCR could be 
encouraged to set up a consultative 
committee involving all refugee-
receiving countries to discuss and 
coordinate a common approach 
towards Burmese refugees – even 
if a comprehensive plan of action 
is currently impossible due to 
the actions of the Burmese junta. 
But, as Loescher and Milner state, 
this is only part of the solution: 
“A humanitarian response to the 
needs of refugees in the region is 
not a substitute for engaging in the 
question of resolving the conditions 
in the country of origin that continue 
to force refugees to flee.”1 The efforts 
of the UN Special Representative 
to push for dialogue between the 
different stakeholders in Burma 
are essential if Burma’s large-scale 
displacement is ever to end. But from 
his latest visit to the country in March 
2008 it is clear that the prospects for 
genuine dialogue remain gloomy.
In January 2008 the junta suddenly 
announced that the National 
Convention had drafted a 
Constitution, on which the Burmese 
population has to vote in a national 
referendum. Elections will be held 
in 2010. Finally a positive move? 
Maybe so, but with a lot of caveats. 
Opposition to or campaigning 
against the National Convention 
and the referendum are regarded as 
treason, and incur a penalty of several 
years’ imprisonment. Additionally, 
opposition leader and Nobel Peace 
Prize Winner Aung San Suu Kyi 
is barred from taking part in the 
elections because of her marriage 
to a British citizen. When Gambari 
requested that international monitors 
be allowed to observe the referendum, 
this was immediately rejected and he 
was accused of bias in favour of the 
opposition. The carving out of both 
humanitarian and political space thus 
so far remains extremely difficult.
We would like to express our thanks 
to the numerous academics, UN 
agencies, NGOs and human rights 
organisations who have written 
for this issue – and to the refugees 
and IDPs themselves who wrote 
from inside the conflict zones 
and the refugee camps to make 
sure their views were heard.2 
Inge Brees (inge.brees@ugent.
be), guest editor for this issue, is 
a doctoral fellow at the Conflict 
Research Group, based at the 
University of Ghent in Belgium 
(www.conflictresearchgroup.be). 
She is currently conducting research 
on livelihoods of both camp and 
self-settled refugees in Thailand.
1. ‘Protracted refugee situation in Thailand: towards 
solutions’. Presentation given to the Foreign Correspondents 
Club of Thailand, 1 February 2006.
2. For their protection, the names of most refugee 
contributors have not been given; these articles have instead, 
at their request, been attributed to their organisation.
 
Burma v Myanmar 
Using the name Burma, rather than 
the official name Myanmar, is a 
politically sensitive choice, as the 
opposition and several Western 
countries refuse to recognise the 
name change instigated by the junta. 
Most Burmese people still use the 
old name in private conversations, 
which is why ‘Burma’ is used here. 
Contributors to FMR were free to 
choose which name to use. The term 
‘Burmese’ is used for any person 
originally coming from Burma, while 
the term ‘Burman’ is used for people 
from the ethnic majority group.
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Refugees who have fled Burma can 
testify to the brutality of the regime. 
In January, I visited the Mae La 
refugee camp in Thailand, just five 
miles from Burma, and heard from 
dozens of the junta’s victims. When 
the camp was first established in 1984 
it sheltered 1,100 refugees; today 
it holds more than 40,000 people. 
The number of refugees continues 
to grow, despite 7,000 of Mae La’s 
inhabitants being relocated to other 
countries last year. Some of those 
who remain have been there since 
the beginning; others have risked 
their lives crossing the heavily mined 
border in recent weeks and months. 
Many spoke to me about having no 
community to return to because the 
army had burned down their villages. 
One father of three said he had to flee 
Burma because the military tried to 
force him to work for free carrying 
their equipment. The only choice 
open to him was either to agree or 
pay off the army. However, with no 
money, he tried to hide. But with the 
military raiding the homes of those 
who do not pay up, sometimes three 
or four times in one night, he was 
left with no option but to take his 
family and flee to Thailand. Sadly, 
similar stories of forced labour were 
a familiar theme during my visit. 
One woman had organised an armed 
group of mothers to protect their 
villages from forced labour. A widow, 
she took her three daughters across 
the border when the military began 
to target them. Each family had a tale 
to tell about protection money being 
extorted from them by the military 
or, in some cases, by the ethnic 
militias. They talked of villages being 
destroyed, systematic rape, chronic 
poverty, a lack of work and no access 
to health care or education. Despite 
the cramped conditions and rationing 
of food, at least the children had 
schools to go to in the refugee camp, 
and the Camp Council gave people a 
degree of democracy which they were 
denied in Burma. In every refugee 
camp I have ever visited, including 
those in Darfur, the vast majority of 
the people wanted to go home. But 
in Mae La, fewer than half of the 
refugees I spoke to said they wanted 
to go back. Even those who hoped to 
return said there was no point until 
democracy had been established.
That is no surprise considering 
millions of people inside Burma 
lead a very harsh life indeed. 
Surrounded by some of the world’s 
most dynamic economies, a third of 
Burma’s people live on less than 30 
cents a day. Ten per cent do not have 
enough to eat, half of the country’s 
20 million children do not complete 
primary school, and 70% of people 
are at risk from malaria. In October, 
I announced a doubling of the UK’s 
aid to Burma, from £9 million in 
2007-08 to £18 million a year by 2010. 
We will do this by expanding on 
our work which has already proved 
effective. That includes caring for 
refugees on Burma’s borders and 
internally displaced people inside 
the country; increasing the number 
of children able to complete primary 
school; helping to fight the main 
killer diseases of malaria, TB and 
HIV/AIDS; improving income-
earning opportunities for poor 
rural families; and strengthening 
civil society organisations. We 
will continue to work through UN 
agencies and NGOs, so that none 
of our aid is channelled through 
the Burmese central government. 
Burma’s absence from the headlines 
since October does not mean that 
anything has improved. At the time 
of writing this article in February, 
Aung San Suu Kyi remains under 
house arrest. The opposition is 
denied a role in drafting Burma’s 
new constitution, and detention of 
its activists continues. The regime 
has described the September 
protests as “trivial”. Setting a 
timetable for a referendum and 
subsequent elections means nothing 
if all opposition is suppressed.
Dialogue with Ibrahim Gambari, 
the UN Secretary-General’s Special 
Envoy, has yet to make real progress. 
The international community, 
including China, India and the 
ASEAN countries, must back the 
UN’s efforts as a matter of urgency. 
As the old guard clings to power, we 
must hope that younger elements 
within the Burmese regime realise 
that their rule will not stifle the 
need or demand for change. 
Douglas Alexander MP is the UK 
Secretary of State for International 
Development (www.dfid.gov.uk).
last September, world attention focused on Burma’s ‘Saffron 
Revolution’ and its brutal crackdown by the country’s military 
regime. The protests were sparked by ever-deepening poverty 
and people’s frustration with years of political repression and 
economic failure. 
Burma: in urgent need of change
Douglas Alexander
Refugee 
school, 
Thailand.
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Burma today has one of the worst 
forced migration crises in the world. 
More than 50 years of conflict and 
human rights violations have led 
to widespread forced migration: at 
least one million people internally 
and more than a million refugees 
to the neighbouring countries of 
Bangladesh, China, India, Malaysia 
and Thailand. Far from assisting and 
protecting those who have fled their 
homes, the Burmese government is 
the biggest perpetrator of human 
rights violations in the country. 
The ethnic minority population 
of Burma, particularly the at least 
half a million people displaced 
in the eastern part of the country, 
remain exceptionally vulnerable 
to violations of international 
humanitarian and human rights 
law. These grave violations continue 
to draw little attention from the 
outside world, despite an increasing 
momentum in recent years of the 
international community’s collective 
‘responsibility to protect’ civilians.
In ethnic minority areas where 
pockets of armed conflict continue, 
especially along the eastern 
border, government forces have 
been responsible for widespread 
persecution, torture, extrajudicial 
executions, forcible conscription 
of children, rape, demolition of 
places of worship and forced labour. 
Government forces have also 
carried out forced displacement of 
civilians in a counter-insurgency 
programme known as the ‘Four 
Cuts’, which aims to cut off the 
supplies of food, funds, recruits and 
information to the resistance groups. 
The deliberate targeting, persecution 
and forced displacement of ethnic 
minority civilians by the Burmese 
government are not isolated or 
sporadic events but widespread 
practice and an integral part of the 
Burmese government’s strategy to 
maintain its control and as such 
are tantamount to crimes against 
humanity. To a lesser extent, 
human rights abuses are also being 
committed by ethnic armies fighting 
government forces. Hundreds of 
thousands of people have been 
left with no choice but to flee their 
areas of origin in search of safety. 
Even in areas where armed conflict 
has come to an end, human rights 
violations by the army continue, 
causing ongoing displacement. 
The Guiding Principles on Internal 
Displacement1 – the international 
framework for protection of and 
assistance to IDPs – are founded 
on the concept of sovereignty as 
entailing responsibility. They affirm 
that national authorities have the 
primary duty and responsibility to 
provide assistance and protection 
to IDPs within their jurisdiction. 
They also grant displaced persons 
the right to request and receive 
protection and assistance from 
national authorities. The Principles 
underline the right of international 
humanitarian organisations to 
offer services to support IDPs, 
and emphasise that a government 
should not arbitrarily withhold 
consent to such aid, especially when 
it is itself unable or unwilling to 
provide the needed assistance.
In the case of Burma, where the 
national authorities are largely 
responsible for the displacement, 
the IDP issue has acquired political 
sensitivity. The government refuses 
to acknowledge the existence of 
IDPs and has no programmes to 
identify or assist them. International 
humanitarian agencies can provide 
some protection merely by their 
presence. In western Burma’s Rakhine 
State, for example, where there are 
international aid agencies, there 
has been a reduction in violations. 
However, international humanitarian 
agencies are denied permission to 
reach IDPs and other vulnerable 
populations in the conflict and 
border zones of eastern Burma. 
In the face of continuing grave violations of human rights 
by the Burmese government against its own civilians, it is 
imperative that the international community start to  
respond to Burma in terms of the Responsibility to Protect 
(R2P) principle.
The international community’s 
Responsibility to Protect
Kavita Shukla
Villagers 
in flight, 
October 2007.
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The International Committee of 
the Red Cross was the only agency 
with independent access to these 
zones but since political changes 
led to the Burmese government 
– currently known as the State Peace 
and Development Council (SPDC)2 
– becoming even more isolationist 
in 2004, it too has been facing many 
new restrictions on access. The small 
amount of assistance that does reach 
this area arrives from community-
based organisations in Thailand 
that undertake cross-border trips to 
reach the displaced population. This 
type of aid violates the principle of 
state sovereignty but remains the 
only way to reach this population. 
In very few countries in the world 
has forced displacement on such a 
large scale elicited such a limited 
response from member states and 
agencies of the UN. Many members of 
the international community remain 
unaware of the scale of atrocities. 
Virtually all international efforts to 
resolve the country’s political and 
human rights crises have focused 
on the conflict between the military 
regime and the pro-democracy forces. 
The conflict between the Burman-
dominated central government and 
non-Burmans, which has triggered 
most of the displacement in Burma, 
has largely remained on the sidelines. 
Despite most of the international 
community’s frustration with the 
Burmese government, Burma’s 
powerful neighbours and trade 
partners China and India generally 
back the SPDC. The Association 
of Southeast Asian Nations 
(ASEAN), a regional forum of 
which Burma is a member, also 
avoids holding the government 
accountable for its transgressions 
and tends to strongly support the 
concept of non-interference in 
the country’s internal affairs.
Responsibility to Protect
Since the Rwandan genocide, the 
international community has started 
taking on greater responsibility in 
certain situations where sovereign 
governments are failing in their 
duty to provide for the security 
and wellbeing of their people. For 
decades, in accordance with the 
UN Charter’s Article 2.7, which 
emphasises the principle of non-
intervention in matters that would fall 
under the domestic jurisdiction of any 
state, the international community 
had been reluctant even to speak 
about situations in which people 
were suffering appalling human 
rights violations in an environment 
of impunity for the perpetrators. 
In recent years, however, there has 
been an evolution from sovereignty 
as an absolute concept towards 
sovereignty as a responsibility to 
protect civilians and prevent grave 
violations and mass atrocities. 
According to the R2P principle, 
sovereign states have primary 
responsibility for protecting their 
own people from genocide, war 
crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes 
against humanity, and it is only 
when they are unwilling or unable 
to exercise that responsibility that 
responsibility shifts to the wider 
international community. The action 
required by R2P is overwhelmingly 
preventive and involves building 
state capacity, remedying grievances 
and ensuring the rule of law. If, 
however, prevention fails, R2P 
requires whatever economic, political, 
diplomatic, legal, security or, in the 
last resort, military measures as are 
necessary to prevent mass atrocity.3
At the World Summit in 2005, 
the world’s governments agreed 
to the R2P principle and to take 
collective action, in a timely and 
decisive manner, through the 
Security Council on a case-by-case 
basis should national authorities 
fail to protect their populations 
from atrocity crimes. The 192 heads 
of state who signed the World 
Summit Outcome Document4 also 
recognised the Guiding Principles 
as an important international 
framework for the protection of 
IDPs and resolved to take effective 
measures to increase their protection.
Through its Resolution 1674 of 
April 2006, the Security Council 
acknowledged that the deliberate 
targeting of civilians and other 
protected persons and the 
commission of systematic, flagrant 
and widespread violations of 
international humanitarian and 
human rights law in situations of 
armed conflict may constitute a 
threat to international peace and 
security. The Security Council 
noted that it would be ready to 
consider such situations and, where 
necessary, to take appropriate steps. 
Acting on R2P
However, the resolution has so far 
not been translated into real action, 
and there is still little agreement on 
how this principle should be applied. 
There also remain serious divisions 
within the Security Council between 
Western nations that view massive 
atrocities as a threat to international 
peace and security, and countries 
such as China and Russia which 
agreed to the World Summit Outcome 
Document and supported Resolution 
1674 but which still promote the 
sovereignty argument above R2P.
In the case of Darfur, actions are 
increasingly being framed in terms 
of the responsibility to protect. 
Security Council Resolution 1706 
was the first to cite and apply the 
R2P concept to a specific situation, 
while Resolution 1769 emphasised the 
importance of protecting civilians and 
humanitarian workers. Many sub-
Saharan governments have strongly 
defended the R2P principle in the case 
of Darfur. Divisions in the Security 
Council, however, have hampered 
strong collective action on Darfur.5 
The situation in Burma was not seen 
as falling within the purview of the 
Security Council until September 2006 
when it was voted onto its formal 
agenda. This vote came after years 
of Burmese government refusal to 
abide by resolutions of the General 
Assembly and the Commission on 
Human Rights that called for national 
reconciliation and democratisation. 
Since 2004, the government had 
denied entry to the Special Envoy 
of the Secretary-General on Burma, 
and the Special Rapporteur on 
Burma had been denied access to 
the country since 2003. There was 
a sense that all efforts outside the 
Security Council had been exhausted. 
The optimism which followed 
Burma reaching the agenda of the 
Security Council was short-lived, 
as permanent members Russia and 
China vetoed the first ever Burma 
resolution in January 2007 that, 
among other demands, called upon 
the government to stop all attacks 
on ethnic minorities and to offer 
unhindered access to humanitarian 
organisations. This was the Council’s 
first multiple veto since 1989. In their 
statements, China and Russia argued 
that the situation in Burma was not 
a threat to peace and security in the 
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region, and that the Security Council 
was not the place to discuss the 
internal affairs of a state. Although 
China and Russia acknowledged 
that Burma was facing a serious 
human rights and humanitarian 
situation, they emphasised that the 
Human Rights Council, which has 
no binding powers, was the best 
venue for action on Burma. The 
vetoing countries made no reference 
to any collective responsibility to 
protect the population of Burma. 
In September 2007, the largest pro-
democracy demonstrations in two 
decades rocked Burma and the 
subsequent government crackdown 
made the country the focus of 
renewed international attention. 
Following intense diplomatic 
pressure, the SPDC allowed the 
Secretary-General’s Special Adviser 
and the Special Rapporteur into the 
country in late 2007. After much 
wrangling, the Security Council 
passed a presidential statement 
deploring the violence against 
peaceful demonstrators and calling 
for a genuine dialogue with all 
concerned parties and ethnic 
groups to achieve an inclusive 
national reconciliation. There was 
no mention of the protection of 
ethnic minority civilians who have 
experienced decades of violence 
and forcible displacement, and who 
may be continuing to experience 
extreme danger and hardship. 
Although the crackdown on Burmese 
democracy activists appears to have 
diminished, government forces are 
continuing to target civilians in 
Burma’s ethnic minority areas as part 
of their counter-insurgency tactics 
and are committing human rights 
violations with impunity. There is 
concern that as memories of the 
‘Saffron Revolution’ fade and the 
Burmese government makes token 
gestures of permitting a political 
dialogue, the Security Council will 
once again view Burma as a low 
priority, more appropriate for other 
UN bodies to tackle. It is imperative 
that the Security Council start to see 
Burma in terms of the R2P scenario. 
If the R2P concept can be brought 
up in the Security Council in the 
case of Darfur, there is every reason 
for it to be raised in connection 
with Burma. International divisions 
may make progress difficult but 
if Security Council members 
continue to ignore the international 
community’s obligation to ensure 
the protection of civilians from mass 
atrocity crimes in Burma they will be 
setting a very poor precedent for a 
responsibility which all governments 
have agreed upon in principle. 
Kavita Shukla (kshuklaus@
yahoo.com) is a researcher 
on Burmese refugees and 
internally displaced persons.
1. www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/gp_page.aspx
2. Formerly known as the State Law and Order 
Restoration Council (SLORC).
3. Gareth Evans, ‘The Limits of State Sovereignty: The 
Responsibility to Protect in the 21st Century’, Neelam 
Tiruchelvam Memorial Lecture, International Centre for 
Ethnic Studies, Colombo, 29 July 2007.
4. http://daccessdds.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/
N05/487/60/PDF/N0548760.pdf?OpenElement
5. Roberta Cohen, ‘Humanitarian Imperatives are 
Transforming Sovereignty’, Northwestern Journal of 
International Affairs, Winter 2008, p6.
Burma/Myanmar has suffered 
from two decades of mine 
warfare by both the State Peace 
and Development Council and 
ethnic-based insurgents. There 
are no humanitarian demining 
programmes within the country.
It is no surprise that those states 
in Burma/Myanmar with the most 
mine pollution are the highest 
IDP- and refugee-producing 
states. Antipersonnel mines 
planted by both government 
forces and ethnic armed groups 
injure and kill not only enemy 
combatants but also their own 
troops, civilians and animals. 
There is no systematic marking 
of mined areas. Mines are laid 
close to areas of civilian activity; 
many injuries occur within half 
a kilometre of village centres. 
Although combatants have 
repeatedly said that they give 
‘verbal warnings’ to civilians living 
near areas which they mine, no 
civilian mine survivor interviewed 
by the International Campaign 
to Ban Landmines reported 
having had verbal warnings. 
Much work needs to be done in 
advance of any return of IDPs or 
refugees in order to map and mark 
mined areas, educate returnees 
and control return movements. The 
reality is, of course, that thousands, 
if not hundreds of thousands, of 
IDPs will return home whenever 
they think it may be safe to do 
so in order to secure land and 
rebuild their lives. No organisation 
can stop them from doing so. 
Humanitarian organisations 
must encourage a moratorium 
on new use and insist that all 
areas be marked, in a similar 
and unambiguous way, by all 
combatants, and that civilians 
with knowledge of mined areas of 
the country should be trained to 
do this now. This will have both 
a preventative and an awareness-
raising impact, and will help 
reduce to the lowest possible 
level the number of casualties 
that will inevitably occur.
Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan 
(yeshua@icbl.org) is a 
researcher and editor for the 
International Campaign to 
Ban Landmines’ Landmine 
Monitor (www.icbl.org/lm).
The Burma landmines report 
is at http://www.icbl.org/
lm/2007/burma.html.
Landmines: reason for flight,  
obstacle to return     
Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan
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During the period 1958-60, the 
caretaker government of General 
Ne Win made Burma’s armed forces 
– rather than elected representatives 
– responsible for governing Yangon 
(Rangoon), Burma’s largest city and 
the country’s capital until the State 
Peace and Development Council 
(SPDC) moved its seat of power to 
Naypyidaw in 2005. The government 
established three new townships 
near Yangon to which 167,000 people, 
one sixth of the city’s population 
of one million, were involuntarily 
relocated.1 The government claimed 
that resettlement was necessary 
because the tens of thousands of 
people fleeing insurgency in the 
countryside who had become 
squatters in the city posed a threat 
both to public health and to law and 
order. Deeply resentful of having lost 
their former homes, the residents of 
the new townships put up strong 
resistance against the Ne Win regime 
during 1988’s Democracy Summer.
In response to the demonstrations 
in the summer of 1988, the State 
Law and Order Restoration Council 
(SLORC, renamed the SPDC in 
1997) seized power. Within a year 
it had established ten new satellite 
towns with a population of almost 
half a million, most of whom had 
been forcibly resettled. Many were 
squatters but others were owners of 
substantial housing who were being 
punished by the SLORC for actively 
supporting the 1988 demonstrations. 
Not only did they lose their old 
homes but they were forced to pay for 
plots of land and materials to build 
new houses in the outlying areas, 
which generally lacked electricity, 
water and other amenities. There 
were few employment opportunities 
in the satellite towns, obliging the 
relocated people to make long and 
costly commutes into central Yangon 
to work in the informal economy.2 
Today, resettled people live crowded 
together in simple houses made of 
thatch and bamboo, the poorest of 
Yangon’s poor. They were hardest 
hit by the August 2007 increase in 
fuel prices that sparked nationwide 
anti-government demonstrations 
the following month, since the cost 
of food and public transportation 
skyrocketed. With its ‘huts to 
apartments’ scheme, the SPDC claims 
to have placed many squatters in 
new multi-storey housing on the site 
of or near their former dwellings. 
However, forced relocation in Yangon, 
Mandalay and other cities in central 
Burma continues today; victims of 
fires, for example, are not allowed 
to rebuild their old neighbourhoods 
and residential areas are cleared to 
make way for new roads, apartments 
and shopping centres. This is an 
environment where the land rights 
of ordinary citizens, whatever their 
ethnicity, remain unrecognised.
Donald Seekins (kenchan@ii-
okinawa.ne.jp) is Professor of 
Southeast Asian Studies at the 
College of International Studies, Meio 
University, Nago, Okinawa, Japan.
1. Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE), 
Burma: Displacement and Dispossession, Forced Migration 
and Land Rights. November 2007, pp95-98.
2. ‘Interviews in Satellite Villages’, Dawn News Bulletin, 
vol. 2, no 14 (July 1990), pp3-9.
Forced relocation in Burma’s 
former capital     
Donald M Seekins
The population of Yangon has experienced coercive 
resettlement on a truly massive scale under military rule.
Burma’s rulers have divided the 
country into three zones: white 
– those areas under their total 
control; brown – contested areas; 
and black – areas over which they 
have no control. Black areas are 
designated ‘free-fire’ zones where 
the Burma army can kill anyone it 
comes across. The area described 
in this article is a black zone. 
In the Karen and Karenni States of 
eastern Burma, the Burma army 
regularly launches sweeping 
operations, involving up to four 
battalions, in villages and areas 
where resistance is active and where 
IDPs are suspected to be hiding. 
The soldiers will often mortar and 
machine-gun the village first and then 
enter the village to harass civilians, 
loot homes, beat, rape and torture 
indiscriminately, and sometimes burn 
homes or entire villages. Landmines 
are then laid in the village and on 
the routes that villagers use in and 
out of the village. If a villager is 
seen, he or she is shot on sight.
During these sweeps, resistance 
fighters will try to protect the 
population. Skirmishes may only last 
a few minutes but they can buy time 
for people to escape into the jungle 
with some belongings before the 
soldiers arrive. On being attacked, 
villagers will flee into the jungle, to 
Under attack: a way of life  
David Eubank
Much of what is happening in the conflict zones of 
eastern Burma is difficult to capture with photos, video 
and reports. It is a slow and insidious strangulation of the 
population rather than an all-out effort to crush them. 
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prepared hiding places if possible. 
They flee with only what they can 
carry – their infant children, some 
utensils, a blanket or two for the 
entire family, some plastic sheeting 
and a few days’ supply of rice. Once 
the troops return to their camps, 
the villagers try to return to or near 
their fields and villages. During 
the current offensive, which began 
in February 2006, there have been 
many Burma army units attacking 
on different fronts. As one resistance 
leader said, “The last few months, 
the Burma army has attacked so 
much that many of the hiding places 
were overrun. Many people were 
scattered in the jungle. Now it is a 
little better as the Burma army is 
busy building up their new camps. 
But when they are finished with the 
new camps they will come again. 
This is a very bad offensive for us 
all and we do not know how we 
will manage it. But we must try and 
we will not leave our homes.” 
Villagers are also forced to clear 
landmines and act as human 
shields around bulldozers to help 
the army improve road networks. 
Forced labour is common, with 
many villagers forced to act as 
porters, subject to harsh treatment 
and not infrequent execution. 
Some of those whose villages were 
attacked return to the same site, 
rebuilding their houses. Many 
others remain on the run, go into 
hiding or attempt to flee the country 
altogether. Some set up camp in 
less accessible places where they 
struggle to eke out an existence. 
The village of Maw Tu Der in 
northwestern Karen State, for 
example, was burned down by the 
Burma army in 2004. The villagers 
have been in hiding in the jungle 
since then. They have built rough 
shelters hidden in the trees near trails 
that have deliberately been kept 
small and difficult to travel on. They 
have some kind of security due to 
the difficulty of access and the help 
of the local resistance forces (mostly 
providing early warning of troop 
movements) but food production has 
plummeted and there is little cash to 
purchase clothes, blankets, cooking 
utensils and farm implements. 
Their health has suffered 
dramatically because they have too 
little to eat, are more exposed and 
share inadequate water sources. 
There is no clinic nearby and 
Burma army patrols make regular 
access by medical teams difficult. 
The Free Burma Rangers, Karen 
Human Rights Group1 and the Back 
Pack Health Worker Team2 have 
extensively documented this direct 
correlation between Burma army 
oppression and the ill-health of the 
population.3 It is only through the 
efforts of the resistance groups – who 
provide information, communication, 
transportation, logistical and security 
support – that any humanitarian 
relief can reach those under attack. 
During the current offensive, over 
370 villagers have been killed in the 
northern three districts of Karen 
State and over 30,000 have been 
displaced, many of whom are now 
in hiding. Over 60 new Burma army 
camps and three new roads have 
been built. The slow but unrelenting 
attacks and the building of new 
camps and roads seem to be driven 
by a plan to dominate, chase out 
or crush any Karen people in these 
areas. This is the largest offensive 
against the Karen people since 
1997. The scale of displacement 
and destruction is large and each 
death an irreplaceable loss. 
The disruption of food production, 
burning of homes and the shoot-on-
sight orders of the Burma army have 
made staying in their homeland 
untenable for thousands more. Of 
the more than 30,000 displaced, 
over 7,000 people have already left 
their homes for the Thai border. The 
people here need food, medicine, 
shelter and help to rebuild their 
homes, schools and lives. They also 
need immediate protection and the 
freedom to return to their homes.
David Eubank (eubank@pobox.
com; info@freeburmarangers.org) is 
Director of the Free Burma Rangers, 
which provides emergency assistance 
and human rights documentation 
in the conflict zones of Burma 
(www.freeburmarangers.org)
1. www.khrg.org/ 
2. www.geocities.com/maesothtml/bphwt/ 
3. See article by Heather Rae ‘Internal displacement in 
eastern Burma’, FMR 28 www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/
FMR28/25.pdf and the Back Pack Health Worker 
Team’s 2006 report on ‘Chronic Emergency: Health and 
Human Rights in Eastern Burma’ at www.geocities.
com/maesothtml/bphwt 
Villagers 
forced to 
carry loads 
for the Burma 
army, June 
2007.
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We had gathered together from ten 
surrounding villages for a prayer 
meeting when the Burma army 
forces appeared and captured 
some of us. We were tied up, 
beaten and punched. Then we were 
given electric shocks to our body. 
My friend Saw Gwe was killed. I 
managed to escape. The Burma 
army accused us of being in the 
resistance but we are not. We are 
farmers. We now cannot stay here 
and so we will go to a refugee camp. 
Saw Nu Nu, a Karenni man 
who is now an IDP
 
Why do the Burmese soldiers come 
to burn our villages? We do not go 
to burn theirs. Why do they want 
to come and bother us? We only 
want to have our farms, do our work 
and live in peace. Our life in the 
mountains is already very hard. Why 
do they want to make it harder?
Karenni pastor
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The abuses were perpetrated across 
Karen State as part of the sustained 
campaign of terror by the SPDC (State 
Peace and Development Council). 
The reports focus in particular on 
the abuses experienced by women 
and girls and draw on over 4,000 
documented cases of human rights 
abuses – in particular those of rape, 
sexual abuse and forced labour. 
Forced labour is itself often committed 
in conjunction with other human 
rights violations such as rape, 
beating, mutilation, torture, murder 
and denial of rights to food, water, 
shelter and legal redress. The cases 
documented cover a 25-year period 
from 1981 to 2006 but the human 
rights abuses continue today. 
Rape
Rape has been used and continues 
to be used as a method of torture to 
intimidate and humiliate the civilian 
populations. Many of the rapes are 
perpetrated by senior military officers 
or done with their complicity. The 
perpetrators are aware that most 
of the civilian population will be 
too afraid to complain or that their 
complaints will not be taken seriously. 
As a consequence, the rape of women 
and girls across Karen State and in 
other states by SPDC soldiers and 
officers continues with impunity. 
Recorded cases of rape include the 
rape of children and of Buddhist nuns.
In a recent case a 25-year-old woman 
was gang-raped by soldiers. Three 
SPDC soldiers came to the village. 
They asked the village chief to 
give them one Karen woman. They 
threatened to kill the chief if he 
did not send for her. The soldiers 
took the woman to the nearest 
bush and two of them raped her.
Two young women describe their 
ordeal at the hands of a soldier. “The 
soldier ordered us to go with them 
and we did not even know where 
we were going. He said “Don’t cry 
or I will kill you.” We walked to a 
valley and he said we should stop 
there. He ordered us to take off our 
clothes. At first, we dare no, then 
he made his voice strong and we 
took off our clothes. He lay down 
with his gun just beside him. He 
raped me first. He made my friend 
just lie down beside him. After he 
raped me, he raped my friend. After 
a while he raped us again.” No 
action was ever taken against him.
In another district, a young woman 
was gang-raped by four soldiers 
in her home. After raping her, they 
killed her by shooting into her 
vagina. No action was taken.
Village chiefs are at constant risk of 
abuse and torture for failing to meet 
SPDC commands. Now, however, 
in the absence of men, it is often the 
senior women who take on this role. 
They of course face the additional risk 
of being raped or forced to engage 
in sex with SPDC soldiers as the 
price of protection for themselves, 
their families and communities.
Forced labour
 Women and girls from across Karen 
State report having been forcibly 
recruited to help build roads and 
bridges, clear landmines and carry 
military supplies. They are at  
particular risk since men and boys flee 
the villages and hide in the jungle to 
avoid arrest, torture or killing. Those 
forcibly recruited include aged and 
frail women, pregnant and breast-
feeding women, and schoolgirls 
as young as 11. Many women 
taken as porters are also raped.
“I had to go as a porter for one 
month. Every day we had to 
carry up the mountain and down 
again. I was sweating and couldn’t 
breathe because I am very old 
and the soldiers prodded me with 
their guns because I am slow. I felt 
like my heart was breaking.”
Recommendations
The KWO requests the assistance 
of the international community in 
the implementation of the following 
recommendations, calling on:
the SPDC  to stop all forms of 
sexual violence and all other forms 
of human rights abuses against 
women and girls, in particular 
in the ethnic areas of Burma
the Royal Thai government to 
ensure survivors of rape and sexual 
violence fleeing to Thailand have 
access to adequate health and 
psychosocial support systems
the international community to 
provide secure refuge and timely 
and appropriate service provision 
in countries of first asylum and 
upon resettlement to women and 
girls who are survivors of rape 
and sexual violence, and to ensure 
that refugee women and girls at 
extreme risk are provided with 
appropriate protection and support 
including case management, 
safe housing and, if appropriate, 
resettlement under UNHCR’s 
women at risk programme
Formed in 1949 and with a 
membership of over 30,000 women, the 
Karen Women’s Organisation (www.
karenwomen.org) is a community-
based organisation of Karen women 
working in development and relief 
in the refugee camps on the Thai 
border and with IDPs and women 
inside Burma. The KWO also 
encourages awareness of women’s 
rights and promotes women’s 
participation in community decision 
making and political processes.
The Karen Women’s Organisation 
would like to thank all the 
women who contributed, shared 
their testimonies and gave their 
time and energy to inform the 
report from which this article is 
taken. Special thanks to Linda 
Bartolomei, Eileen Pittaway and 
Colleen Bartolomei of the UNSW 
Centre for Refugee Research. 
1. www.karenwomen.org 
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State of terror: women at risk      
The Karen Women’s Organisation
Two reports researched and written by the Karen Women’s 
Organisation – Shattering Silences in 200 and State of 
Terror in 2001 –  document the wide range of human 
rights abuses against Burmese women and girls. 
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On United Nations Day, 24 October 
2007, in Yangon, in the immediate 
aftermath of  events that had for a 
while put the country on the front 
pages of international media, the 
Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator 
of the UN system in Myanmar 
read out a statement on behalf of 
the UN Country Team (UNCT)1. 
Among other things, it said: 
 “[T]he peaceful demonstrations 
that followed the sudden hike in 
fuel prices on 15 August […] clearly 
demonstrated the everyday struggle 
to meet basic needs, and the urgent 
necessity to address the deteriorating 
humanitarian situation in the country. 
These are the same messages that 
the United Nations Country Team 
in Myanmar has been endeavouring 
to bring to the Government’s 
attention for some time.”   
In the charged atmosphere prevailing 
at the time, this statement raised 
alarm in government circles, 
especially the Ministries of Foreign 
Affairs and Planning, whose 
responsibility it is to rein in the UN 
agencies and international NGOs 
operating in the country. The Ministry 
of Foreign Affairs promptly issued a 
note of protest as well as a detailed 
refutation of the UNCT’s claim 
of a “deteriorating humanitarian 
situation”. Furthermore, the Ministry 
accused the Resident/Humanitarian 
Coordinator of “acting beyond his 
capacity by issuing the statement” 
and concluded that “the Government 
of the Union of Myanmar does 
not want [the Coordinator] to 
continue to serve in Myanmar, 
especially at this time when the 
cooperation between Myanmar and 
the United Nations is crucial”. 
This over-reaction is, sadly, 
the reflection of an operational 
environment that is severely 
constrained as a result of two abiding 
assumptions in the military regime’s 
ideology: firstly, that the UN agencies 
and international NGOs are used 
“by some big powers against the 
host country”2 and, secondly, that 
there is no armed conflict anywhere 
in Myanmar and hence no internal 
displacement of potential concern 
to the international community.
Insiders and outsiders
As though such challenges were 
not serious enough, humanitarian 
organisations operating within 
Myanmar have also been criticised 
by agencies and Burmese opposition 
groups based in Thailand (and by 
the opposition groups’ supporters 
in the West). To their credit, Thai-
based humanitarian actors, including 
those providing essential relief to 
stranded and displaced populations 
across the border in south-east 
Myanmar, have historically played 
a crucial advocacy role on behalf of 
the victims of military ruthlessness 
Medical 
treatment 
for IDPs 
in eastern 
Burma.
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Agencies working inside Myanmar to assist forcibly displaced 
people work within an extremely constricted operational 
environment. Despite occasional glimmers of hope, carving 
out sufficient humanitarian space to meet urgent needs 
remains an uphill struggle. 
Carving out humanitarian space 
Jean-François Durieux and Sivanka Dhanapala
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and abuse in Myanmar. It is thanks 
to their cross-border ventures, 
and to the testimonies of refugees, 
that the phenomenon of internal 
displacement in the south-east has 
been documented, quantified and 
brought to the world’s attention. 
Regrettably, this powerful advocacy 
was, at times, also used to discredit 
the efforts of those agencies who were 
pursuing, from within Myanmar, 
similar humanitarian objectives 
through other means and under 
a different set of constraints.      
By the end of 2003, though, a glimmer 
of light began to appear within 
this rather gloomy picture. The 
appointment of Khin Nyunt as Prime 
Minister proved to be a significant 
turning point. Within a context of 
‘pacification’ of border areas but also 
as a gesture of goodwill towards 
the international community, the 
Prime Minister opened up a number 
of areas in the east and south-east 
to international organisations for 
the provision of humanitarian and 
community development assistance. 
Thus, in 2004, the UN obtained 
a qualified green light to assist 
returning IDPs to areas of potential 
refugee return. The authorities were 
careful not to use the term IDPs but 
rather referred to “those returning 
to their homes within Myanmar”.  
Retrenchment
This era of relative optimism and 
expansion came to a rather abrupt 
end in late 2004/early 2005. With the 
removal and incarceration of Khin 
Nyunt in October 2004, the regime 
started swinging resolutely back 
to its tested ways, shutting down 
the few avenues through which 
the international community had 
come closer both to a humanitarian 
dialogue with the authorities and to 
the affected populations themselves. 
At the end of May 2005, the new 
Minister of the Interior reassessed 
his ministry’s relations with 
humanitarian organisations. UNHCR 
was denied permission to undertake 
any further expatriate missions to 
the south-east. ICRC was informed 
that its activities in the border 
areas would be subjected to intense 
scrutiny, as they appeared to be 
“illegal” (meaning, based on verbal 
agreements only). The watchword of 
the new era was clearly suspicion. 
Government counterparts, including 
the traditionally more understanding 
Ministry of Health, played the card 
of caution. The Minister of Economic 
Development and National Planning 
seized the opportunity to re-affirm his 
authority over international agencies, 
a process which led to the issuance 
of the controversial Guidelines on 
Cooperation in February 2006. In 
response, the UNCT submitted to 
the Minister and other counterparts 
a set of Guiding Principles for the 
provision of humanitarian assistance, 
describing both the objectives and 
the modus operandi of the UN in 
Myanmar as essentially humanitarian. 
This ever more constrained 
operational environment coincided, 
sadly, with an apparent increase of 
humanitarian needs in parts of south-
east Myanmar. The removal of Khin 
Nyunt had also presented a serious 
set-back to the tentative peace process 
with Karen insurgents, and the 
military forces on both sides prepared 
for confrontation again. The spark 
came in the final months of 2005 in the 
hilly areas of Eastern Bago Division, 
provoking an army offensive of 
proportions unseen for many years 
and displacing thousands of civilians.
Neither the UN nor ICRC got access 
to these troubled areas. In July 2006, 
the Prime Minister turned down the 
Assistant High Commissioner for 
Refugees’ plea for an inter-agency 
mission to the area in order to assess 
the humanitarian needs resulting 
from “insurgency and counter-
insurgency measures”. During 
the same period, the government 
deployed extraordinary public 
relations efforts to convince the 
international community, through 
its representatives in Yangon, that 
the situation was under control, 
and to counter what it called the 
propaganda of the Karen National 
Union (KNU). In the same breath, the 
government blamed the insurgents 
for any suffering inflicted upon the 
civilian population. It also accused 
the KNU of forcibly displacing 
populations out of their villages and 
into KNU-controlled areas (including 
refugee camps in Thailand) – which 
at least was an acknowledgement that 
forced displacement was a reality. 
Further south, the latter part of 2005 
and 2006 witnessed some tentative 
humanitarian advances, as well as 
setbacks. ICRC proved increasingly 
unable to operate according to its 
standards and by the end of 2006 the 
only field missions the agency carried 
out were related to its programme 
of prosthetic rehabilitation, the 
beneficiaries of which were Myanmar 
military as well as civilians. UN 
agencies managed to complete their 
2005 micro-projects and even, in some 
cases, to strengthen their presence 
but only through their local staff.  
Eventually, in April 2006, UNHCR 
secured a fresh legal basis for its 
programme in the south-east by 
signing a Letter of Understanding 
(LOU) with the Ministry for Progress 
of Border Areas and National 
Races (whose Burmese acronym is 
Natala). According to the terms of 
this document, which was renewed 
for two years in mid-2007, the 
target groups of this programme 
in the south-east are “communities 
affected by population movements” 
and agency staff should be given 
unhindered access to project areas, 
subject only to considerations of 
staff safety. UNICEF also opened 
a sub-office in the capital of Mon 
State; however, it has not been 
able so far to post an expatriate 
there on a permanent basis. 
Natala is a relatively new player, 
and remains a modest one, in south-
eastern Myanmar. There, as elsewhere 
in the country, it is the Ministry of 
Health that has the largest number 
of operational partnerships with 
the UN and international NGOs. 
As a result, it is in the health sector 
that humanitarian assistance is 
most developed in the south-east 
– although it is far from compensating 
for the dearth of public services. 
Coordination
Since late 2004, flexible coordination 
mechanisms have brought together 
all members of the humanitarian 
community in the south-east, mainly 
in order to exchange information 
and initiate a ‘mapping’ of actors 
and activities. This information was 
fed into the work of the Population 
Movement Working Group (PMWG), 
established within the UNCT 
at the end of 2004. The PMWG 
commissioned a major study on 
internal displacement and in-country 
migration, which introduced a much 
needed typology of population 
movements and made a number 
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of concrete recommendations 
to the UNCT.3 The report 
provided an impetus to consult 
more with community-based 
organisations (CBOs) and to 
assess which of these were best 
placed and equipped to reach 
out to isolated communities. 
The establishment of the 
Humanitarian Coordinator 
function within the UN 
framework in Myanmar 
spurred on the establishment 
of the inter-agency standing 
committee.4 This in turn allowed 
for the inclusion of NGOs as an 
important voice in deliberating 
humanitarian strategies. While 
not all NGOs and CBOs could 
openly participate in these 
processes, innovative ways of 
safe consultation with them have 
ensured that they were heard. 
The PMWG report, coinciding 
with TBBC’s 2005 report on 
IDPs,5 also provided the occasion 
for a first structured exchange 
of views, in Bangkok, between 
the Myanmar UNCT and those 
doing cross-border work out of 
Thailand. These exchanges were to 
be continued, and their frequency 
and depth improved with time. By 
2007 these ‘convergence’ meetings, 
as they came to be known, were 
organised thematically – with 
health, education, livelihoods 
and protection each addressed 
in its own right. It is reassuring 
to see that, between the 
‘insiders’ and the ‘outsiders’, 
complementarity rather than 
competition has become the order 
of the day. Suspicions linger on, 
though, as evidenced by the fact 
that, so far, very few international 
NGOs based within Myanmar 
have welcomed the opportunity to 
interact with Thai-based agencies. 
More significantly, the UN still 
has to find ways to bring IDPs 
and other vulnerable populations 
in the south-east out of the most 
pernicious form of ‘invisibility’, 
namely the denial of their plight, 
if not of their very existence, in 
the junta’s official discourse. 
The angry reaction to the UN Day 
message of October 2007 contains 
a bitter irony; while emphasising 
the need for greater cooperation 
between Myanmar and the UN aid 
system, the regime brutally closed the 
door on attempts at a humanitarian 
dialogue, which the now ousted 
Resident/Humanitarian Coordinator 
had vigorously pursued throughout 
his tenure. That military regimes 
loathe being taken to task in public 
statements is nothing new. This 
does not mean that humanitarian 
principles cannot be used, even 
in Myanmar, in innovative ways. 
Carving out humanitarian space 
will remain a core mission of the 
UN and its partners in Myanmar. 
Jean-François Durieux (jean-
francois.durieux@qeh.ox.ac.uk) 
was UNHCR’s Representative 
in Myanmar from May 2005 to 
September 2007. He is now a 
Lecturer in International Human 
Rights and Refugee Law at the 
Refugee Studies Centre, University 
of Oxford. Sivanka Dhanapala 
(dhanapal@unhcr.org) is UNHCR’s 
Senior Regional Durable Solutions 
Officer in Kabul, Afghanistan. 
This article is written in a personal 
capacity and does not necessarily 
reflect the views of the UN.
1. The UNCT comprises FAO, ILO, IOM, UNDP, UNFPA, 
UNHCR, UNICEF, UNODC, UNOPS, WFP and WHO.
2. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Response to the Statement 
of the UNCT in Myanmar, 31 October 2007.
3. Ashley South ‘Burma: The Changing Nature of 
Displacement Crises’, RSC Working Paper 39, Feb 2007: 
www.rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/WP39%20Burma%20AS.pdf 
4. Wherever there is a Humanitarian Coordinator, 
OCHA requires that there should also be an inter-agency 
coordination committee modelled on the IASC (www.
humanitarianinfo.org/iasc), which includes, in addition 
to UNCT members, the Red Cross movement and major 
NGOs.
5. ‘Internal Displacement and Protection in Eastern 
Burma’, 2005: www.tbbc.org/idps/report-2005-idp-
english.pdf  
Relocation Sites, Hiding Areas
& Ceasefire Areas in Eastern Burma, 2007
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Towards a typology of forced migration
in Burma
Ashley South
One can broadly define three types of forced migration in 
Burma, according to the causes of population movement: 
Type 1: Armed conflict-induced displacement: this is either 
as a direct consequence of fighting and counter-insurgency 
operations, or because armed conflict has directly 
undermined human and food security, and is linked to 
severe human rights abuses. This type can be found across 
Karen State, in eastern Tenasserim Division, southern 
Mon State, southern and eastern Karenni State, southern 
Shan State, and parts of Chin State and Sagaing Division.
Type 2: Military occupation- and development-induced 
displacement: this is generally caused by a) confiscation 
of land – following armed conflict – by the Burma 
army or other armed groups, including for natural 
resource extraction and infrastructure construction, 
and b) predatory taxation, forced labour and other 
abuses. All the border states and divisions are affected 
by militarisation and/or ‘development’-induced 
displacement, as are a number of urban areas (including in 
the context of developing tourism and ‘urban renewal’).
Both of the above two types of displacement are 
products of conflict. Type 1 is directly caused by 
armed conflict; type 2 is caused by latent conflict or 
by the threat of use of force. As such, they constitute 
forced migration, and cause internal displacement 
(as defined in the Guiding Principles).
Type 3: Livelihoods vulnerability-induced displacement: 
this is the primary form of internal and external 
migration within and out of Burma. The main causes 
are inappropriate government policies and practices, 
limited availability of productive land and poor access 
to markets – all leading to food insecurity and lack of 
education and health services. Such people make up 
a particularly vulnerable set of economic migrants. 
Ashley South (lerdoh@yahoo.co.uk) is an independent 
writer and consultant on humanitarian and political 
issues in Burma and South-East Asia. For more 
information, see his report ‘Burma: The Changing 
Nature of Displacement Crises’, Refugee Studies 
Centre Working Paper No 39, Feb 2007, online at www.
rsc.ox.ac.uk/PDFs/WP39%20Burma%20AS.pdf.
1. www.brookings.edu/projects/idp/gp_page.aspx 
 
The role of coercive measures in internal 
displacement in Burma
Andrew Bosson
Forced migration in Burma may be caused by a single event 
such as a natural disaster, a military attack or a relocation/
eviction order from the military or civil authorities for 
military, infrastructure or commercial purposes. Typically, 
these events affect whole villages or communities or 
sections of towns, and are relatively sudden. 
More commonly, however, displacement is caused 
by a series of events, including coercive measures 
imposed by the authorities such as forced labour, 
land confiscation, extortion and forced agricultural 
practices. These measures, which constitute serious 
violations of human rights, typically act cumulatively 
over time, reducing the family’s resource base, and 
thus its income, until the household economy collapses 
and leaving home becomes the best or only option. 
This process first affects the poorer families, though 
the whole community may gradually migrate over a 
period of years. This pattern of ‘gradual displacement’, 
in which people tend to leave as individuals or as 
family groups, may be recognised in regions of current 
conflict and in the cease-fire areas as well in as the 
rest of Burma. The coercive measures operate in, are 
affected by and exacerbate a situation of widespread 
poverty, rising inflation and declining real incomes. 
In other words, people leave home due to a combina-
tion of interconnecting coercive and economic factors. 
One has to consider the whole process leading to 
displacement rather than a single, immediate cause. 
Where coercive measures are involved, which is generally 
the case in Burma/Myanmar, the resulting population 
movement falls squarely within the scope of the Guiding 
Principles on Internal Displacement, even if the situation 
that actually triggers movement – frequently food 
insecurity – may also be described in economic terms.
Andrew Bosson is an independent researcher. He is the 
author of ‘Forced Migration/Internal Displacement in 
Burma with an Emphasis on Government-Controlled 
Areas’, a report written in May 2007 for the Internal 
Displacement Monitoring Centre. Online at www.
ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/IDMC-Burma_report_mai07.pdf 
Andrew Bosson’s analysis is developed further at www.
ibiblio.org/obl/docs4/IDPs-Coercive-measures2008-03-
17.pdf as well as in the IDMC report referred to above. 
Defining ‘forced migration’ 
in Burma
Most Burmese people fleeing their homes do so for a combination of reasons. The root causes for leaving, however, 
determine which ‘category’ they belong to: ‘internally displaced persons’ (IDPs) or ‘economic migrants’. There is  
some discussion as to whether people leaving their homes due to exhaustion of livelihoods options are IDPs  
according to the Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement1 – or not. Ashley South and Andrew Bosson present  
their views below.
By analogy, this debate can be extended to Burmese people in exile. Are Burmese people outside refugee camps 
‘economic migrants’ or ‘self-settled refugees’?  The article ‘Invisible in Thailand’ (pp31-33) sheds more light on this. 
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The majority of assistance and 
advocacy – and most research 
– regarding forced migration in 
Burma has focused on the situation 
in armed conflict-affected areas 
along the Thailand border. As 
international agencies do not have 
direct access to conflict-affected parts 
of eastern Burma, they provide aid 
in partnership with local agencies. 
Assistance for displaced people 
inside Burma, sent from Thailand 
or other neighbouring countries, is 
by definition illegal as it challenges 
the sovereignty of the Burmese 
government (which most cross-border 
actors in fact consider illegitimate). 
Some cross-border activities are 
carried out from Bangladesh and 
India (very limited amounts of relief 
and documentation on human rights) 
and also from China (including low-
profile medical assistance). Most 
Thailand-based cross-border groups 
work in Karen areas but also in Mon 
and Karenni States; security and local 
capacity constraints mean that much 
less work is undertaken in Shan State. 
Cross-border programmes provide 
aid which may be characterised 
as impartial – inasmuch as it is 
distributed according to need – but  
it is far from neutral.
Cross-border aid networks are 
closely associated with armed 
opposition groups, on which they 
rely for security and logistical 
arrangements. In fact, most cross-
border personnel are members (or 
affiliates) of insurgent organisations. 
A number of local NGOs and CBOs 
are also engaged in human rights 
documentation and advocacy 
work, and capacity building with 
a range of opposition groups. 
As Burma’s ethnic insurgency groups 
lost control of their remaining 
‘liberated zones’ in the early/mid-
1990s, civilians displaced by armed 
conflict could no longer settle behind 
the frontlines of conflict, and IDP 
numbers increased substantially. 
With the help of international 
NGOs and donors who had been 
supporting refugees in Thailand 
for decades, Karen and Mon IDP 
assistance programmes were 
established. By April 2002, the 
annual cross-border aid budget 
had grown to $1m, distributed 
through local Karen and, to a lesser 
extent, Karenni and Shan groups.
Short-term humanitarian aid was 
intended to supplement villagers’ 
rice-sharing and other coping 
mechanisms, offering them a chance 
to reconstruct their communities 
once the immediate crisis had 
passed. In 2005 several cross-
border groups began to implement 
a range of community-based 
development initiatives, stimulated 
by the injection of significant new 
US government funds for cross-
border work. Several of these 
organisations also implemented 
sometimes quite extensive health 
and education programmes in 
partnership with local communities.1
Working inside Burma
International relief and development 
projects in Burma are still spread 
very thinly. Yangon-based 
international organisations and UN 
agencies generally take a long-term 
incremental approach to expanding 
access into conflict-affected parts of 
the country, starting programmes in 
areas adjacent to state capitals and 
gradually moving into more remote 
locations, although not in the most 
severely conflict-affected areas. Over 
the past few months, however, the 
military government has moved to 
further restrict the activities of most 
humanitarian agencies in the country.
Very few international organisations 
operating in government-controlled 
areas of Burma implement 
programmes that specifically 
target IDPs. In part, this is due to 
the sensitivity of the issue; in part, 
it reflects a lack of appreciation 
of the nature and extent of the 
displacement crises in Burma. 
From the late 1990s, international 
organisations in Burma began to 
realise the benefits of working in 
partnership with local NGOs and 
CBOs in order to gain access to 
vulnerable and remote communities. 
During this period, a variety of civil 
society groups emerged within 
and between ethnic nationality 
communities inside Burma, in part 
as a result of the series of ceasefires 
negotiated between the government 
and most armed groups. These 
civil society networks include 
religious groups and traditional 
village associations as well as 
more formal organisations.
Such local actors often have access 
to conflict-affected areas beyond the 
reach of international organisations. 
Their relief and development 
activities take the form of self-
help initiatives, undertaken by 
extended family and ethnic clan 
networks, as well as more systematic 
programmes implemented by CBOs 
and local NGOs. Relief aid usually 
consists of food, medical supplies 
(including mobile outreach teams) 
and community rehabilitation 
development activities. In particular, 
three separate church-based 
networks working with IDPs have 
developed sophisticated capacities 
to assess needs and to monitor and 
evaluate the impacts of assistance. 
Local community leaders – who are 
able to engage with those holding 
power (eg Burma army and 
ceasefire group commanders) – also 
undertake important protection 
work to improve conditions for 
vulnerable communities. Their 
interventions may involve persuading 
There is a need for greater understanding and coordination 
between groups working inside Burma and those operating 
cross-border. 
Humanitarian aid to IDPs in 
Burma: activities and debates
Ashley South
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A common external misrepresentation 
of the conflict and displacement in 
eastern Burma is one which narrowly 
depicts a civil war between the 
SPDC army and armed opposition 
groups like the Karen National 
Liberation army (KNLA), with 
civilians as unintended victims and 
displacement a side-effect of the 
armed conflict. A closer examination 
of the situation, however, which 
listens to what civilians themselves 
are saying, shows that this is not 
the case. Rather, the SPDC army 
has overwhelmingly focused its 
military campaigns against civilian 
communities and in many cases has 
actively avoided KNLA patrols.
Military units of the SPDC active 
in Karen State depend for their 
day-to-day operations on labour, 
money, food and other supplies 
extracted from the local civilian 
population through various forms of 
forced labour and extortion. In non-
military controlled areas, especially 
the more mountainous regions of 
northern Karen State, the SPDC army 
has had difficulty enforcing such 
demands and has therefore sought 
to forcibly transfer the disparate 
rural communities into contained 
relocation sites where they can be 
more easily exploited. This strategy 
has undermined villagers’ livelihoods 
by preventing them from travelling 
to work or trade and by requiring 
that they submit their money and 
resources to military personnel 
and take time away from their 
own occupations in order to meet 
SPDC demands for labour. These 
inter-related abuses have combined 
over time to exacerbate poverty, 
increase malnutrition and worsen 
the region’s humanitarian crisis.
Aware of conditions of life under 
military control, many villagers have 
therefore chosen instead to go into 
hiding. By evading demands and 
restrictions, villagers not only claim 
their right to be free from such abuse 
but also weaken the operations of 
local army units and thus frustrate 
the spread of militarisation over 
Karen State. The SPDC, in turn, has 
deemed those villagers in hiding to be 
enemies of the state, targeting them as 
such in military campaigns, shooting 
them on sight and burning down 
their homes, fields and food stores.
IDPs as political actors
Most displaced villagers in Karen 
State could, in principle, go to live 
under SPDC rule. The fact that so 
many civilians remain displaced 
in hiding sites is indicative of 
villagers’ aspirations to live free 
from oppressive military control 
and their success in resisting the 
SPDC army’s efforts to enforce this 
control. Fleeing into the forest is thus 
not an act of fear and helplessness 
but a courageous way of resisting 
SPDC rule. Those unable to flee 
resist in different ways, employing 
daily acts of subtle subversion and 
non-compliance in order to mitigate 
or wholly avoid the demands and 
restrictions put upon them.
Along with the act of flight itself, 
villagers in hiding have developed 
additional response strategies. For 
example, those remaining in their 
villages but expecting to have to flee 
hide rice stores at secret locations 
in the forest and build concealed 
shelters to which they can escape 
should SPDC troops suddenly arrive. 
Using advanced warning systems to 
relay messages between communities, 
Whether in hiding or living under military control, displaced 
villagers of Karen State and other areas of rural Burma 
have shown themselves to be innovative and courageous 
in responding to and resisting military abuse. They 
urgently need increased assistance but it is they who 
should determine the direction of any such intervention.
Supporting IDP  
resistance strategies 
Poe Shan K Phan and Stephen Hull
authorities not to relocate civilians 
nor to demand forced labour from 
a village or to allow humanitarian 
access for international or, more 
often, local NGOs and CBOs. 
Civil society actors may also pass on 
human rights information to contacts 
in Yangon or Thailand. Such informal 
‘protection and advocacy networks’ 
help reduce the incidence of human 
rights abuses as, for example, army 
commanders may be reluctant to 
use forced labour in areas where 
this fact is likely to be passed onto 
advocacy groups in Thailand. 
Conclusion
Agencies working outside Burma, 
especially opposition groups in exile 
and their support and lobbying 
networks, should be encouraged 
to gain a better understanding 
of the important assistance and 
protection work undertaken – despite 
government restrictions – by local 
civil society actors in Burma. 
Organisations working from inside 
Burma cannot afford to be as bold 
in their advocacy roles as those 
based in Thailand and overseas. 
However, the presence of local and 
international agency personnel in 
conflict-affected areas can help to 
create the ‘humanitarian space’ in 
which to engage in behind-the-
scenes advocacy with national, 
state and local authorities. 
Ashley South (lerdoh@yahoo.co.uk) is 
an independent writer and consultant 
on humanitarian and political issues 
in Burma and South-East Asia.
1. The total amount of aid provided by international 
organisations in Burma is approximately $250 million 
(less than $5/person), while the budget of international 
agencies on the Thailand border is about $50 million – for 
a refugee population of approximately 150,000 people 
– of which some $7 million is spent cross-border.
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villagers can learn of the impending 
arrival of troops and thereby gather 
belongings and head into the forest 
prior to the actual arrival of soldiers. 
Upon reaching relatively secure 
hiding sites, displaced communities 
are quick to re-establish schools to 
educate their children and provide 
some measure of structure despite 
the disruptions of a life on the run. 
Villagers share rice with others who 
have been unable to bring along 
sufficient reserves. If they expect to 
remain for a longer period at one 
hiding site, villagers often establish 
small hillside paddy plots or cultivate 
cardamom, betel nut and other 
crops which, being relatively small 
and durable, are practical trade 
goods for displaced communities. 
Using traditional knowledge of their 
environment, villagers have been 
able to concoct natural remedies for 
a variety of ailments out of locally 
available ingredients. As the SPDC 
enforces heavy restrictions on 
travel and trade, the establishment 
of temporary and covert ‘jungle 
markets’ allows displaced villagers 
in hiding to trade with those living 
under military control. Displaced 
villagers also actively seek out 
local aid groups providing cross-
border medical, educational and 
nutritional support. Civilian lookouts 
monitoring the military presence 
at their abandoned villages inform 
others if and when army patrols move 
on, allowing for a possible return 
to reclaim their homes and land or 
at least to fetch items left behind.
In the context of the SPDC’s efforts 
to control and exploit the civilian 
population and villagers’ efforts 
to resist this control, the pursuit of 
subsistence, healthcare, education 
and other social programmes outside 
of military control becomes a highly 
political act. As such, aid to displaced 
communities likewise becomes a 
political act. Where aid programmes 
support IDP efforts to survive in 
hiding, they directly challenge the 
regime’s efforts at civilian control 
and the SPDC views such aid with 
hostility. Acknowledging the right 
of displaced people to resist military 
abuse is a necessary aspect of trying 
to address their various needs. 
External intervention which seeks the 
return, resettlement and reintegration 
of displaced communities to SPDC-
controlled villages and relocation 
sites and provides aid through 
SPDC channels would strengthen 
the SPDC and weaken the villagers. 
In contrast, aid delivered directly 
to civilian communities outside 
military-controlled channels 
strengthens the position of the 
villagers in relation to the military.
Village agency
While international awareness of the 
human rights situation in rural Burma 
has increased in recent years, it has 
tended to favour a simplistic view 
of villagers as helpless ‘victims’ who 
lack the knowledge and means to 
address their own needs. Thousands 
of interviews with local people 
conducted by the Karen Human 
Rights Group (KHRG1), however, 
make it clear that villagers in rural 
Burma have strong views about what 
needs to be done to improve their 
situation and how these aims can 
be practicably realised. In response 
to what villagers were telling us, 
KHRG introduced its ‘Village Agency’ 
project in 2005. This project 
has two components: firstly, 
to document – along with 
the abuses which rural 
people face – their stories 
about the efforts they make 
to resist this abuse and, 
secondly, to help villagers 
identify and strengthen 
their resistance strategies. 
In our Village Agency 
workshops, with the help 
of KHRG field researchers 
as facilitators, villagers 
discuss their perceptions 
of human rights and local 
events, are introduced to 
basic international human 
rights norms and explore how these 
relate to their own situation. They 
are encouraged to recognise and 
discuss what they are already doing 
to respond to and resist human rights 
abuses and, finally, to discuss ways 
to strengthen, extend and implement 
local strategies. The objective is not 
to ‘teach’ villagers about human 
rights but to get them thinking more 
consciously about human rights, to 
help them recognise the ways they 
are already claiming their rights 
and to catalyse discussion on ways 
to strengthen their strategies. The 
hope is that these workshops will 
kick-start a process where villagers 
will regularly discuss and share 
approaches amongst themselves, 
trying out new ones as appropriate.
The more villagers strengthen 
their own strategies to claim their 
rights, the more they will be seen as 
actors participating in the processes 
and decisions which affect them. 
In turn, local and international 
actors will be encouraged to work 
in ways that strengthen villagers’ 
own strategies, rather than 
imposing strategies upon them.
Poe Shan K Phan (poeshan@
khrg.org) is the Field Director of 
the Karen Human Rights Group 
(KHRG www.khrg.org) and a 
former IDP from eastern Burma. 
Stephen Hull (stephen@khrg.
org) is a researcher for KHRG. 
Thanks to KHRG staff member 
Jennifer Haigh for her assistance.
For email updates on new KHRG 
reports, please visit www.khrg.org.
1. www.khrg.org 
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Humanitarian responses to this 
chronic emergency have come 
both from agencies based inside 
Burma and from agencies based 
in neighbouring countries and 
working discreetly across national 
borders. Government restrictions 
on programmes and travel by 
international staff in remote 
areas were formalised in a set 
of guidelines for humanitarian 
agencies in 2006. These government 
regulations have particularly 
restricted agencies that prioritise 
the field presence of expatriate 
staff as a protection strategy. 
Ironically, the contraction of 
humanitarian space may present 
opportunities for agencies based 
inside Burma to reinforce coping 
strategies by focusing more on 
developing national staff and 
partnerships with community-based 
organisations. Just as cross-border 
operations have primarily been 
implemented by community-based 
organisations for over a decade, 
humanitarian responses into conflict-
affected areas from agencies based 
in country are also now more 
dependent on local capacities. The 
international community is now 
dependent, for example, on surveys 
conducted by community-based 
organisations to gauge the level of 
vulnerability in contested areas.
There is a challenge how to increase 
humanitarian space in the areas of 
ongoing conflict of eastern Burma. 
For agencies and governments in 
dialogue with the military junta, 
this requires an extension of 
geographic access and the relaxation 
of restrictions on monitoring, 
as well as policy-level dialogue 
about protection of civilians from 
systematic violence and abuse. Until 
such concessions can be secured, 
the main way of reaching the most 
vulnerable communities in eastern 
Burma will remain cross-border. 
Cross-border assistance
Agencies based inside the country 
can reach more stable areas, 
including some internally displaced 
communities in government-
controlled relocation sites and 
ethnic ceasefire areas, but the scale 
and scope of this assistance remain 
limited. Cross-border aid not only 
reaches these areas but is also the 
main means of accessing communities 
hiding from SPDC patrols in more 
unstable areas. In 2007, approximately 
US$7 million was channelled into 
cross-border initiatives supporting 
livelihoods, health care, education, 
human rights, environmental 
protection, independent media 
and community rehabilitation.
The largest sector of cross-border 
assistance is support for livelihoods, 
including both food aid for IDP 
camps situated close to the border, 
and cash transfers for communities 
deeper inside Burma. The benefits 
of cash transfers include ease of 
mobility, speed and security, allowing 
beneficiaries rather than the aid 
agencies to prioritise their needs, 
and supporting peace building by 
reinforcing remote markets which 
maintain economic and social links 
across political conflict lines. 
The other two main sectors are health 
and education. Just as humanitarian 
agencies based inside Burma provide 
technical support to relevant SPDC 
ministries, some cross-border 
assistance is implemented through, 
and develops the capacities of, the 
ethnic nationalities’ own formal 
health and education departments. 
This is complemented by non-
formal approaches to health and 
education such as support for 
traditional birth attendants, monastic 
schooling and early childhood 
development programmes.  
Smaller amounts of assistance are 
channelled towards the protection 
of civilians caught in conflict and 
the promotion of civil society. As the 
‘citizen-journalists’ of the independent 
media disseminated uncensored 
news during the Saffron Revolution 
in 2007, so ethnic community-
based organisations have resisted 
the suppression of fundamental 
civil and political rights inside 
Burma by working cross-border 
to document gross human rights 
abuses. Despite the ongoing conflict, 
in some communities it has also been 
possible to supplement emergency 
relief activities with social capital 
development and the rehabilitation 
of natural, physical or social assets.
Given the military regime’s lack of 
political legitimacy, even UN agencies 
in Burma have challenged the 
relevance of neutrality as a guiding 
principle.1 The use of armed escorts 
to secure access for delivery of some 
cross-border assistance is another 
aspect of this debate. The UN Office 
for the Coordination of Humanitarian 
Affairs (OCHA) has recognised 
that exceptional circumstances exist 
where armed escorts are necessary 
for humanitarian convoys.2 The 
context in conflict-affected areas 
of eastern Burma embodies these 
exceptional circumstances and 
justifies the use of armed escorts. 
During the past few years, similar 
circumstances have led NGOs to use 
armed escorts to deliver humanitarian 
aid into northern Iraq, Somalia, 
Chechnya and northern Kenya.
Strategic challenges
Cross-border aid programmes into 
eastern Burma have responded to the 
challenge of ensuring that aid is not 
inadvertently prolonging violence 
and abuse in three main ways. 
Firstly, the larger programmes are 
based on formalised agreements in 
which basic humanitarian principles 
and respective responsibilities 
Responses to eastern Burma’s 
chronic emergency  
The Thailand Burma Border Consortium 
Humanitarian agencies and community-based organisations 
are working in partnership to assist remote communities in 
the most contested areas of eastern Burma.
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are clarified. These agreements 
acknowledge that the relevant 
ethnic opposition party is to secure 
access, while decisions about 
the distribution of aid are the 
independent domain of the local 
humanitarian agency. Agencies also 
need to redouble their efforts in 
promoting awareness among armed 
non-state actors of their obligations 
under international humanitarian 
law. Secondly, risk assessments prior 
to, and conflict impact assessments 
after, the distribution of aid monitor 
whether there have been negative 
repercussions for villagers instigated 
by any of the armed groups. Thirdly, 
independent field surveys have been 
conducted with both beneficiaries of 
programmes and non-beneficiaries 
to get a clearer picture of the impact 
of cross-border aid. These surveys 
identified strong and positive impacts 
in mitigating conflict and promoting 
local capacities and linkages for peace. 
Among the institutional challenges 
is the promotion of information 
sharing and coordination between 
humanitarian agencies based on 
both ‘sides’ of the conflict, that is, 
in-country and cross-border. While 
there is currently minimal overlap 
in existing services, this is more 
due to restrictions on access and 
funding than to active coordination. 
The level of trust and dialogue 
between humanitarian agencies 
across the national borders has 
increased significantly over the past 
few years. However, efforts need 
to be strengthened to overcome 
ongoing constraints such as logistical 
difficulties (including restrictions on 
visas and censorship), political risks 
(by association with ‘government 
informants’ or ‘rebel sympathisers’) 
and budgetary concerns (arising 
from ‘competing’ for funds). 
For donors, a strategic challenge 
remains how to reconcile funding 
needs for nation-wide poverty 
alleviation programmes and for 
emergency responses to the chronic 
protracted conflict in eastern Burma. 
The sheer size of the population 
impoverished by decades of poor 
governance needs to be balanced 
against the humanitarian imperative 
to prioritise resources for the most 
vulnerable groups. Pending a political 
solution, it would be short-sighted 
to confine cross-border agencies 
to emergency relief responses. 
Instead, the potential for any future 
transition from relief to development 
assistance to sustainable livelihoods 
will be best served by developing 
a continuum of response capacities 
on both ‘sides’ of the conflict.
Meanwhile, with the international 
community dependent on ethnic 
community-based organisations 
to reach and assist the most 
vulnerable groups in eastern 
Burma, it is essential that donors 
and UN agencies recognise and 
support these local capacities for 
cross-border aid. It is equally vital 
that diplomatic pressure for the 
expansion of humanitarian space in 
conflict-affected areas is intensified. 
This article was written by the 
Displacement Research Team 
(tbbcbkk@tbbc.org) of the Thailand 
Burma Border Consortium (www.
tbbc.org). The TBBC comprises 
11 international NGOs providing 
food, shelter and non food items 
to refugees and displaced people 
from Burma. TBBC also engages 
in research on the root causes of 
displacement and refugee outflows.
1. UN Country Team, 22 April 2005, ‘Strategic framework 
for UN Agencies in Myanmar, Yangon’. www.unicef.
org/about/execboard/files/Myanmar_UNDAF.pdf
2. UN OCHA, 14 September 2001, ‘Use of Military or 
Armed Escorts for Humanitarian Convoys: Discussion 
Paper and Non-Binding Guidelines’ www.who.int/
hac/network/interagency/GuidelinesonArmedEscorts_
Sept2001.pdf 
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There is an urgent need for improved 
reproductive health services in 
Burma. At 360 per 100,000 live births2 
the estimated maternal mortality 
ratio is lower than for a number of 
other countries in the region but 
there is widespread belief that this 
number is not a true representation 
of the maternal deaths in the 
country. Contraceptive use is also 
low, with large regional variations; 
women in those areas most affected 
by conflict are less likely to use a 
modern contraceptive than those 
living in the central plains region. 
In Arakan (Rakhine) State, where 
many people are displaced from 
their homes or are returnees from 
refugee camps in Bangladesh, the 
contraceptive prevalence rate among 
married women is particularly low.
The government of Burma has stated 
that it is committed to achieving 
the Millennium Development 
Goals (MDGs) by the target date of 
2015 and that reducing maternal 
mortality by 75% (MDG 5) is a 
priority for action in 2008. However, 
reproductive health (RH) services in 
Burma are predominately through 
private provision and therefore only 
accessible to those able to pay. There 
are limited services available in rural 
areas and the areas along the borders 
are particularly poorly served. 
Despite the government’s stated 
policy of focusing on MDG 5, one of 
the major barriers to contraceptive 
use is the government’s stance in 
favour of raising the birth rate. In a 
recent speech, the Chairman of the 
State Peace and Development Council 
clearly indicated the desire for a 
much larger population, referring to a 
“projected population of 100 million” 
(almost double the current estimated 
population). It is not surprising, 
therefore, that contraceptives are 
not widely available in government 
health centres and that the private 
sector is reported to be the main 
source of contraception. This is 
particularly relevant to women 
living in conflict-affected States 
and the border areas where private 
practitioners and private clinics 
are less likely to be available and 
where few international agencies 
are able to work. There are also tight 
restrictions on the use of permanent 
methods of family planning.
Without access to family planning 
services women tend to have babies 
too young, too close together, too 
many and too late – the four main 
factors which increase the risk of 
maternal and child death. Lack 
of family planning also leads to 
unplanned pregnancies, which may 
result in unsafe abortion. Despite 
efforts by a number of international 
and national agencies, HIV prevalence 
is among the highest in the region.
SRH services on the border
Reproductive health needs are being 
addressed by a number of agencies 
working on the Thai-Burma border, 
though these are often limited to 
reaching only those refugees living 
in camps. There have been significant 
improvements in the camps since the 
late 1990s. For example, emergency 
obstetric care is now available in 
most sites 24 hours a day, seven 
days a week. However, use of 
contraceptive methods is still low. 
High levels of unsafe abortion are 
reported, with correspondingly high 
levels of morbidity and mortality.  
There is a particular need for sexual 
and reproductive health (SRH) 
education. Many refugees have only 
limited knowledge of basic methods 
of contraception and how to protect 
themselves from sexually transmitted 
infections and HIV. Young women 
are particularly vulnerable, as 
they are at risk of being forced to 
work in one of the many brothels 
located in western Thailand. 
Reproductive health needs of both 
internally displaced populations 
in Burma and refugees in Thailand 
and Bangladesh are far from 
being met. There is a need to:
support development of human 
resource capacity as well as 
provide supplies and equipment
develop or update relevant 
policies and guidelines
encourage the Burmese 
government – despite its pro-
natalist stance – to recognise the 
importance of family planning 
in reducing maternal mortality. 
Policy response
The British government is one 
of the largest donors to Burma. 
Its Department for International 
Development (DFID) works with 
UN agencies, international and 
local NGOs, rather than funding 
the government of Burma directly, 
in order to ensure that funds 
are not diverted to support the 
repressive and illegitimate regime. 
In 2007, the International 
Development Committee3 of the 
British parliament held an inquiry 
into DFID’s assistance to Burmese 
IDPs and refugees along the Thai-
Burma border which published its 
recommendations in October 2007.4 
The report highlights key areas 
where support is needed, including 
in sexual and reproductive health. 
Both the Global Fund to Fight 
AIDS, TB and Malaria and the Fund 
for HIV and AIDS in Myanmar 
(FHAM)5 reflected the need to work 
through national and international 
NGOs but recognised the challenge 
of achieving the national-level 
coverage required to meet the 
n
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With per capita expenditure on health in Burma estimated 
at less than $0.0 per year,1 it is not surprising that 
health status in Burma is lower than elsewhere in the 
region. This is particularly true of reproductive health.  
Reproductive health in Burma:  
a priority for action  
John Bercow
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The Karenni are the second largest 
grouping remaining in camps in 
Thailand and by late 2007 numbered 
around 23,000, about 13% of the 
total Burmese refugee population.1 
Humanitarian conditions in Karenni 
State are by all accounts dire, 
even by Burma’s low standards. 
The Karenni refugee leadership is 
dominated by the Karenni National 
Progressive Party (KNPP), which 
has remained committed to armed 
opposition to the Burmese regime. 
There are also various other 
armed groups vying for control 
of territory, resources and people 
inside Karenni State. High-minded 
ideology is often lost as conflict and 
its civilian consequences become a 
way of life and ultimately contribute 
to patterns of displacement. In 
the four years between 1996 and 
2000, for example, it is estimated 
that more than 15% of Karenni 
State’s population were displaced 
because of military activity.2 
The basic structure of assistance 
provision to Karenni refugees has 
changed relatively little in the past 
12 years, despite increases in the 
refugee camp population, camp 
mergers and the tighter physical 
and legislative confinement of all 
border refugees since 1998. The 
increasing impact of UNHCR’s 
large resettlement programme, 
whilst an understandable approach 
to a prolonged refugee situation, 
has also augmented anxieties 
and tensions within the camp. 
Unsurprisingly, Karenni refugee life 
is increasingly problematic – and, 
as a result, all agencies appear 
variously to be identifying and 
seeking to address a significant 
rise in both mental ill-health and 
social and legal problems.   
‘Materialising’ exile 
Displacement inevitably complicates 
and changes people’s relationships 
with objects and places, as well as 
with each other. In order to live 
as ‘normally’ as possible within a 
new place, Karenni refugees seek 
to make it as familiar in material 
ways, and as like the old, as possible. 
In so doing, they are attempting to 
connect two points in space (the 
refugee camp ‘here’ and the pre-
exile ‘there’) and two time periods 
(the displaced ‘now’ and the pre-
migration ‘then’). The connections 
are continually being renewed 
through ritual practices, clothing, 
food and myriad everyday activities. 
Essentially, this is about creating a 
sense, however flawed, of ‘home’ – 
somewhere people feel is comfortable 
and intrinsically linked to who and 
what they perceive themselves to 
be. While it is unhelpful for relief 
agencies and anthropologists 
alike to idealise the worlds that 
refugees have left behind, refugees 
often do precisely that. It renders 
the experience understandable 
and the present more bearable. 
The cultural experience of 
displacement is reflected in how 
refugees act in the physical world 
of which they are a part. How, for 
example, does life in the camps 
relate to cultural aesthetics about 
the ‘right’ or ‘best’ way to live and 
feel? In what ways do the memories 
and imagination of the home that 
has been left behind influence the 
ways in which refugees seek to 
create a sense of home in the camp? 
What particular material objects and 
aspects of the physical environment 
(if any) are important in these 
processes, and why? What does it 
physically feel like to be a refugee? 
At least three elements in human 
interaction with the physical world 
have become particularly significant 
in Karenni forced displacement. 
Firstly, opportunities to repeat 
physical actions familiar from the 
past, such as building houses and 
other creative processes possible in 
the camp, are important – and not 
only because they ameliorate the 
boredom and anxiety of displacement 
and provide necessary physical 
objects. They may be comforting 
in their familiarity, enable the 
structuring of time, and provide 
distraction and a sense of doing the 
best one can. They also allow the 
continued development and practice 
of valued skills. Furthermore, the 
reassurance provided by utilising 
subconscious cultural knowledge 
to use one’s body in established 
ways, while hardly unique to 
Material objects and the physical actions of making and using 
them are a fundamental part of how forced migrants, far 
from being passive victims of circumstance, seek to make 
the best of – and make a home in – their displacement.
A sense of home in exile   
Sandra Dudley
needs of the most vulnerable 
when operating through NGOs.   
Donor recognition of the need 
to support community-based 
organisations and NGOs inside 
Burma marks something of a shift 
in policy. As with IDPs elsewhere 
in the world, it is those not living 
in camps and not recognised as 
displaced who are most excluded 
from access to services. 
The International Development 
Committee recommends a 
quadrupling of aid for Burma. The 
real challenge for donors, however, 
is to find effective development 
partners able to provide good 
SRH services within the country in 
addition to those NGOs working 
across the Thai-Burmese border.
John Bercow (BERCOWJ@
parliament.uk) is a Member of the 
UK Parliament and is Chairman of 
the All-Party Parliamentary Group 
for Democracy in Burma. He is also 
a member of the UK’s International 
Development Committee. 
1. www.burmacampaign.org.uk/total_report.html#8
2. UNFPA, 2007
3. www.parliament.uk/parliamentary_committees/
international_development.cfm
4. www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200607/
cmselect/cmintdev/1070/107002.htm
5. http://myanmar.unfpa.org/projects.htm
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refugees, does have particular 
importance in forced migration as 
another means of simultaneously 
preserving continuity with the pre-
exile past and adjusting to the loss 
of some of life’s rhythm. Indeed for 
Karenni refugees, being busy, be it 
in making things such as textiles 
or baskets, teaching or cooking, is 
a key component of mechanisms 
for coping with displacement. 
Secondly, material forms such as 
photographs can stand for past 
personal and communal experience 
and create connections with that past. 
Many people possess photograph 
albums, for example, which include 
images not only of friends and 
activities in the camp but also of 
persons and places significant 
in life before displacement. The 
value of such artefacts is evident 
in both their continued existence 
in the refugee camp and in the 
ways in which they are kept and 
frequently engaged with in private 
or with visitors as a springboard for 
remembering and re-telling the past. 
Thirdly, as well as being an important 
vehicle for memory and link to the 
past, photographs and other personal 
objects, as with building houses in a 
familiar style and weaving traditional 
textiles, also enable Karenni refugees 
partially at least to colonise or possess 
a new place within which they 
otherwise feel inadequately at home. 
A better understanding of these 
cultural and material processes would 
contribute to more effective and 
sympathetic assistance for refugees.
Sandra Dudley (shd3@le.ac.uk) 
works in the Department of Museum 
Studies, University of Leicester.
1. Thailand Burma Border Consortium 2007 ‘Burmese 
border refugee sites with population figures: November 
2007’, www.tbbc.org/camps/2007-11-nov-map-tbbc-
unhcr.pdf
2. Human Rights Watch 2007 ‘Burma: army attacks 
displace hundreds of thousands’ http://hrw.org/english/
docs/2007/10/25/burma17168.htm 
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Displaced Karen in the border-
lands are taking advantage of 
new technology not only to 
maintain connections with their 
homeland but also to inform 
the international community 
of human rights violations. 
A key connection between the 
borderlands and homeland 
is their shared subjection to 
atrocities arising from military 
conflict. Displacement has 
provided opportunities and 
space to advocate against human 
rights violations – and this has 
been facilitated in particular by 
the presence of international 
networks and new technology 
in the borderlands. These have 
provided previously unimaginable 
opportunities to access the 
international community, 
including UN mechanisms, 
sympathetic governments and 
funding sources. By accessing 
international networks the 
Karen are able to appeal to a 
wider audience while at the 
same time maintaining a close 
geographical and emotional 
attachment to their people and 
culture. At the same time they 
have learnt a number of skills 
– including the ability to negotiate 
complex global structures and 
to communicate cross-culturally 
– which will serve them in an 
increasingly globalised community.
New technologies such as 
blogs, websites and multimedia 
have allowed Karen activists to 
reach more diverse audiences 
with targeted messages. In 
turn, increased knowledge of 
Karen injustices, whether it 
is a sympathetic audience or 
an audience that can equate it 
with their own experiences, has 
created networks of solidarity.
Rachel Sharples (sharples.
rachel@gmail.com) is a PhD 
student at RMIT, Melbourne. She 
is studying how displacement 
has impacted Karen constructs 
of identity and culture along 
the Thai-Burma border.
Technology in the borderlands     
Rachel Sharples
2BURMA’S DISPlACED PEOPlEFMR 30
There has been a notable progression 
to systematic aid dependency among 
the Myanmar refugees living in nine 
camps along the Thai-Myanmar 
border. Refugee participation shifted 
from self-reliance for shelter and food 
to the current situation in which the 
refugees have become fully dependent 
on the international community for 
their living in Thailand, tempered 
by partial self-management of 
their own health care, education 
services and food distribution. 
The first documented Burmese 
refugees arrived in Thailand in 1976, 
scattering to several small so-called 
‘displaced persons camps’ along 
the Salween river that forms the 
border. Camps held between 300 
and 2,000 refugees, who made their 
living by trading goods. At first, aid 
agencies provided essential drugs, 
vaccines, basic health-care training 
and services, as well as certain 
basic commodities. During the mid-
eighties the refugees continued to be 
able to earn their own income, and 
retained control over their housing 
and most of their food supply. They 
were able to plant their paddy fields 
and vegetables across the border 
in Myanmar and to raise domestic 
livestock in the camps. Assistance was 
minimal, and mainly organised and 
managed by the refugees themselves.
The large increase in the number 
of refugees entering Thailand after 
1988 and again in 1994-95 resulted 
in a more systematic ‘top-down’ 
approach, providing health care, 
shelter and nutrition, with planning 
and implementation mainly through 
NGOs, who were requested by the 
Royal Thai Government to increase 
their services in order to avoid 
outbreaks of disease. These services 
included implementation of a health 
surveillance system, provision 
of essential drugs, immunisation 
against communicable diseases, 
treatment of the most problematic 
diseases such as diarrhoea, malaria 
and tuberculosis, laboratory 
training and services, training of 
refugees in health-care services and 
management, water supply and 
sanitation. NGOs also needed to 
provide food supplies and shelter as 
the refugees were no longer allowed 
to organise their own. The level of 
humanitarian assistance was not 
allowed to exceed the living standards 
of the Thai host communities, in 
order to avoid inequalities. 
There was a consolidation of the 
camps in the late 1990s, resulting 
in larger camp settlements with 
up to 45,000 refugees in the largest 
camp. The number of camps was 
reduced from 29 in 1994 to nine 
camps by 2007. Additional stringent 
movement restrictions set by 
the host government resulted in 
increased confinement in the camps 
with limited work and educational 
opportunities, which has led to 
almost complete dependence on 
aid over the last five years. 
Income was and is still only possible 
for the refugees working with one 
of the 19 aid agencies providing 
humanitarian assistance, or from 
daily labour work in the camp. 
Although many refugees have been 
trained with support from the Royal 
Thai Government, donors, local 
and international and NGOs in 
aspects of health-care management, 
education, food distribution and 
camp management, very few refugees 
are now able to earn an income 
working outside this structure. 
Over the years some small refugee 
community-based groups have been 
established and supported, including 
the Karen’s Women Organisation 
and the Karen Women’s Education 
Group, which are mainly engaged in 
women’s and adolescents’ health and 
education, and which operate more or 
less independently of the international 
NGOs. They depend on donor 
commitment and availability of funds 
as well as on the international NGOs’ 
philosophy regarding participation 
of those affected by conflict. 
This refugee population has 
therefore moved from relative 
independence in the early years 
to an almost total dependency on 
aid. Refugee ‘participation’ has 
been reduced  to providing staff 
for health and education services 
and food distribution – to the  
administration of activities rather 
than the design and planning of 
programmes. If this is to be avoided 
here, and in other protracted 
refugee crises, the international 
community and host governments 
need to pay far greater attention to:
involving refugees early 
on in the planning and 
designing of programmes
providing work opportunities 
to ensure self-sufficiency and 
reduce aid dependency
ensuring that aid supports the 
integration, rather than isolation, 
of refugees, with an emphasis 
on building trust, synergy and 
good relationships between 
refugee and host communities.
Marie Theres Benner (mariet.
benner@malteser-international.
org) is a Senior Health 
Coordinator for Malteser 
International (www.malteser.
de/61.Malteser_International). 
Aree Muangsookjarouen (aree@
searo.who.int) works on Burmese 
migrant and refugee health issues 
with the World Health Organisation 
in Bangkok. Egbert Sondorp 
(egbert.sondorp@lshtm.ac.uk) 
is a Senior Lecturer on Conflict 
and Health, and Joy Townsend 
(joy.townsend@lshtm.ac.uk) is 
Emeritus Professor of Primary 
Health Care, both at the London 
School of Hygiene and Tropical 
Medicine (www.lshtm.ac.uk).
The views expressed in this 
article do not necessarily reflect 
those of the organisations.
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The participation of affected populations in planning or 
implementation of humanitarian aid in conflict or post-
conflict situations has too often been neglected. 
Neglect of refugee participation 
Marie Theres Benner, Aree Muangsookjarouen, Egbert Sondorp and Joy Townsend
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Villagers fled as whole communities, 
negotiated land with local Thai 
authorities and established 
themselves in camps around their 
traditional village leaders. The Thai 
government invited NGOs already 
providing assistance to Cambodian, 
Laotian and Vietnamese refugees 
to respond to this new caseload 
– on condition that assistance was 
minimal and low key, nothing 
which would encourage more 
refugees into the country or which 
would raise the profile of the 
people fleeing from Burma. 
NGOs coordinated through the 
Committee for Coordination of 
Services to Displaced Persons in 
Thailand (CCSDPT)1 to provide 
basic relief assistance and services 
through refugee committees initially 
appointed by the ethnic political 
groups. The refugees used systems 
that they had brought with them. 
They set up camp committees and 
health and education departments. 
They built warehouses, maintained 
monitoring systems and built upon 
their community networks for justice 
and social welfare. Teachers from 
within the communities taught in 
their own languages. Health agencies 
provided training to community 
health workers to treat common 
diseases in the border areas. 
For ten years this model was seen as 
ideal: refugees taking care of their 
day-to-day lives, Thai authorities 
providing local security, and 
international NGOs providing 
minimum assistance. The refugees 
remained close to the border and 
their intent was to return as soon 
as the situation allowed. The ethnic 
nationalities still controlled territory 
adjacent to the border, which acted 
as a buffer zone between refugees 
across the border and advancing 
Burmese army troops. The refugee 
programme was extremely lean, 
cost effective and with minimal 
international staff, in stark contrast 
to the high-profile assistance 
programmes coordinated by the UN 
on the Indochinese border. If change 
had come in Burma, refugees would 
have been able to return relatively 
unaffected by their stay in Thailand.
UNHCR was largely absent 
throughout this period. There was no 
official screening process. Refugees 
crossed the border, entered the 
nearest camp, reported to the refugee 
camp committee and were generally 
added to the camp register. NGOs 
accepted these figures and provided 
support for services accordingly.
The Burmese army gradually gained 
nominal control over the homelands 
of the ethnic nationalities in the 
border areas; no longer was the 
border a safe haven. Between 1995 
and 1998, 12 camps were attacked 
and burnt, resulting in a shift in 
Thai policy. Containment became 
the order of the day and whereas 
camps had been spread far and wide 
along the border, now they were 
consolidated and fenced in. From 
a situation of relative self reliance, 
the refugees were on the road to 
dependency on external assistance.
Village communities turned into 
urban centres as camps expanded 
from a maximum of 6,000 people 
then to an average of 17,000 today. 
Mae La, the largest camp, holds 
45,000. Anyone caught outside the 
camps was considered an illegal 
migrant. With access to asylum 
no longer assured, the need for 
UNHCR became essential.
After the Thai army forcibly pushed 
back a group of new arrivals, 
UNHCR negotiated a Memorandum 
of Understanding and was given 
a mandate for protection and 
monitoring, while coordination of 
services remained under CCSDPT. 
In coordination with the Thai 
authorities, UNHCR organised the 
first registration for 15 years. This 
was a turning point for the refugee 
camp committees who had been 
reporting the population figures on a 
monthly basis. Although some NGOs 
and donors had been sceptical of the 
committees’ reporting standards, 
the registration came within 5% of 
their reported population figures, 
thereby raising the credibility 
of the camp committees. 
The model under review
The policy for 10 years was non-
interference in order to maintain 
traditional culture, minimise the 
effect of displacement and leave 
people ready for return. In reality 
it was leaving people behind as 
the world around them continued 
to move forward. It failed to 
recognise that their situation had 
fundamentally changed and that 
different skills were needed to meet 
the responsibilities placed upon 
them. Instead it ‘preserved’ a culture 
and tradition which clashed with 
the more progressive thinkers in the 
camps who wanted to move ahead.
Community-based organisations 
(CBOs) were given training to enable 
them to effectively implement 
services supported by NGOs but 
the skills required to deal with the 
wider needs of a community were 
largely ignored. Camp committees, 
section leaders, women’s and youth 
organisations were all expected to be 
mediators, negotiators, counsellors, 
managers, administrators and 
accountants, translators and trainers, 
as well as being the interface with 
the NGOs, the donor community 
and the Thai authorities. The 
required skills base was huge. 
Increased demands from the inter- 
national community for accountability, 
transparency and the fulfilment of 
minimum standards for humanitarian 
responses challenged the NGOs 
to review the model. While new 
In 1, 10,000 refugees crossed from Burma into Thailand 
seeking temporary refuge. No one imagined then that 
refugees would still be arriving almost 2 years later.
Community-based  
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arrivals continued to enter the camps, 
the focus was on monitoring and 
standardising systems. The camps’ 
supply management, while in many 
respects perfectly adequate, no 
longer met procedures required by 
donors for tendering, quality control 
and monitoring. Thus began a long 
process of re-design, training and 
implementing new systems to fit with 
the global humanitarian community’s 
expectations. The systems had 
functioned on trust and informal 
agreements. Rejection of these 
systems implied a breakdown in trust 
which then had to be re-established. 
Camp Management Project
In 2004, the Thailand Burma Border 
Consortium (TBBC) agreed with 
the Karen and Karenni Refugee 
Committees to set up a Camp 
Management Project that would 
acknowledge the true cost of 
demands placed upon the camp 
committees. Support was needed 
for a number of areas, such as a core 
budget to cover administrative and 
management costs (for example, 
office supplies, communications and 
transport) and stipends for staff. Not 
only were staff not being sufficiently 
rewarded for their work but the lack 
of funding left them feeling under-
valued. For years the camps were run 
by ‘volunteers’. It was the medical 
agencies who first began paying 
stipends in an attempt to retain 
trained staff. Staffing and stipend 
levels have now been determined 
camp by camp and responsibilities 
formalised. In addition to the formal 
needs of the camp, support was 
also needed for activities such as 
liaison with local Thai authorities 
and host communities, security, and 
cultural and religious occasions.
The Camp Management Project 
supports relationships with local 
communities whose land provides 
them with sanctuary. It helps to 
maintain relationships with local 
authorities and it provides support 
for CBO activities which in turn 
help to strengthen the voices of 
others in the community. Currently, 
women hold 28% of camp committee 
positions and participation of  
women in food distributions has  
been increased to 35%. 
Both formal networks and 
partnerships have evolved, with 
NGO coordination through CCSDPT 
well established from the beginning. 
UNHCR’s late entry 14 years into the 
refugee crisis heightened the need for 
partnerships. With no implementing 
partners initially, their dialogue was 
largely with the local Thai authorities, 
alienating the very people they 
had come to protect. The merits of 
partnership were soon clear and 
UNHCR and the NGOs established 
protection working groups 
from field level to national level, 
including camp-based organisations 
committed to sharing responsibility 
for protection. The focus was on 
practical protection in the field but 
has since widened to address policy 
issues such as birth registration, 
administration of justice and ensuring 
the civilian character of the camps. 
The inter-dependency between 
NGOs, CBOs, UNHCR and the 
Thai authorities is evident through 
a host of coordination meetings 
at camp, provincial and national 
levels, ranging from coordination of 
services through child protection, 
resettlement, donor interests and 
general information updates. 
Long-term confinement without 
gainful employment has given rise 
to increasing social problems from 
rising domestic violence to substance 
abuse to youth gangs, which in turn 
require more skills in handling. The 
camps have been accused of being 
lawless. The refugees’ response was 
“we have our laws but they can 
be very harsh”. The camp justice 
systems are in the process of aligning 
customary law with national and 
international law, in cooperation 
with the Thai Ministry of Justice. 
All of these initiatives require human 
resources in the camps where the 
percentage of skilled and educated 
people is relatively small (only 
2% of the camp population have 
any further education). If there are 
to be genuine community-based 
programmes, then efforts have 
to be made to ensure that NGOs 
provide capacity-building support 
not only for the skills required to 
deliver humanitarian assistance 
but also for the skills to promote 
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Historically, Thai officials overseeing 
the refugee camps on the Thai-Burma 
border have assigned a fairly high 
degree of responsibility for handling 
some crimes or civil disputes to the 
refugee leadership. This excludes 
serious crimes, such as murder, 
rape, drug offences and human 
trafficking (although even in these 
categories in practice many cases 
to date have not been referred or 
reported to Thai police by refugee 
leaders, except where Thai citizens 
are involved). Whilst this approach 
may be seen as laudable in terms of 
empowerment, the dispute resolution 
mechanisms that have emerged in 
the camps are less than perfect. 
Due to the nature of displacement and encampment – 
entailing resource scarcity, geographic isolation, restricted 
mobility and curtailed legal rights – refugee victims of crime 
often have inadequate legal recourse.  
Access to justice  
and the rule of law
Joel Harding, Shane Scanlon, Sean Lees, Carson Beker and Ai Li Lim
greater community representation 
and to address issues arising on a 
daily basis, from family disputes to 
negotiations with local authorities. 
The need for adequate capacity-
building programmes has been 
accelerated by the opening up of 
opportunities for third country 
resettlement. The impact on 
community-run systems is proving 
to be a significant challenge. The very 
people responsible for implementing 
the programmes – the educated, 
the skilled and the community 
leaders with years of experience 
– are the first to go. By the end of 
2008 approximately 70% of NGO 
and CBO staff will have had to 
be replaced. Technical resources 
are also necessary. NGOs all use 
computers, email, trucks and phones. 
More emphasis should be placed on 
ensuring that camp management 
staff can meet the responsibilities 
expected of them. Finally, if refugees 
had more freedom of movement 
and refugee organisations had some 
status then this would open up 
opportunities for them to engage 
in the wider discourse of the 
humanitarian and donor community. 
Community-based camp management 
has focused on keeping refugees in 
control of their own situation and 
as autonomous as possible. It has 
moved from complete ‘hands off’ 
to compliance with international 
standards and procedures. Systems 
continue to evolve. The NGO 
community needs to build on the 
incredible coping skills that refugees 
possess. With appropriate support 
the communities will continue to 
address the daily realities of camp 
life where the possibility of return is 
unlikely in the near future and where 
new arrivals continue to crowd into 
the already overcrowded camps.
Sally Thompson (sally@tbbc.
org) is Deputy Executive Director 
of the Thailand Burma Border 
Consortium (www.tbbc.org).
 1. www.ccsdpt.org/
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Camp justice officials are influential 
in their communities and often have 
significant practical experience in 
dispute resolution through their work 
in camp. Under the overall authority 
of the Ministry of Interior, refugee 
leaders have, generally speaking, 
tried to administer camp affairs 
fairly and, considering the scale of 
the challenge, have done a great deal 
with limited resources. However, 
they themselves agree that they often 
lack the capacity to administrate 
justice effectively in the camps. 
Against this backdrop, in 2005-
06 UNHCR and the International 
Rescue Committee (IRC) developed 
a legal assistance project.1 The 
Royal Thai Government saw 
merit in the proposed project 
and played an important role in 
establishing an advisory board 
to oversee implementation and 
provide support to activities. 
In August 2006, a Working 
Committee, including relevant 
Thai government departments, 
UNHCR and IRC, approved a 
comprehensive assessment of the 
administration of justice in three 
pilot project sites in order to better 
understand a) the security and 
protection-related concerns of camp 
residents and b) access to justice 
and the rule of law as experienced 
by the refugee community and 
leadership. This Access to Justice 
Survey involved 2,299 respondents, 
with in-depth interviews and 
focus group discussions. 
Key protection concerns that emerged 
were: alcohol and drug abuse; fear 
of the Burmese military; inability to 
access food entitlements; physical 
violence in the community in general 
and rape specifically; lack of proper 
documentation; deportation; inability 
to access justice; and incidents 
involving Thai security volunteers 
(Or Sors). These protection and 
security concerns are not particularly 
surprising as they reflect concerns 
common to protracted, closed 
camp situations where movement 
and work are restricted.
Some groups, those usually 
designated as vulnerable, feel less 
confident in the ability of camp 
institutions to resolve disputes fairly. 
Although consensus building and 
support from the community can be 
strengths of the dispute resolution 
methods applied by some camp 
institutions dealing with justice, 
community-driven outcomes can put 
weaker residents at a disadvantage.
Women are significantly more 
threatened by violence in the 
camp, and in particular by gender-
based violence. Marital status has 
a strong impact on the security of 
refugees in the camp. Divorced, 
separated and unmarried refugees 
feel more vulnerable to certain 
risks, particularly exploitation for 
goods and services and physical 
abuse. Widowed respondents also 
reported more difficulties in the 
camp; they are more concerned, for 
example, about access to food rations 
than their married counterparts.
Access to justice
Contrary to popular belief, the 
majority of respondents want a 
criminal justice system capable of a 
vigorous response to, punishment 
of and prevention of actual crime, 
rather than a focus on compromise, 
financial compensation or mediation. 
There are manifold barriers to 
achieving this, however. 
Many people do not know whether 
and when Thai law applies to them, 
or do not clearly understand the 
rules applied by camp justice or 
have confidence in them. This lack 
of knowledge acts as a barrier to 
accessing justice for three main 
reasons. Firstly, it makes it difficult 
for refugees to regulate their 
behaviour according to the law 
and to know what kind of judicial 
response to expect. Secondly, 
refugees have little idea of the legal 
procedures they should follow 
inside or outside the camp, resulting 
in the choice of inappropriate fora 
for pursuing justice. Finally, their 
lack of knowledge of basic legal 
rights also means that refugees 
are more vulnerable to abuse or 
exploitation in the system and are 
less likely to receive a fair trial, 
whether as victim or defendant.
A major barrier in the camp justice 
system is the institutions’ lack of 
capacity to deliver appropriate 
judicial processes and outcomes 
to complainants and defendants, 
particularly in relation to more 
serious crimes. Camp justice 
officials are easily pressured by 
influential refugees. They lack 
training and their task is made 
more difficult by confusing and 
inappropriate laws. Camp justice 
officials are unanimous that there 
is an urgent need for legal reform.
The constraints of encampment 
often do not allow justice officials 
to deliver the outcomes expected 
by the community. Camp detention 
facilities are more like holding cells, 
inappropriate for long-term detention. 
Heavy fines or compensation orders 
are not realistic in the camp context 
as few have the capacity to pay. 
Some refugees complain that 
camp justice institutions do not 
satisfactorily protect vulnerable 
groups such as women, the poor and 
ethnic minorities. In most instances, 
survivors of crimes have no choice 
but to continue sharing the same 
neighbourhood as the perpetrators, 
months and years after the criminal 
incident. In many cases, perpetrators 
are not prosecuted for the crimes they 
commit or may be released without 
significant punishment. In some 
cases, due to a lack of capacity on 
the part of camp leaders to handle 
violent criminals, and a preference 
for dealing with them within the 
refugee community, cases have been 
referred to representatives of ethnic 
opposition groups in camps. These 
groups sometimes also act as an ad 
hoc appeal forum for camp residents 
who are dissatisfied with the 
decisions made by leaders in camp. 
The camp institutions struggle to 
deliver justice to their constituents 
while judicial institutions provided 
by the host government remain, in 
practice, difficult to access. Refugee 
respondents to the survey report that 
they are deterred from accessing the 
Thai legal system for various reasons, 
such as language, lack of transport, 
fear of reprisal, concern about the 
police reaction and ignorance of the 
system. They may also fear shame or 
community rejection if they report 
a crime outside the camp. Moreover 
some camp officials may be reluctant 
to allow cases to go outside the 
camp. Some Thai officials may be 
reluctant to assert jurisdiction due to 
resource or workload implications. 
The roles and responsibilities of the 
various camp authorities dealing 
with these issues are ill-defined and 
in some respects overlapping. Camp 
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residents are also unclear about the 
demarcation between the jurisdiction 
of the camp and Thai judicial 
systems. Following discussion of 
this issue in various meetings and 
conferences, the Thai authorities have 
indicated that the national justice 
system would focus on prosecuting 
serious crimes, with the camp 
justice systems continuing to deal 
with civil disputes and minor crime 
(although exact distinctions between 
these have still to be clarified).
There is a gap, however, between 
desired outcomes and what is 
feasible. Camp residents over-
whelmingly prefer camp justice 
structures to resolve disputes, even 
for serious crimes such as murder. 
But for murder, most respondents 
felt that the appropriate penalty 
was 10 years or more in prison – or 
the death penalty. Neither of these 
punishments can be delivered by 
the camp fora – but they are within 
the legal power of Thai authorities 
and the de facto power of the ethnic 
military groups across the border.
Camp governance structures are 
ill-equipped to deal with children 
in conflict with the law – although 
children feel more susceptible to 
violence and a substantial majority 
of all rape and attempted rape 
victims are minors. GBV survivors 
generally are often denied justice 
or dissuaded from accessing 
justice because of camp officials’ 
lack of sensitivity and/or capacity, 
and the community emphasis on 
reconciliation and compromise that 
puts pressure on women to accept 
inadequate judicial outcomes. 
Ethnic minorities in the camps can 
also have different experiences of 
the overall accessibility, efficacy and 
fairness of camp justice and security 
institutions, and some have voiced 
less confidence in camp structures 
that are commonly dominated by 
members of majority ethnic groups. 
Conclusion
The survey results should not be 
interpreted as a failure of refugee 
leaders in their efforts to administer 
justice in camps. Indeed, there are 
many examples where mediation 
has been conducted adeptly using 
an impressive range of techniques 
to help parties reach mutual 
understanding. However, without 
clear guidelines or standards, this 
varies greatly from case to case and 
between different mediators and 
justice officials. Bearing in mind 
that refugee leaders have previously 
had very few external resources, 
either technical or material, to 
support them in the administration 
of justice inside the camp, and 
given the size of the communities, 
they have done their utmost to 
cope in an extremely complex and 
sensitive protection environment. 
Since the assessment, IRC has been 
able to implement activities focused 
on addressing gaps identified in 
the survey, such as: direct service 
provision of legal advice assistance; 
mediation and arbitration training for 
leadership; training and awareness 
on Thai law; civic education for 
youth; material and technical support 
to justice and security officials; legal 
and rights training for Thai security 
volunteers; and the development 
of community service orders with 
justice committees in camp. Thus 
far, stakeholders are highly engaged 
in the project and have received it 
with enthusiasm and support.
Joel Harding (joel.harding@theirc.
org) is Legal Assistance Project 
Coordinator.  Shane Scanlon 
(shane.scanlon@theirc.org) is 
Legal Assistance Manager for the 
International Rescue Committee, 
Thailand (www.theirc.org/where/
the_irc_in_thailand.html). Sean 
Lees, Carson Beker and Ai Li Lim 
were all project fellows during the 
assessment and survey phase. 
1. Previously funded by the Italian government and 
UNHCR, now co-funded by UNHCR and Austcare/
DIAC, the Australian Department of Immigration and 
Citizenship.
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Invisible in Thailand: documenting 
the need for protection      
Margaret Green, Karen Jacobsen and Sandee Pyne
IRC is concerned that there are 
significant numbers of Burmese living 
in Thailand who qualify for and 
deserve international protection and 
assistance but who do not have access 
to proper registration processes. 
Without a transparent, humane and 
lawful asylum policy for Burmese 
people entering Thailand, it is 
impossible to estimate the percentage 
of bona fide refugees within the 
group of migrants who have left 
Burma for other reasons. The lack 
of systematic data to document 
the reasons people flee Burma 
provides the Thai authorities with 
the excuse to treat those Burmese 
living outside the refugee camps as 
mere economic migrants, subject 
to deportation. It also weakens the 
leverage that agencies working 
with the Burmese living in Thailand 
have to advocate on their behalf. 
Since 1988, over one million Burmese 
citizens have left the country without 
permission, although it is a crime 
to do so. Even though they have 
fled one of the most repressive 
countries on earth, the overwhelming 
majority of Burmese in Thailand 
have either no legal status or only 
temporary migrant worker status. 
They live on the peripheries of Thai 
society, often working in unsafe 
conditions, underpaid and at risk 
of trafficking and exploitation. 
They are subject to Thailand’s 1979 
Immigration Act, which considers 
all undocumented aliens (including 
those in need of asylum) to be ‘illegal 
immigrants’ subject to deportation. 
Thailand’s aggressive deportation 
policies contravene not just the 1951 
Convention but also the principle 
of non-refoulement, which applies to 
all countries and forbids them from 
returning an asylum seeker to a 
country or territory where s/he has 
a well-founded fear of persecution. 
The US, Canada, Australia, 
Sweden, Norway and others have 
determined that many Burmese do 
have credible, well-founded fears 
of persecution according to the 
international refugee definition and 
have offered them asylum, or an 
opportunity to re-settle. The Thai 
government, however, steadfastly 
refuses to acknowledge international 
legal standards governing the 
identification and treatment of 
refugees, instead viewing the 
application of external standards 
or norms as an encroachment on 
Thai sovereignty and contradictory 
to national interests. 
Thailand has not ratified the 1951 
Convention, nor has it created 
domestic legislation that would 
provide the framework for the 
determination of refugee status and 
the corresponding body of rights 
that accrue to bona fide refugees. 
Although the government permitted 
the establishment of rudimentary 
camps along its border for Burmese 
“fleeing fighting”, fewer than one-
tenth of Burmese in Thailand have 
been able to access the camps. The 
camps exclude certain minority 
groups altogether, and lack a fair 
and fully functioning admissions 
board to screen and admit newly 
arriving Burmese who qualify. 
UNHCR is no longer permitted 
to conduct individual status 
determination interviews in Bangkok 
as it once did on a limited basis.
In an effort to underpin its advocacy 
efforts with accurate data, IRC 
collaborated with Karen Jacobsen 
of Tufts University to conduct a 
survey of Burmese people living 
outside the camps in three sites in 
the Thai-Burma border area: Chiang 
Mai, Mae Hong Son and Mae Sot. 
The surveys reveal significant 
differences in the demographic and 
socio-economic make-up of the three 
sites. Respondents were selected 
through a randomised sampling 
technique and interviewed about 
a) their experience in Burma – why 
they left home, whether they had 
experienced violence related to the 
conflict, and whether they had been 
internally displaced in Burma before 
coming to Thailand – and b) their 
experience in Thailand, including 
return movements to Burma, 
humanitarian assistance received 
and treatment by Thai authorities. 
We divided reasons for leaving 
Burma into four categories: 
conflict-related reasons: where 
respondents mentioned any 
direct or indirect experience 
of violence, torture, forced 
labour or armed conflict. 
economic reasons: where 
respondents only mentioned 
economic factors, such as 
seeking employment. 
education or family reasons: 
where respondents said they 
left Burma to follow a relative 
or in search of educational 
opportunities for their children. 
other reasons (ie not 
included in above). 
Experiences in Burma
Most respondents provided 
multiple reasons for flight. When 
people mentioned conflict-related 
reasons, we inferred fear on the 
part of respondent, which is an 
essential component of satisfying 
the refugee definition. During the 
survey testing phase it became clear 
that respondents would not answer 
questions about their political 
views or specific activities in Burma 
because they worried that their 
families would get into trouble if the 
SPDC found out. While additional 
data on this topic would have 
enriched the findings, we deemed 
n
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n
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The International Rescue Committee (IRC) has conducted a 
survey to document the experiences of Burmese people living 
in border areas of Thailand and assess the degree to which 
they merit international protection as refugees.
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it unethical to probe too deeply 
in this area. Given this reluctance, 
it is likely that our results are 
skewed and that more respondents 
experienced violence and conflict 
than were willing to say so. 
Our findings suggest that a great 
number of Burmese people currently 
living in Thailand without legal 
protection merit further investigation 
as to their refugee status; and that 
only a small number of Burmese 
who warrant refugee status and 
attendant services actually receive 
any aid or protection either from 
the Thai government or from 
international aid agencies.
The findings indicate that significant 
numbers of people from ethnicities 
and faiths that have long endured 
persecution are 
present in Thailand. 
For example, 64% 
of respondents in 
Chiang Mai reported 
Christianity as their 
faith. It is clear that 
many unprotected 
Burmese once lived 
in areas significantly 
affected by conflict. 
In all three sites, most 
respondents gave 
multiple reasons for 
leaving Burma but 
in both Mae Hong 
Son and Chiang 
Mai more than 50% 
of respondents 
mentioned flight 
from violent abuse, 
forced labour or the 
destruction or forced 
appropriation of 
their livelihoods or 
property as a reason 
for their flight. 
Reasons for coming 
to Thailand were 
significantly related 
to ethnicity. In 
Mae Sot, Burmans 
were more likely 
to cross the border 
to Thailand for 
economic reasons 
only, with only 
15% citing reasons 
related to the 
conflict in Burma. 
Other ethnic groups 
cited conflict more 
frequently. In each site, significant if 
varying numbers of people reported 
experiencing violence, either 
towards themselves or witnessed 
perpetrated on others – another 
strong indication that they deserve 
refugee protection. Of those targeted 
by violence, 22% in Mae Sot and 
62% in Mae Hong Son attributed 
it to their political activities.
Experiences in Thailand
Respondents in all sites had most of 
their immediate family members with 
them in Thailand. Very few had lived 
in a refugee camp and around 80% in 
each site had received no assistance 
at all. The frequency of return trips to 
Burma could be another telling factor 
of migrants’ fear of their homelands; 
most respondents in Mae Hong Son 
and Chiang Mai and 52% in Mae 
Sot had never made a return trip. In 
Chiang Mai, 38% of respondents said 
it would not be possible to return to 
Burma even if they wished to do so.
In an effort to gauge interest in 
durable solution options, participants 
in Mae Hong Son and Chiang Mai 
were asked about resettlement 
elsewhere. In Mae Hong Son, only 
10% said they would prefer to 
resettle in a third country. In Chiang 
Mai, when asked where they would 
like to be living in three years’ 
time, 44% said they would like to 
be in a third country, 27% would 
like to stay in Thailand and 26% 
would like to return to Burma.
Recommendations
Clearly, each Burmese citizen’s 
story is different but many stories 
share similar threads of violence, 
displacement due to conflict, and 
fear of return. These potential 
refugees lack adequate access 
to assistance or protection in 
accordance with international refugee 
standards. Therefore, the IRC has 
the following recommendations: 
The international community 
must increase support for 
essential services to bona fide 
(albeit currently unrecognised) 
refugees. Thailand should not 
have to shoulder the responsibility 
of hosting the Burmese refugee 
population on its own. 
Thailand must take steps to ensure 
that (unrecognised) refugees 
can access essential services 
without fear of harassment, 
arrest or deportation.
Thailand must cease its 
deportation practices unless or 
until the individuals at risk are 
first given an opportunity to 
state their claim for asylum, in 
a fair and informed process.
Thailand must create a fair 
and accessible refugee status 
determination procedure, either 
for individual or large group 
prima facie determinations. 
Thailand must confer legal status 
on recognised refugees and 
provide proof of that status.
 Thailand should, within a 
prescribed time frame, regularise 
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Burmese asylum seekers in 
Thailand: still nowhere to turn      
Chen Chen Lee and Isla Glaister
If there is one positive result from 
the Burmese junta’s brutal response 
to the peaceful demonstrations in 
Yangon in September 2007, it is 
the re-opening of registration by 
UNHCR for new asylum seekers 
from Burma. This comes after a 
hiatus of two years beginning in 
November 2005 when UNHCR, at 
the request of the Thai authorities, 
stopped registering anyone from 
Burma who sought asylum and 
international protection in Thailand.
Up until January 2004, UNHCR had 
been able to conduct full Refugee 
Status Determination (RSD) for 
Burmese asylum seekers. Due to the 
Thai authorities’ wish to retain greater 
control over the asylum screening 
process, asylum seekers arriving from 
Burma after January 2004 could only 
register with UNHCR and obtain a 
slip (hence now commonly referred 
to as ‘slipholders’). Those arriving 
since November 2005 have had no 
opportunity to register or receive  
any form of documentation or  
protection. 
Previously, there were three groups 
of slipholders, based in Bangkok, Mae 
Sot and Kanchanaburi provinces, 
comprising a total of 10,887 people.1 
In September 2006, more than 2,000 
slipholders were transferred to camps 
in Tak province and underwent 
the Thai asylum process known as 
the Provincial Admissions Board 
(PAB). All now have recognition 
as camp refugees.  However, for 
the remaining slipholders, despite 
ongoing discussions between 
UNHCR and the Thai authorities, 
none has been transferred to a camp. 
The majority of asylum seekers 
have remained without protection 
since the beginning of 2004. 
On 15 September 2007, UNHCR 
re-opened registration for all those 
arriving in Thailand after this date 
for reasons related to the protests 
in Yangon. However, as with the 
previous batch of slipholders, the new 
slips offer no legal status in Thailand 
and do not grant any rights; they 
are only proof of their registration 
with UNHCR and merely represent 
a request to the Thai authorities not 
to arrest or deport the bearers.  
In the last few years, international 
organisations, including the Jesuit 
Refugee Service (JRS), have been 
advocating for slipholders and 
non-slipholders alike to undergo 
national screening for refugee 
status and admission into the nine 
official camps along the border. 
Recommendations have been made 
to the Thai government to allow 
registered Burmese asylum seekers to 
stay temporarily in Thailand and for 
assistance to be provided to them by 
UN and other relief agencies. So far, 
advocacy efforts by UNHCR and a 
handful of international organisations 
have met with limited success.  
A 2005 report2 by JRS and the 
International Rescue Committee 
(IRC) on the conditions of Burmese 
slipholders in Thailand found that 
almost all of the 353 individuals 
surveyed had experienced 
persecution in Burma and risked 
serious human rights violations if 
they were to return. As they did 
not possess legal documents, they 
would be regarded by the Thai 
authorities as illegal immigrants 
and were therefore subject to arrest, 
detention and deportation. In order 
to survive, many of them ended up 
working illegally in Thailand, often 
in exploitative conditions. Unlike 
camp-based refugees, refugees and 
asylum seekers living in urban areas 
are not able to receive basic services 
from NGOs. Many of them do not 
have adequate shelter and food, and 
are frequently arrested and have their 
money and property confiscated.3
The provision of slips to the 
September protestors is welcome. 
It gave hope that those with 
genuine asylum claims could now 
register with UNHCR again and 
that eventually the Thai authorities 
would reactivate the PAB system to 
screen all Burmese asylum seekers. 
Although established in 1999, the 
PAB has been largely dysfunctional 
in practice. This is partly due to 
the fear that accepting the current 
Until the Thai authorities and UNHCR can provide an asylum 
process that is systematic and fair, as opposed to one that is 
conditional on particular events and dates, the current asylum 
system will offer nothing more than pot luck.
refugees’ status in Thailand so 
that they may eventually become 
permanent residents or citizens.
Margaret Green-Rauenhorst (margaret.
green@theirc.org) is Senior Technical 
Advisor-Protection/Rule of Law in 
the International Rescue Committee’s 
Governance & Rights Unit (www.
theirc.org). Karen Jacobsen (karen.
jacobsen@tufts.edu) is Director of 
the Refugees and Forced Migration 
Program at Feinstein International 
Center, Tufts University (http://fic.
tufts.edu). Sandee Pyne (sandee.pyne@
thailand.theirc.org) is Advocacy 
Coordinator for International Rescue 
Committee, Thailand. 
The full results of the survey are online 
at http://fic.tufts.edu/?pid=76. The 
survey data, on which this report was 
based, are available for researchers 
who wish to conduct further analysis. 
To obtain the Excel data base, contact 
Karen Jacobsen at karen.jacobsen@
tufts.edu. 
The IRC would like to thank Research 
Fellows Julia Fisherman and Lindy 
Worsham and our community partners 
without whom this research would not 
have been possible.
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caseload would create a pull factor 
for more arrivals from Burma.  
For those asylum seekers who 
fled Burma in the aftermath of 
the September crackdown, and 
who have been issued temporary 
registration slips by UNHCR, it 
still remains uncertain when or if 
they will be screened by the PAB. 
However, for the thousands of 
slipholders and others who had been 
anticipating a change in policy and 
greater international attention to their 
plight, UNHCR has made it clear that 
they will have to continue to wait.
 There is a danger that unless the Thai 
government allows the new arrivals 
to be screened for refugee status soon, 
a new group of Burmese slipholders 
will be created, adding to a backlog 
of those who are still waiting for 
some form of durable solution. 
The greatest concern is for those who 
have had no access to a process of 
registration and therefore have no 
protection and no hope of asylum. 
Undocumented, unwanted and 
largely invisible, these Burmese 
slipholders and asylum seekers will 
continue to live on the fringes. It 
remains to be seen whether the crack 
opened up by the September protests 
in Burma for Thailand and the 
international community to redress 
their situation will lead to significant 
improvement and a better future. 
Chen Chen Lee (chen@jrs.or.th) 
is Information and Advocacy 
Officer and Isla Glaister (isla@
jrs.or.th) is Mae Sot Programme 
Coordinator for the Jesuit Refugee 
Service Thailand (www.jrs.or.th)
1. Email exchange with UNHCR Bangkok, October 2007
2. Nowhere to Turn, Jesuit Refugee Service and 
International Rescue Committee, 2005. www.
reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/RMOI-
6E83HG?OpenDocument
3. See article by Vera den Otter on ‘Urban asylum seekers 
and refugees in Thailand’, FMR28: www.fmreview.
org/FMRpdfs/FMR28/27.pdf
In 1991 some 250,000 Muslim 
Rohingyas were recognised as 
refugees on a prima facie basis by 
the Government of Bangladesh. The 
vast majority were repatriated by 
the Government of Bangladesh to 
Myanmar in the following years, 
leaving only two of the 20 refugee 
camps in existence. For the last 
16 years, a residual number of 
approximately 27,000 Rohingyas 
have been living in two refugee 
camps in the southernmost tip of 
the country, near Cox’s Bazar.
Bangladesh is neither a signatory 
to the 1951 Convention relating 
to the Status of Refugees nor to 
its 1967 Protocol and has not 
enacted any national legislation 
on asylum and refugee matters. 
Nevertheless the government, 
on its own initiative, recognised 
the Rohingya arrivals in 1991 as 
refugees and has, in partnership 
with UNHCR, been providing 
them with assistance to this day.
It is significant that Bangladesh has 
acceded to several of the existing 
international rights Covenants and 
Conventions1 and has provisions 
within its Constitution that uphold 
the rights and duties within the 
UN Charter and further safeguard 
the legal protection of non-citizens 
within its territory2. As a result, it 
recognises a body of international 
law which provides the framework 
for protecting refugees. 
The difficulty lies in ensuring 
compliance and sustainability in 
the standards of protection when 
there is no law regulating refugee 
status itself. The situation of the 
Rohingya refugees demonstrates 
the challenges in providing 
protection in an ad hoc, arbitrary 
and discretionary system. Although 
16 years have passed, Rohingya 
refugees are still denied freedom of 
movement, the right to work and 
the right to education – and thus are 
denied the chance of self-reliance 
and self-determination. Refugees 
are forced to engage in clandestine 
activity, working illegally and for 
low wages. They have been denied 
the opportunity to develop, to learn 
and to better themselves, restricted 
until recently to informal education 
classes taught by refugee volunteers 
with limited courses and grades. 
UNHCR in Bangladesh has had some 
success lobbying for the improvement 
of standards across all sectors by 
strongly advocating to bridge the 
discrepancy between international 
protection principles and practice 
on the ground. The agency reached 
landmark agreements with the 
previous government in 2006, before 
recent political events and the 
declaration of a state of emergency. 
The present interim government is 
also showing very positive signs of 
engagement with refugee issues. 
What can be observed thus far are 
milestones in negotiations between 
the government and UNHCR 
which are changing the shape of 
the delivery of protection. First, 
in 2006, the government agreed to 
allow UNHCR to construct new 
shelters for refugees in both camps, 
recognising the abysmal conditions 
of the current structures which fall 
below international standards. The 
maintenance of the shelters built 
in 1992 had been restricted by the 
government to the bare minimum 
for fear of promoting any form of 
permanent presence of the refugees. 
The Rohingya refugees from northern Rakhine State 
in Myanmar are living in a precarious situation in their 
country of asylum, Bangladesh, but have seen significant 
improvements in recent times. 
Rohingyas and refugee  
status in Bangladesh 
Pia Prytz Phiri
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Burmese 
refugee 
children play 
in front of 
new houses 
built with 
UNHCR 
funding in 
Nayapara 
refugee camp, 
Bangladesh, 
February 
2008. 
Since that agreement was reached, 
UNHCR has been successful 
in starting to raise funds – and 
construction in the two refugee camps 
has begun. It is hoped that both 
camps will have new accommodation 
facilities by end of 2009.  
A second major recent achievement 
was that, for the first time in the 
history of UNHCR’s operation 
in Bangladesh, resettlement to a 
third country was used to provide 
protection and a durable solution 
for some. Twenty-three refugees 
were resettled to Canada in 2006 
and a further 79 in 2007. 
The agreement to re-settle was 
piloted by UNHCR in part to lobby 
the government to allow more skills 
training and enhanced education 
facilities. As a consequence, the 
government in 2006 agreed to allow 
skills training and an increase in the 
number of courses as well as the 
grades taught in schools. Although 
this progress still does not reach 
the level of international standards, 
it certainly points in the right 
direction. Since the first successful 
resettlement to Canada, resettlement 
for those refugees in urgent need 
of protection has been negotiated 
with other interested countries; 
both New Zealand and the UK have 
confirmed an intake for 2008. 
A further development of great 
significance has been agreement 
with the Government of 
Bangladesh in 2006 to allow other 
UN agencies and NGOs to work 
in the refugee camps, bringing 
expertise in the different sectors. 
Nevertheless, there is still some 
way to go before the refugees are 
able to enjoy the rights they are due 
under international law. UNHCR 
Bangladesh has made its position 
very clear that the status quo is 
simply untenable. The provision 
of external assistance for a period 
of 16 years without progress to, 
and attainment of, self-reliance is 
contrary to the principles of refugee 
protection, human rights and human 
dignity. The need to engage in 
dialogue with the Government of 
Bangladesh and other stakeholders 
to discuss durable solutions for the 
Rohingyas continues. It is too early 
to predict the outcome of discussions 
but what is extremely positive at this 
stage is that both UNHCR and the 
government agree on the importance 
of taking a more holistic longer-
term perspective to resolving the 
plight of the Rohingya refugees. 
Pia Prytz Phiri (BGDDA@unhcr.
org) is UNHCR’s Representative 
in Bangladesh (www.unhcr.
org/country/bgd.html).
The views expressed are those 
of the author and do not 
necessarily represent the views 
of UNHCR or the UN.
1. www.un.int/bangladesh/misison_arc/treaty_
adherence.htm
2. Articles 25, 31 & 32 of  the 1972 Constitution
U
N
H
CR
/K
 M
cK
in
se
y
3 BURMA’S DISPlACED PEOPlE FMR 30
Like many other ethnic nationalities 
in Burma, widespread human rights 
abuses have caused tens of thousands 
of Chin from Burma’s western hills 
to flee Burma in search of survival 
elsewhere. While Thailand plays host 
to a majority of Burma’s refugees, 
the Chin population in Thailand 
remains very small. Most Chin 
instead seek refuge in India and 
Malaysia. There they face challenges 
distinct from those faced by their 
compatriots living in Thailand. 
Chin refugees in India
A majority of Chin forced to flee 
Burma cross into neighbouring 
India and settle in the Mizoram 
hills, which are adjacent to the Chin 
Hills. Although it is impossible 
to accurately determine their true 
number, it is estimated that 60-80,000 
Chin live along the Indo-Burma 
border. A smaller number journey 
onward to New Delhi,  hoping to gain 
UNHCR protection. Both locations 
provide little protection for Chin 
refugees and daily existence is fraught 
with difficulties and hardships.
Since India is not a signatory to 
the 1951 Convention Relating to 
the Status of Refugees or the 1967 
Protocol, there is no procedural 
mechanism for providing official 
protection or benefits to refugees 
living in India. UNHCR, however, 
does have a presence in India and 
continues to register, recognise 
and resettle Chin refugees. Of the 
1,800 Chin living in Delhi, 1,000 
have been granted refugee status 
by UNHCR. Another 300 Chin 
cases have been registered by 
UNHCR and are awaiting refugee 
status determination. In mid 2006, 
UNHCR also began resettling 
the Chin to third countries.
Obtaining refugee status through 
UNHCR, however, has become 
increasingly difficult for the Chin 
community in India. Most Chin live 
in Mizoram, where UNHCR is not 
operational. As a result, Chin living in 
Mizoram seeking UNHCR recognition 
must make an arduous and expensive 
journey to Delhi. 
Once registered, 
they are required 
to remain in Delhi, 
where it is difficult 
to make a living and 
assimilate culturally. 
Further limiting 
the accessibility of 
refugee status for 
the Chin, UNHCR 
recently announced 
the closure of 
general registration 
in September 2007. 
Only ‘priority’ cases 
or those considered 
especially 
vulnerable, such as 
pregnant women, 
the elderly and 
the infirm, are 
now eligible 
for registration. 
‘Non-priority’ 
cases will have 
to wait until the 
general registration 
process re-opens, which is 
unlikely to happen soon.
Life for Chin refugees in Delhi is 
extremely difficult as they must 
compete for limited resources 
with the local poverty-stricken 
population who are struggling 
for their own survival. To address 
the growing needs of the refugee 
population, UNHCR, in coordination 
with implementing partners, had 
developed a network of social service 
programmes in financial support, 
Most Chin refugees have never set foot in a refugee camp; 
they live as urban and undocumented refugees in India  
and Malaysia.
Without refuge: Chin refugees 
in India and Malaysia
Amy Alexander
Chin weavers 
in Mizoram, 
India, where 
they live 
and work.
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education and health. This included, 
firstly, a short-term subsistence 
allowance for newly recognised 
refugees. In 2003, however, UNHCR 
began to phase out this allowance, 
cutting amounts by half after six 
months and eliminating it altogether 
after one year. This shift in policy 
fails to account for the realities of 
refugee life in Delhi, where self-
reliance is not feasible for most 
of the refugee population. 
Secondly, it includes a salary top-
up scheme under which UNHCR 
agreed to supplement the salaries 
of refugee workers to bring them 
up to the official Delhi poverty line. 
However, since August 2007, no new 
applicants have been accepted into 
the programme. Meanwhile, the 
top-up scheme has in effect created 
a secondary labour market, where 
employers have grown accustomed 
to paying lower wages for refugee 
workers. Without continued 
supplementary payments by 
UNHCR, Chin labourers can expect 
to consistently earn less than the 
local population for the same work. 
A third form of assistance is provided 
by the Young Men’s Christian 
Association (YMCA) to cover the 
educational expenses of school-aged 
refugee children. But these subsidies 
are calculated based on the cost of 
attending government schools, where 
it is almost impossible for refugee 
children to meet the admissions 
criteria. Meanwhile, the subsidies 
are insufficient to cover the cost of 
private schools. As a result, many 
are left without an education.
The fourth programme seeks to 
address the health and medical 
problems suffered by refugees due 
to their poor living conditions in 
Delhi. Language barriers and intense 
discrimination inhibit Chin patients 
from receiving prompt or proper 
treatment in local hospitals. The 
Voluntary Health Association of Delhi 
(VHAD) had been responsible for 
providing basic health-care services 
to refugees in Delhi. However, in 
early 2007, VHAD closed its doors 
due to a lack of resources. Medical 
care is now prohibitively expensive 
for Chin refugees living in Delhi.
In addition, tension with the local 
population is an enormous obstacle 
to achieving self-reliance for the 
Chin in Delhi and Mizoram. In Delhi, 
discord between the Chin and the 
local population is accentuated by 
the general lack of resources. As 
they compete with the locals for 
scarce commodities, the Chin live 
in constant fear of eviction, physical 
violence and other abuses. Most 
abuse is perpetrated with impunity, 
either because it is unreported or 
through a lack of law enforcement. 
In Mizoram, despite Mizos and 
Chin sharing common ancestry, 
discrimination is pervasive. In the 
past, the Young Mizo Association 
(YMA), a non-political but extremely 
influential civil organization in 
Mizoram, targeted the Chin, leading 
to several crackdowns against them. 
The most serious incident occurred in 
2003 when the YMA forced thousands 
of Chin back to Burma. Possibly 
indicating an easing of tension 
between the Mizo and Chin, in 
October 2007 the Mizo demonstrated 
alongside the Chin in their calls for 
change in Burma. Nevertheless the 
Chin continue to fear more evictions 
and forced deportations by the Mizo. 
Chin refugees in Malaysia
Due to substantial militarisation 
along the Indian border, many 
Chin fear the dangers associated 
with crossing into India. So, despite 
the distance, Malaysia has become 
a destination for the Chin and 
currently hosts some 23,000. 
Like India, Malaysia is not a signatory 
to the Refugee Convention or its 1967 
Protocol and since the beginning of 
2006 the general registration process 
has been closed. As the exodus of 
Chin to Malaysia continues, more and 
more Chin find themselves waiting 
to be registered. Holding UNHCR 
documents at least provides hope of 
resettlement to a third country even if 
it provides no guarantee of protection 
or access to benefits in Malaysia. 
The majority of Chin refugees live 
in devastating poverty in extremely 
cramped accommodation in the 
capital, Kuala Lumpur. Others live in 
makeshift camps outside the city or 
in the distant Cameron Highlands, 
where they work for low wages on 
farms, with unreliable water supplies 
and inadequate protective gear. 
Harassment and abuse by the 
authorities is a daily reality for the 
Chin in Malaysia. In addition to raids 
on neighbourhoods and workplaces, 
immigration officials approach 
and threaten individuals in public 
areas. Those unable or unwilling 
to pay bribes risk arrest, detention 
or deportation. Refugees who are 
detained in Malaysia are often kept 
in overcrowded, unhygienic cells. 
They are inadequately fed and 
given little access to basic amenities. 
Illness is common. Complaints of 
harassment and physical abuse by 
guards and officials are widespread.
Chin refugees are not allowed to work 
in Malaysia and are relegated to the 
informal work sector. Fewer than 
one third of the Chin community in 
Malaysia are employed while those 
who secure employment are often 
subject to exploitative employers 
and abusive working conditions. 
Basic health services are provided 
through mobile clinics to both 
urban refugees and those living 
in the jungle camps. Médecins 
Sans Frontières (MSF) had been 
operating in Malaysia providing 
translators and reimbursements for 
hospital care until early last year 
when it withdrew its operations. 
Conclusion 
Tens of thousands of Chin have fled 
torture, persecution and the threat 
of death in Burma. They take great 
risks, endure extreme hardships and 
confront dangerous challenges in the 
hope of finding refuge somewhere. 
What they find in India and 
Malaysia, however, is a lack of legal 
recognition, limited access to UNHCR 
protection, and difficulty in obtaining 
work, receiving an education and 
accessing health-care services and 
acceptable living accommodation. 
Like their brothers and sisters 
from Burma living in Thailand, 
the Chin in India and Malaysia 
are living without true refuge. 
Amy Alexander (amyalex_thailand@
yahoo.com) is the Advocacy 
and Campaigns Coordinator 
for the Chin Human Rights 
Organisation based in Chiang 
Mai, Thailand (www.chro.org). 
CHRO is grateful to all those 
in the Chin communities who 
generously shared their time, 
stories and experiences which 
formed the basis for this article.
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Human trafficking – the modern-
day slave trade in women, children 
and men – occurs around the world 
but the limited data available shows 
south-east Asia to be a particular 
hub. Within this region, Myanmar 
is a key country of origin, with 
people being trafficked into both 
Thailand and China. It is not known 
how many people fall victim to 
this crime each year but estimates 
range from 3,000 to 30,000. 
Few perhaps would expect 
much to be done about this 
crime in Myanmar. Not only 
is human trafficking driven 
by poverty and relative 
economic differences, which 
are not easily remedied, but 
fighting human trafficking 
also requires a complex 
response, including respect 
for human rights and the 
rule of law, across many 
government departments and 
non-governmental service 
providers. In its annual 
report on human trafficking, 
the US State Department 
gives Myanmar the lowest grade, 
a Tier 3 placement, stating that the 
government had failed to address 
human trafficking. Yet a small 
group of anti-trafficking workers, 
along with supportive government 
policies, have been able to make a 
significant difference in recent years.
In the Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime, 
trafficking is defined as consisting 
of three distinct elements: firstly, 
the act of trafficking, which can be 
recruitment, transport or harbouring 
of a person; secondly, the means of 
trafficking, which must involve either 
coercion (force or the threat of force) 
or deception; and, thirdly, the purpose 
of trafficking, which is exploitation, 
be it sexual or labour exploitation.1 
We speak of trafficking only when all 
three of these elements are present.2
Using this definition, trafficking is 
not always a clear-cut crime. Often 
people may move willingly, even 
into labour situations that might be 
considered exploitative, as a relative 
improvement over their present 
situation. Alternatively, people 
might be deceived into situations 
with lower pay, longer hours or 
worse conditions than those they 
agreed to; yet as long as they stay in 
these circumstances without being 
forced to, it is not legally trafficking. 
Conversely, people may initially 
migrate voluntarily but later fall into 
a trafficking situation. Implementing 
this legal definition in practice has 
been a central challenge of anti-
trafficking interventions. Nonetheless, 
it is imperative to do so to ensure 
that protection and assistance are 
available to those most in need.
Migration and trafficking
There are many different ways 
in which people are exploited, 
and just as many ways in which 
people are trafficked. Trafficking 
is fundamentally a crime against 
an individual, and, as with other 
crimes of this nature (murder, 
rape, kidnapping), it is difficult to 
generalise about it. Nonetheless, 
based on interviews with trafficking 
victims and perpetrators as well 
as victim service agencies and 
law enforcement personnel, an 
overall picture of trafficking in 
Myanmar emerges, which is mainly 
one of migration gone wrong.
Myanmar, located at the nexus of 
ancient trading routes, has long 
seen migration. Today, economic 
disparities in the region fuel 
cross-border migration by 
many young people in search 
of more promising futures. 
Most of this migration does not 
lead to trafficking. For some, 
however, the migration process 
goes terribly wrong and they 
find themselves at the mercy 
of traffickers. Sometimes these 
are brokers that take people 
to destinations different than 
those agreed; sometimes they 
are employers who coerce 
victims into exploitative work. 
While the sexual exploitation 
of women through forced 
prostitution has garnered 
many of the headlines, there have 
also been reports of trafficking for 
labour exploitation involving both 
women and men in factories, as well 
as of men into the fishing industry.
Alleviating poverty at home may 
remove some of the impetus to 
migrate but much migration is 
driven by the perception of relative 
economic differences, the gap 
between opportunities at home and 
perceived opportunities abroad. The 
goal of responsible anti-trafficking 
interventions should thus not be to 
stop movement but to stop trafficking.
Across Myanmar people are on the move, both inside the 
country and across its borders, either pushed by necessity or 
pulled by the prospect of a brighter future. For many, these 
hopes are at least partially fulfilled. For some, however, this 
migration brings them face-to-face with exploitation, abuse, 
disease and even death. 
Migration and trafficking:  
putting human rights into action
Nikolas Win Myint
This Burmese 
woman, 
who escaped 
after being 
trafficked into 
a garment-
making 
sweatshop, is 
now learning 
traditional 
crafts in the 
government-
run Baan 
Kredtrakarn 
shelter in 
Bangkok, 
Thailand.
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Recent years have seen a number 
of encouraging developments in 
this regard in Myanmar. Significant 
progress has been made both 
in keeping migrants safe and in 
providing support for victims 
of trafficking. Myanmar’s Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Law, enacted 
in September 2005, provides specific 
legal protections for victims of 
trafficking, including immunity 
from prosecution and legal, 
financial and medical assistance 
as needed. The law also aims to 
make it easier for victims to access 
assistance, while reducing fear of 
police and immigration officials.
At the same time, since 2005, a 
number of prevention campaigns 
have been initiated on long-distance 
buses and at highway bus terminals. 
Trained facilitators are educating 
people not only about the risks 
and dangers of trafficking but are 
also providing information about 
basic rights, useful contacts and 
key phrases. Initially begun in bus 
stations around Yangon, this has 
now been expanded to the city of 
Mawlamyine, a transit hub near the 
Thai border. Trafficking videos are 
shown and pamphlets distributed 
to passengers on buses bound for 
the border. In 2006, this initiative 
reached over half a million people.
In parallel with these efforts to make 
migration safer, efforts are also 
underway to increase the protection 
and assistance available to victims 
of trafficking. One promising 
initiative has been an effort to build 
on the Border Liaison Offices (BLOs) 
– border offices established through 
cooperation with the UN Office 
on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) to 
combat drug trafficking – to extend 
their mandate to cover human 
trafficking. In this task, the primary 
focus is not on stopping people 
from crossing the porous borders 
but rather to facilitate cross-border 
cooperation between government 
agencies to help victims of trafficking 
return home safely. Working with 
immigration, police and social 
welfare officials on both sides of 
the border, the BLOs now provide 
services to victims of trafficking 
to help them on their journey.
At the end of that journey, local 
and international NGOs are being 
encouraged and given the necessary 
space to provide assistance to 
trafficking victims, through 
counselling, financial and medical 
support, family tracing and vocational 
and livelihood training. With 
training provided to a wide range 
of community-based organisations, 
local communities are increasingly 
empowered to combat the trafficking 
taking place in their midst. 
Lessons learned
Dedicated workers at all levels 
– community organisers, government 
officials, UN and NGO workers 
– have brought this system to life 
and have made it work. Yet a key 
condition for bringing human 
trafficking out of the shadows was 
to secure acknowledgement by 
the Myanmar government of this 
problem – and the desire to do 
something about it. Both are in some 
measure linked to an innovative 
regional process in which the six 
governments of the Mekong Sub-
region, supported by technical experts 
provided through the UN, pledged 
to work together to combat the 
problem of human trafficking. This 
process, known as the Coordinated 
Mekong Ministerial Initiative against 
Trafficking, or COMMIT Process, 
was formally launched in October 
2004 by Cambodia, China, Lao PDR, 
Myanmar, Thailand and Vietnam.3 
COMMIT served not only as official 
recognition of human trafficking 
as a pressing problem in Myanmar 
but, by bringing the country into a 
regional partnership to address the 
problem, it also provided a platform 
for action. The COMMIT process built 
up a network for government officials 
from across the region to share their 
experiences and thus facilitated 
early adoption of international 
best practices in Myanmar. This 
has provided the necessary space 
for NGOs and UN agencies to 
work on human trafficking in 
Myanmar and has also created 
support inside the government 
for a victim-centred approach, 
including far-reaching provisions 
for the protection of trafficking 
victims. Finally, by including regular 
evaluations of progress at inter-
governmental meetings, the process 
led to competition among the six 
governments which has proven 
useful in maintaining momentum 
in the fight against trafficking.
While these are encouraging 
developments, much remains to 
be done. The challenges ahead for 
the anti-trafficking community in 
Myanmar are, at least, three-fold: 
Ensure that help is 
targeted towards those 
who need it the most.
Reduce the number of people 
trafficked through effective 
prevention interventions: debate 
continues as to whether the 
focus of prevention should be 
at source or destination, along 
transit routes or at border towns 
and other points between.
Coordinate anti-trafficking 
activities to ensure 
complementarity in approaches: 
the Myanmar government has 
drafted a National Plan of Action 
in consultation with UN agencies 
and victim protection agencies.
Much remains to be done in the fight 
against human trafficking, and the 
current response is far from perfect. 
Nonetheless, in an environment 
where humanitarian assistance 
faces a challenging operational and 
political environment, the initiatives 
against human trafficking are a 
welcome ray of light. The fight 
against human trafficking is also a 
fight against HIV, against corruption 
and against organised crime. Even 
more importantly, it is a fight for 
human rights, for personal freedoms 
and for the rule of law. Progress 
may be slow, and it may be small 
– but it should not go unnoticed.  
Nikolas Win Myint worked in 
Myanmar from 2003 to 2007, most 
recently as Country Programme 
Manager for the UN Inter-Agency 
Project on Human Trafficking in 
the Greater Mekong-Subregion 
(UNIAP www.no-trafficking.org). 
This article is written in a personal 
capacity and does not necessarily 
reflect the views of the UN.
1. Complete definition at: www.unodc.org/unodc/en/
treaties/CTOC/index.html See also FMR 25 on ‘People 
trafficking: upholding rights and understanding 
vulnerabilities’ at www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR25/
FMR25full.pdf 
2. The exception to this are children under the age of 18, 
where the means becomes irrelevant as governments 
decided in the Convention that minors cannot consent to 
such actions, nor anyone on their behalf.
3. See article by Susu Thatun of UNIAP ‘Mekong sub-
region committed to ending trafficking’, FMR 25, www.
fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR25/FMR2509.pdf 
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On 25 November 2007, a trawler 
and two ferry boats carrying some 
240 Rohingyas being smuggled 
to Malaysia sank in the Bay of 
Bengal. About 80 survived; the rest 
drowned. A week later, another 
boat sank, allegedly fired at by the 
Burmese Navy. 150 are believed to 
have perished. Many Rohingyas 
are ready to embark on a risky sea 
journey in order to escape oppression, 
discrimination and dire poverty. 
On 3 March 2008, the Sri Lankan 
Navy rescued 71 passengers, most 
of them Rohingya, from a boat that 
had drifted for 22 days in the Indian 
Ocean with a broken engine. Twenty 
had already died from starvation and 
dehydration.1 The Arakan Project2 
estimates that, from October 2006 
to mid March 2008, more than 8,000 
boat people departed mostly from the 
coast of Bangladesh towards Thailand 
and then Malaysia, including about 
5,000 during the sailing season from 
the end of October 2007 to the present.
The Rohingya are a Muslim minority 
group numbering some 725,000 and 
inhabiting North Arakan (Rakhine) 
State, adjacent to Bangladesh. They 
are related to the Chittagonian 
Bengali in terms 
of ethnicity, 
language and 
religion. The 
Rohingya were 
rendered stateless 
by the Burma 
Citizenship Law 
of 1982.3 Gross 
human rights 
abuses and 
discriminatory 
practices against 
them since then 
include severe 
restrictions on 
their movements, 
requirement 
of special 
permission 
to marry, 
confiscation of 
land, forced 
labour and 
arbitrary taxation as well as neglect 
of health and education services. 
Bangladesh was the destination 
of two mass exoduses in 1978 
and 1991-92 of a total of 250,000 
Rohingya refugees, each followed 
by a repatriation exercise often 
conducted under duress. To date, 
26,000 remain in Bangladesh in two 
official refugee camps supervised 
by UNHCR. An estimated 200,000, 
including many repatriated refugees 
who then fled for a second time, 
have settled in precarious conditions 
in villages and semi-urban slums 
outside the camps or in an unofficial 
makeshift site near Teknaf, with 
little or no access to humanitarian 
assistance and protection. 
Migratory movements of Rohingyas 
beyond Bangladesh are nothing 
new. For decades, smugglers and 
traffickers have sent Rohingyas to 
Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and the UAE 
where many obtained a temporary 
permit to stay. At the end of 2005, 
11,000 were also registered for 
temporary protection with UNHCR 
in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia, 
although Saudi Arabia remained the 
preferred destination. Travel agents 
in Bangladesh arranged ‘Bangladeshi 
passports’, Hajj or Umra visas to 
Mecca and air tickets. The trip was 
usually paid for by migrants’ relatives 
who had already settled there.
In previous years, several boats 
had carried Rohingyas to Malaysia 
via Thailand but their number 
swelled considerably from the end 
of October 2006. While the human 
rights situation in North Arakan 
remains a constant push factor, there 
has been no significant deterioration 
which would explain this sharp 
increase in boat people but rather 
the combination of several pull 
factors. Tighter security measures 
implemented by Bangladesh 
following the nation-wide bombing 
campaign by Islamic extremists 
in 2005 made the procurement of 
Bangladeshi passports very difficult. 
This coincided with stricter 
regulations governing the issuing of 
visas plus reinforced immigration 
control at airports in Saudi Arabia. 
As other alternative migration routes 
are now virtually closed to the 
Rohingyas, Malaysia is currently the 
only affordable Muslim destination 
and the sea voyage the only option 
for leaving Bangladesh and Burma 
without travel documents.
Malaysia: primary destination
In August 2006, Malaysia started 
registering Rohingyas for residence/
work permits. Although the 
process was soon suspended due 
to allegations of fraud, rumours of 
registration and job opportunities in 
a booming economic environment 
spread like wildfire among Rohingyas 
in North Arakan and Bangladesh. 
Local smuggling and recruiting 
networks in North Arakan and 
Bangladesh swiftly emerged. Two 
deals are offered to prospective 
candidates: sea passage to the shores 
of southern Thailand for less than 
US$300 or an all-inclusive package up 
to the final destination in Malaysia for 
between $700 and $1,000. Most boat 
passengers are males aged between 
18 and 40 but children as young as 
eight have been found among them.
Thousands of stateless Rohingyas are leaving Burma and 
Bangladesh, dreaming of a better life in Malaysia. 
Asia’s new boat people
Chris Lewa
Boat people 
arrested in 
Thailand 
2008.
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The route, which for most starts in 
North Arakan with a brief transit 
in Bangladesh, passes through 
Thailand and continues overland 
to Malaysia. The sea crossing 
lasts about one week. As most, if 
not all, boats are captured upon 
arrival, the itinerary via Thailand 
is deemed safer. Arrest in Malaysia 
would mean a longer detention 
period and eventual deportation 
across the border to Thailand. 
Complex networks of smugglers and 
brokers, mostly but not exclusively 
Rohingyas, are involved at various 
levels in transporting Rohingya 
from North Arakan to Bangladesh, 
from Bangladesh to Thailand and, 
finally, overland from Thailand to 
Malaysia. The networks operate 
in collusion with law enforcement 
personnel in these four countries.
Until 21 March 2007, boat people 
arrested along the coast of South 
Thailand were briefly detained and 
subsequently deported ‘informally’ 
into a cease-fire zone in Burma 
close to Mae Sot. Brokers would 
release them upon payment of a 
fee of around $700 and carry them 
across Thailand to Malaysia. The 
Thai authorities later attempted 
to deport a few directly into the 
hands of the Burmese immigration 
authorities, probably as a test case, 
but these deportees were pushed 
back to Thailand the following day. 
However, since the onset of the new 
sailing season in November 2007, the 
whereabouts of the boat people after 
initial detention remain unknown 
and a matter of serious concern. It is 
believed that the Thai immigration 
authorities hand them over to brokers 
in south Thailand who allegedly 
detain them near the Malaysian 
border until a fee is paid for them 
to be smuggled across. As on the 
Thai-Burmese border, brokers on the 
Thai-Malaysian border routinely beat 
their detainees to pressure them into 
arranging payment. Those unable 
to pay have reportedly been sold to 
plantation owners or fishing boats 
as bonded labour. Many ultimately 
reach Malaysia and find jobs as illegal 
migrants but many also disappear 
on the way. As the number of boat 
departures continues to rise, more 
and more families are desperately 
seeking news of missing relatives.
Responses in the region
The Burmese regime does not 
appear interested in stemming the 
movements of Rohingya boat people. 
In 2007, some boat people caught 
in Burma were briefly detained 
and released – after payment of 
a bribe – or simply towed back 
towards Thai territorial waters. 
However, more recently, a couple 
of boats landed on the Burmese 
coast and boat people were given 
seven-year jail sentences for having 
re-entered the country illegally.
So far, Bangladesh has only taken 
minor steps to counter the smuggling 
of Rohingya boat people. Since 
October 2007, Bangladesh law 
enforcement agencies have intensified 
raids at departure points and at 
Burmese border crossing points. 
A few people were even pushed 
back across the Naf River to Burma. 
Usually only passengers are caught 
– not the smugglers themselves, who 
The Rohingyas have a history 
which dates back to the 
beginning of the 7th century 
when Arab Muslim traders 
settled in Arakan (Rakhine).
They were recognised as an 
indigenous ethnic group by 
the U Nu government during 
the parliamentary era in the 
1950s but lost their political and 
constitutional identity when 
the military government of 
General Ne Win promulgated 
the Citizenship Act of Burma 
in 1983. This effectively denied 
the Rohingyas recognition of 
their status as an ethnic minority 
group. Harsh discrimination 
against them soon followed. 
The military junta maintains 
a clearly articulated stance on 
the Rohingya people. In a press 
release issued by the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs of Myanmar on 26 
February 1992, the government 
declared: “In actual fact, although 
there are [135] national races living 
in Myanmar today, the so-called 
Rohingya people is not one of them. 
Historically, there has never been 
a ‘Rohingya’ race in Myanmar.”
In response to criticisms from 
the UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child in April 2004, the 
junta stated that it had granted 
full and equal treatment to the 
Rohingyas, as with other races, in 
matters relating to birth and death 
registration, education, health 
and social affairs. Moreover, the 
junta also mentioned that the 
Rohingyas are listed as a Bengali 
racial group and recognised as 
permanent residents of Myanmar. 
However, in practice, the rights 
of the Rohingya population 
remain greatly restricted. The 
presence of UNHCR and some 
other international NGOs in 
northern Rakhine State can help 
ameliorate the current plight 
of the Rohingyas but without 
political will from within the 
Myanmar military government, 
their plight cannot be resolved. 
Nyi Nyi Kyaw (nnkster@gmail.
com) is an MSc candidate 
(International Political Economy) 
at the S Rajaratnam School of 
International Studies (RSIS), 
Nanyang Technological University, 
Singapore. A Muslim native of 
Myanmar, Nyi Nyi Khaw lived all 
his life in Myanmar before moving 
to Singapore to do his MSC. A 
longer version of this article first 
appeared online in February 2008 
at: www.rsis.edu.sg/publications/
Perspective/RSIS0122008.pdf   
Myanmar’s forgotten people  
Nyi Nyi Kyaw
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pay kickbacks to the authorities to 
operate freely. Brokers who have 
been arrested are soon released.
Thailand, as a transit country, faces 
a particular challenge. The Thai 
authorities perceive the Rohingyas 
as a threat to national security. 
‘Informal deportation’ in the form of 
a transfer to brokers who will move 
them to Malaysia appears to be the 
order of the day, an approach that 
is exploitative rather than punitive. 
However, such a response is likely 
to create an additional pull factor.
Malaysia’s promise to issue work/
residence permits to Rohingyas 
appears to have vanished; the 
registration process has been 
indefinitely postponed and is unlikely 
to resume. Crackdowns against illegal 
migrants, which include refugees, 
are commonplace. UNHCR ceased 
the registration of Rohingyas for 
temporary protection at the end 
of 2005 and has yet to restart it. 
These maritime movements present 
a serious challenge in a region 
where protection mechanisms for 
asylum seekers are already weak 
and where there is an ever shrinking 
space for UNHCR to exercise its 
mandate. None of the concerned 
countries has ratified the Refugee 
Convention nor have they enacted 
any domestic legislation for the 
protection of refugees. They identify 
these movements as the smuggling 
of economic migrants and are not 
prepared to view the Rohingya boat 
people as asylum seekers and to allow 
UNHCR’s involvement. There is no 
doubt that Rohingya boat people 
embark on these perilous journeys in 
order to escape systematic oppression, 
discrimination and human rights 
violations, and not only for economic 
reasons. One could thus argue that 
the Rohingya boat people are ‘persons 
of concern’ on a prima facie basis.
These irregular movements by 
boats are generally identified as 
human smuggling rather than 
trafficking because they fail to meet 
all three conditions of the Palermo 
Protocol4 definition of trafficking: a 
movement, a means (deception or 
force) and delivery into a situation 
of exploitation. However, if brokers 
who receive them in Thailand 
or in Malaysia are forcing them 
into forced labour or slavery as 
defined in the Protocol, it would 
be trafficking. Thailand has signed 
but not ratified the two Protocols 
on trafficking and smuggling and 
recently passed a new anti-trafficking 
domestic law. Malaysia is not party 
to any of these international legal 
instruments. Nevertheless, all 
concerned countries have ratified 
the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child and children should be 
protected under the provisions of 
this convention. The fact that the 
Rohingyas are stateless further 
complicates this issue and exposes 
more acutely the inability of the 
international community to address 
their plight and to protect them. 
Because of its international 
mandate to protect refugees and 
stateless people, UNHCR should 
be involved and, in collaboration 
with receiving countries, seek 
appropriate solutions for them. 
Adequate protection strategies should 
take into account the legitimate 
concerns of these governments 
about irregular movements but 
should also guarantee the rights 
of the Rohingya boat people. 
Chris Lewa (chris.lewa@gmail.
com) is coordinator of The Arakan 
Project, a local NGO dedicated 
to research and advocacy on the 
Rohingya minority of Burma.
 
On 28 March 2008 the Thai Prime 
Minister announced that Thailand 
was exploring the option of detaining 
Rohingya boat people on a deserted 
island. “To stop the influx, we have to 
keep them in a tough place. Those 
who are about to follow will have to 
know life here will be difficult in order 
that they won’t sneak in,” he said. 
See www.bangkokpost.com/290308_
News/29Mar2008_news03.php 
1. See www.unhcr.org/news/NEWS/47cd360411.html   
2. The Arakan Project is a research and advocacy 
NGO based in Thailand primarily focusing on the 
plight of the stateless Rohingya in North Arakan 
State of Burma. Papers and reports produced by 
Chris Lewa are available on the Online Burma 
Library www.burmalibrary.org 
3. The 1982 Citizenship Law defines citizens as 
members of ethnic groups that have settled in 
Burma before 1823, the start of British colonial rule 
in Burma. The Rohingya do not feature among the 
135 ‘national races’ listed by the government and are 
therefore rendered stateless.
4. Trafficking and smuggling protocols at www.
unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/index.
html#Fulltext
“Chuwa ma yeh, ga ma ye” is an 
expression in the Karenni language 
that translates roughly as “between 
a rock and a hard place” or, more 
accurately, “difficult to move forward, 
difficult to go back.” The phrase aptly 
characterises the emotions of many 
of the 145,000 refugees on the Thai-
Burmese border who, after decades 
of living in refugee camps with their 
eyes metaphorically turned towards 
Burma, are now being offered the 
possibility of resettlement to a third 
country. In 2007, more than 14,000 
refugees from the camps resettled to 
third countries and as many as 20,000 
are expected to resettle in 2008.
On the one hand, it is difficult 
to move forward; refugees are 
understandably anxious and confused 
about what life in a new country 
will hold if they choose to resettle. 
Most recognise that even the best 
educated among them will experience 
In a context where the durable solutions of repatriation and 
local integration are not available, resettlement has become 
increasingly attractive.
Difficult to remain: the impact 
of mass resettlement 
Susan Banki and Hazel Lang
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A young 
Burmese 
refugee files 
documents of 
identification 
for her 
resettlement 
file, Mae La 
refugee camp, 
Thailand.
grave social, economic and cultural 
challenges, particularly at the outset. 
On the other hand, it is not only 
difficult but virtually impossible 
to go back. Given the abuses and 
intransigence of the Burmese 
military junta, refugees cannot 
return home at the present time. 
One might add a third component 
to the Karenni phrase: difficult 
to remain. Although refugees in 
camps in Thailand have been the 
beneficiaries of assistance from 
more than twenty humanitarian 
organisations, living in legal limbo 
has taken its toll. At present, camp 
residents are restricted in their 
movements and few are permitted 
to leave the camps to pursue 
livelihoods or continue education.
However, as the resettlement 
programme gains momentum, 
it is important to remember that 
not every refugee will resettle. 
Refugees who will never resettle, 
or who will resettle in some years’ 
time, deserve the attention of 
practitioners and policy makers, 
because their protection needs in 
the short and long term are even 
greater than those who resettle. 
For this reason, the Committee for 
Coordination of Services to Displaced 
Persons in Thailand (CCSDPT1), 
the coordinating body for NGOs 
operating on the Thai-Burmese 
border, commissioned a report to 
determine the impact of resettlement 
on the remaining refugee population.2 
The research indicates that, first, 
while resettlement has done much 
to boost the hopes of those who 
are resettling, many of those who 
remain have experienced a loss of 
morale as their friends and colleagues 
depart. Resettlement has sapped 
the energy of those refugees who 
have been working for change 
in Burma, and has done nothing 
to improve conditions for those 
internally displaced in Burma. 
Second, while resettlement is taking 
place en masse, a higher proportion 
of educated, skilled and experienced 
refugees have resettled first, relative 
to the rest of the population. This 
is partly because some resettlement 
countries have tended to select 
refugees for resettlement based not 
on their status as refugees but on 
their ‘integration potential’ – which 
generally translates as the best 
educated and most highly skilled. 
Furthermore, one method of 
prioritising applicants, the ‘first in, 
first out’ approach, meant that those 
who had been in the camps the 
longest were the first to be resettled. 
These individuals strongly correlate 
with the most educated and skilled 
camp residents, and in the early 
stages of resettlement this further 
reinforced the rapid depletion of 
skilled workers from the camps. 
Loss of capacity 
It is true that the US group 
resettlement approach, 
which has a relatively speedy 
resettlement process and 
for which there is neither a 
quota for the total number 
of refugees to be accepted 
nor ‘integration potential’ 
criteria for acceptance, 
should eventually redress 
the disproportional drain 
of skilled leaders from the 
camps. As UNHCR has 
noted, the demand for 
services in the camps will 
decrease as the population 
decreases significantly. But 
in some camps, the damage 
has already been done, and 
is nearly irrevocable. 
As the skilled and educated 
leave, it is increasingly difficult 
to find replacements within 
the existing population, which 
is placing a strain on service 
delivery in the camps. Since 
refugee camps are not an open 
labour market, there is only 
a limited supply of skilled 
workers for essential jobs 
– including vital leadership 
jobs. In some camps, particularly 
those where the resettlement process 
started before the US adopted 
its group resettlement approach, 
virtually every person with higher 
secondary education is already 
employed. Camp leaders and 
experienced administrators have left 
these camps in higher proportions as 
well. This has had its strongest impact 
on two sectors of camp life: the health 
sector and the education sector.
In the health sector, the departure of 
many highly trained refugee health 
staff has severely affected the ability 
of health NGOs to deliver good 
quality health care. Non-refugee 
doctors (generally Thai or expatriates) 
supervise the refugee staff and 
provide training but the day-to-
day activities of the health agencies 
currently rely on refugee staff. 
Training new staff members takes 
not only time – eighteen months for 
medics and between nine months and 
one year for maternal health workers 
– but experience. Newly trained 
recruits, even if they have the time 
to receive the full term of training, 
are poorly positioned to serve as 
leaders in the health sector. One camp 
has already had to close one of its 
primary health centres because of 
staff departures. Another camp has 
reported high increases in the number 
of referrals its staff are making to 
nearby hospitals because of a lack of 
capacity in the camps. As the number 
of medical staff falls, so the risk of 
public health crises in the camps rises.
In the education sector, teachers are 
resettling in relatively higher numbers 
as well. Finding good teachers has 
always been difficult, even prior 
to the start of resettlement, and 
will continue to be so. Of greater 
concern, however, is the loss of 
supervisors, school principals, subject 
coordinators, teacher trainers and 
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other long-serving education staff. 
Many of these individuals have 
been trained in key education tools 
such as curriculum development, 
classroom management and school 
supervision. The loss of personnel 
who can provide educational 
guidance heightens the problem 
of losing long-serving teachers, 
influencing the quality of teaching, 
monitoring and training.
The education sector is also affected 
by resettlement for two other 
reasons. First, as teachers receive 
lower remuneration than other NGO 
workers, losses in other sectors will 
compound the shortages in the 
education sector, as teachers will be 
tempted to move into empty, higher 
paid jobs. Second, the capacity-
building approach adopted by 
education agencies was designed 
with repatriation in mind, specifically 
to empower refugees to conduct 
their own trainings, monitoring 
and reporting. This very approach 
now makes the education system 
more vulnerable to decline.
The camp administrator sector 
has also felt some of the effects of 
resettlement, though not to the 
same extent. Here the impact of 
resettlement on the number of staff 
of Community-Based Organisations 
(CBOs) has been manageable to 
date, given the way their structures 
allow for the relatively smooth 
succession of staff in these roles, 
although gaps in key personnel 
have resulted in heavier workloads 
for remaining committee members. 
Overall, comparatively small 
numbers of their staff have departed 
or applied for resettlement.
As the overall pool of skilled, 
educated and experienced people in 
the camp decreases, NGOs search 
out the best available staff – and 
will inevitably compete for qualified 
camp-based people serving in CBOs. 
People recruited to work full-time 
in NGOs will have less time to 
dedicate to working with CBOs, 
which generally do not pay stipends.
It is not only in Thailand that 
resettlement has negative implications 
– particularly in the short term – for 
the remaining refugee population. 
Refugees from Bhutan living in Nepal 
are poised to resettle en masse, and 
other refugee groups may also turn 
to resettlement as the most feasible 
durable solution. Our research 
indicates that, in the short term, mass 
resettlement increases the needs of 
the remaining population as refugee 
camps require more training input 
to replace departing skilled workers. 
The following recommendations 
were developed specifically for the 
refugee population on the Thai-
Burmese border, and incorporate 
additional recommendations 
from UNHCR.3 Many of these 
suggestions are already being taken 
up. In other mass resettlement 
situations, similar recommendations 
may be appropriate. 
Encourage donors to fund training 
and capacity-building programmes 
and initiatives for inexperienced 
and new staff in the camps.
Implement trainings for 
new replacement workers as 
early as possible and pursue 
‘shadowing’ with a pool of 
available individuals.
As early as possible, undertake a 
survey of skills and employment 
abilities of the refugee camp 
population in order to identify 
refugees who could be included 
in a pool of replacement staff.
Recruit camp workers from among 
new arrivals in the camps and 
from the local (Thai) population. 
Promote, as much as possible, 
an open and predictable 
resettlement process so that 
refugees know how long it will 
take for resettlement to occur, and 
agencies involved in delivering 
assistance in the camps know 
when their staff will be departing. 
Streamline service delivery 
by reassessing the assistance 
needs of the camps, combining 
some facilities and simplifying 
management structures.
Encourage skilled refugees to 
relocate between camps.   
Consider seeking voluntary 
commitments from refugees, in 
cooperation with the resettlement 
country, that they will delay their 
resettlement for a certain period 
of time, or until replacements 
have been fully trained.
n
n
n
n
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Encourage the host country to 
expedite permission for refugees, 
expatriate workers and local staff 
of NGOs and CBOs to work in 
and travel between camps.  
Encourage longer-term contracts 
for expatriate and national staff to 
ensure continuity in the system. 
Advocate for greater integration of 
remaining refugees into national 
health and education systems, 
in addition to formal approval 
of livelihood programmes 
inside and outside the camps.
There have been some positive 
benefits of resettlement, such as a 
decrease in camp overcrowding, more 
remittances, increased opportunities 
for positions for younger refugees 
and streamlining of camp services. 
But for many of those who remain, 
particularly in the short term, the 
depletion of skilled workers in 
the camps has exacerbated the 
difficulties of camp life. Predicting 
how and when the gaps will occur, 
and planning for the future, will 
help to alleviate at least one of the 
consequences of resettlement.
Susan Banki (s.banki@griffith.edu.au) 
and Hazel Lang (hazellang@yahoo.
com.au) are both research fellows 
at Griffith University in Australia 
(www.griffith.edu.au), where they 
are currently engaged in a three-year 
Australian Research Council project 
exploring protracted displacement 
in Asia. The linkage partner for 
the project is Australian NGO 
Austcare (www.austcare.org.au).
This article is based on research 
commissioned by the Committee 
for Coordination of Services to 
Displaced Persons in Thailand 
(CCSDPT). However, the analysis, 
conclusions and recommendations 
are those of the authors only and 
do not necessarily reflect the views 
of the members of CCSDPT.
1. www.ccsdpt.org
2. Report by Susan Banki and Hazel Lang, ‘Planning 
for the Future, The Impact of Resettlement on the 
Remaining Camp Population’, July 2007; online at www.
tbbc.org/resources/2007-07-ccsdpt-resettlement-impact-
study.pdf. The findings summarised in this article 
incorporate comments by UNHCR from their assessment 
of the original report: UNHCR, ‘Assessment of 
Recommendations Relating to the Impact of Resettlement 
on the Remaining Camp Population in Thailand’, 
October 2007. 
3. Ibid, and Herve Isambert, UNHCR, ‘Impact of 
Resettlement on the Health Sector in the Thai/Myanmar 
Border Camps: Towards a Strategic Approach’, 
September 2007.
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In 2005 the Royal Thai 
Government eased 
restrictions and allowed 
resettlement from the 
camps on the Thai-
Burmese border to 
countries in the West. The 
impact of resettlement 
in the camps has been 
of great concern to 
the Karen Women’s 
Organisation (KWO)1 
for several years. They 
want the voices of the 
refugees, in particular 
refugee women, and of 
their community-based 
organisations to be heard 
in discussions on the 
provision of durable 
solutions. Sadly, refugee 
women have to scream 
to be heard whispering. 
As a result of the ongoing 
conflict, persecution 
and human rights 
abuses suffered by the 
Karen people, caused 
by the SPDC and 
ongoing encampment in 
Thailand, resettlement 
was requested by local 
refugee-run Community-
Based Organisations 
(CBOs) on behalf of 
some refugees in the 
camps. Approximately 
4,500 refugees were resettled to 
several third countries in 2006, and 
up to 15,000 by the end of 2007.2 
Since the resettlement programme 
began, the situation in the camps 
along the border has worsened 
significantly; as many key community 
members were speedily resettled, 
camp facilities and services suffered 
from lack of structure and capacity. 
Various reports compiled by 
NGOs detail some aspects of the 
consequences – but mainly present 
the NGOs’ and UNHCR’s views. 
They do not look at resettlement from 
a cultural identity perspective and 
they do not show the full impact of 
resettlement on people living in the 
camps. Despite the fact, for example, 
that rape and sexual violence 
are part of the SPDC’s strategy 
and a big problem in the camps, 
there is little acknowledgement 
of gender issues in the reports.
Refugees’ voices
The KWO and the Karen Refugee 
Council (KRC) are part of the refugee 
entity; we are from the camps and we 
are refugees. The people in the camps 
need us to be a voice and to speak 
out on their behalf. The authorities 
(donors, UNHCR, supporters) need 
to talk to the people in the camp and 
they do that through 
us. However, when we 
look at ourselves we are 
weak because Thailand 
is not a signatory to the 
Refugee Convention 
and has no obligation to 
support refugees or even 
accept them. They do not 
want to jeopardise their 
relationship with the 
de facto government in 
Burma but they do have 
humanitarian obligations. 
As a result, we can 
work and live here but 
we are kept in hiding. 
They will seldom permit 
foreigners into the camps, 
especially the media. We 
are always cautioned 
to be discreet when 
speaking with foreigners. 
We have lived in these 
camps for 20 years. The 
conditions are very 
poor. What has kept 
people going is hope 
– and the belief that 
one day we will return 
to our homeland, to a 
peaceful and democratic 
Burma. We have kept 
these dreams and have 
fought to educate our 
children and maintain 
a community structure 
which would sustain 
them when they return.
The introduction of the resettlement 
programme is a major challenge 
to that dream. While the Karen 
community fully supports the 
rights of its people to seek safety 
and security in a third country, this 
comes at a high cost. It challenges 
the struggle we have been engaged 
in for the past 20 years and the 
meaning of this to so many families. 
This is causing a deep loss of 
hope and grief for a homeland 
that may never be regained. 
With little support and often under threat, members of the 
Karen Women’s Organisation have conducted research, 
provided programmes and support, and challenged the 
wisdom of international NGOs and UNHCR.
Karen voices on resettlement
The Karen Women’s Organisation, with Sarah Fuller and Eileen Pittaway 
A Burmese 
refugee weeps 
as a relative 
leaves Mae 
La camp to 
start a new 
life in a third 
country.
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“Our home is not home anymore; our 
beautiful land is no longer beautiful. 
This is why we called for resettlement 
for our young Karen people.”  
Karen Refugee Activist 
Initially people wanted repatriation. 
This is not possible – but people 
need a place to belong so we were 
the first to call for resettlement, 
especially for the young people who 
need good education. Education in 
the camps stops at level ten, which is 
not enough. We do not worry about 
the old people. Our concern is the 
young people; they are our future 
and they need citizenship and a place 
to belong where they are treated as 
human beings. Some young people 
have been in camp for 20 years. 
Resettlement has become a love/
hate issue for us. On the one hand 
it can provide good opportunities, 
including education. On the other 
hand, however, our camps need 
harmony and organisation and 
skilled people. We don’t want to 
object, because we called for this and 
it will be good for those resettling, 
but it has left the community 
without resources and support 
and fearful for the future. All the 
educated and skilled people are 
being taken. From what we hear, 
their skills will be of little use to the 
country they are going to but they 
are important here. People think 
that if they have been teachers in 
the camps they can be teachers in 
the new country but it does not 
happen like that. And for those left 
in the camps it is having a terrible 
impact on health and education.
We already struggle for our identity 
and our freedom, and we are losing 
this even more through all the 
people who are leaving. Community 
structures are falling apart because 
everyone is waiting for resettlement. 
It is causing a lot of stress and 
conflict within families. Some family 
members wish to resettle while 
others wish to stay. We still need 
to consider those refugees who 
remain here. It is the people who 
can speak out and have capacity 
who are leaving. Those left are 
illiterate, simple, hidden people. 
They will have no voice. Some of 
us need to stay because we need to 
help and work for the people here. 
Journey to the new country
For those who opt to resettle and are 
selected, the process of resettlement 
itself is often traumatic. IOM and 
the NGOs in the camps do not tell 
the community the negative aspects 
of a country or the challenges. 
People choose quickly because they 
are encouraged to put their names 
down. The process happens very 
fast and then they find themselves 
in the third country and many 
want to come home again.
CBOs report that there is insufficient 
time allocated and information 
provided for pre-departure briefing. 
Only three days’ orientation is 
provided – insufficient for covering 
all the information needed to 
facilitate a dignified, positive and 
stress-free transition to a new life. 
Many refugees have lived in these 
camps for much of their lives. They 
have not been to doctors’ surgeries, 
driven cars, lived in Western-style 
houses; they do not speak English 
and know little or nothing about the 
culture or laws of their destination. 
If they had more information, they 
could make better decisions. 
Something else that is needed is 
gender sensitivity from staff and 
translators. Refugee women report 
that they have to sit in public waiting 
rooms and are not given the option to 
have a female translator or a female 
doctor for medical check-ups. 
As conflict continues in Burma, more 
refugees are seeking entry to the 
camps. Fearing that resettlement is 
becoming a ‘pull factor’, the Thai 
government has closed the border 
with Burma, and UNHCR is not 
registering new arrivals. Those 
newly arriving have generally 
spent long periods in hiding in the 
jungle before crossing the border. 
Their health is not good and they 
are suffering from malnutrition. 
But they receive no food rations nor 
health services. There is not enough 
food in the camps for everybody 
and this is causing great hardship.
Recommendations 
The Karen CBOs and Karen 
leaders do not wish to stop people 
resettling to third countries but 
they do want concerns openly 
discussed in order to maximise 
the possibilities for successful 
resettlement. We recommend that: 
third country governments, 
UNHCR, IOM and other 
agencies a) consult with Karen 
leaders to discuss the whole 
process of resettlement before 
implementation and b) plan 
how best to handle the negative 
consequences of resettlement 
all information be made available 
in the Karen language
resettlement country governments 
provide information about 
their country's resettlement 
policies to the Karen CBOs 
general information about third 
countries and their social welfare, 
political and legal systems 
be provided, in a way that is 
accessible for rural refugees from 
extremely isolated situations
the experiences and circumstances 
of families already arrived in 
third countries be reported 
back to the Karen community 
in Thailand – including both 
positive and negative aspects 
the process of resettlement be 
slowed down so that refugees 
have more time to make 
decisions and sufficient time to 
hand over their work to others 
and so that the community has 
time to train replacements 
an in-depth evaluation be 
conducted of the impact of 
resettlement on the community 
remaining and funding be 
allocated to enable CBOs to 
provide intensive training for 
new staff in the community to 
replace those leaving to resettle. 
The Karen Women’s Organisation 
(www.karenwomen.org) is a 
community-based organisation 
of Karen women working in 
development and relief in the 
refugee camps on the Thai border 
and with IDPs and women inside 
Burma. The KWO also encourages 
awareness of women’s rights and 
promotes women’s participation 
in community decision making 
and political processes.
Eileen Pittaway (e.pittaway@unsw.
edu.au) works at the University 
of New South Wales Center for 
Refugee Research, Australia (www.
crr.unsw.edu.au). Sarah Fuller 
(sarahbfuller@yahoo.com.au) was 
an intern and student at the Center.
1. www.karenwomen.org 
2. www.tbbc.org/resources/2007-6-mth-rpt-jan-jun.pdf
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Throughout this time, political 
uncertainties, protracted and constant 
refugee flows, and a changing policy 
environment have affected refugees’ 
access to education, the quality and 
relevance of the education they 
receive and their ability to use the 
skills and knowledge acquired for 
income generation 
and community 
development. 
In this article, we 
look at education 
provision in the seven 
predominantly Karen 
refugee camps. The 
Karen Education 
Department (KED), 
which is linked to 
the Karen National 
Union (KNU1), plays a 
role in policy making 
and implementation 
in these camps. The 
education system is 
funded by a range 
of organisations and 
implemented by 
local NGOs (eg the Karen Women’s 
Organisation and the Karen Youth 
Organisation) and international 
NGOs (eg ZOA Refugee Care and 
International Child Support). 
There are approximately 115,0002 
residents in the seven predominantly 
Karen camps, about 54,000 of whom 
are children and young people. 
There are roughly equal numbers 
of men and women in the camps, 
whose populations range from about 
4,000 to 45,000. The diversity in 
geographical location, population 
density, population groups and 
community organisational abilities 
pose distinctive challenges to 
providing and coordinating relevant 
and good quality education across 
seven widely spread camps. 
The Royal Thai Government 
(RTG) has overall authority over 
the refugee camps and it enforces 
policy and implementation. It 
allows international and local 
NGOs to provide resources, 
services and capacity building to 
support education in the camps. 
Range of educational services
The general education system consists 
of nursery, primary, secondary and 
post-secondary schools. The RTG’s 
policy on education in the camps 
only allows education up to the post-
secondary level as security concerns 
prohibit anyone from leaving the 
camps to pursue their studies.
The school curriculum is approved by 
the KED and textbooks are constantly 
being updated and made relevant 
to the camp environment. Children 
study three languages (Karen, 
Burmese and English), science, maths, 
geography, social science and health. 
Registration figures, however, show 
that about 18% of the children in the 
camps were not attending primary 
or secondary school in the 2007-08 
academic year. The more than 1,500 
teachers are paid meagre wages. They 
also face noisy and overcrowded 
classrooms, few resources and mixed 
ability classes. Many of them strive 
to teach well but are constrained by 
lack of experience and know-how.3
Learning programmes are provided 
for adults and young people who are 
not attending school. These include 
courses in literacy (Skaw and Pwo 
Karen), languages (English and Thai), 
vocational skills 
(such as agriculture, 
sewing and cooking), 
crafts (soap-making 
and knitting) and 
community skills 
(HIV, mine risk, 
domestic violence), 
and limited general 
education in night 
schools. Participants 
gain valuable skills 
and knowledge but 
the opportunities 
for refugees to earn 
a livelihood with 
these skills are sorely 
lacking. The Thai 
government refuses 
to allow them to leave 
the camps and the 
camp economy is too small to support 
such a large number of tailors, 
welders and cooks. However, in 
2007, after concerted lobbying, ZOA 
Refugee Care – in partnership with 
UNHCR – received approval from the 
RTG to begin an unprecedented pilot 
project allowing 80 refugees to set 
up agricultural activities just outside 
Mae La refugee camp and to sell their 
products in a market outside camp. 
The involvement of Thai Ministry of 
Education (MoE) vocational colleges 
as well as the participation of local 
Thai villagers has contributed to the 
RTG accepting this new initiative. 
From emergency to 
protracted refugee context
After years of trial, error and 
practice, educational services 
The provision of education in the refugee camps along the 
Thai-Burmese border has evolved over 20 years, adapting  
its purpose, expanding its reach and improving its quality  
and relevance. 
Educational change in a  
protracted refugee context
Marc van der Stouwe and Su-Ann Oh 
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student in 
Mae Ra Ma 
Luang Camp, 
Mae Hong 
Son Province, 
Thailand. 
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are now provided in a relatively 
effective and efficient manner, 
with high levels of commitment 
and involvement from the camp 
communities. However, NGOs have 
worked according to a traditional 
basic service delivery approach, 
despite the fact that the refugees 
have been living in the camps for 
many years. This situation now 
requires longer-term development 
and educational strategies which 
emphasise enhanced quality 
of education and sustainability 
over basic service delivery. 
The provision of basic services 
such as school construction and 
school supplies, however, cannot 
be neglected, because refugees 
live in camps where there is 
minimal interaction with local Thai 
communities and travel outside the 
camps is forbidden. Consequently, 
they are fully dependent on 
external organisations for even 
the most basic forms of support. 
To complement this basic service 
delivery, more resources have had 
to be made available for longer-
term interventions in educational 
content areas such as teacher 
training, curriculum and materials 
development, and capacity building 
of education management staff. 
The focus on these long-term 
capacity-building initiatives at the 
camp level serves the dual purpose 
of addressing both educational 
quality and sustainability. 
Progress can be made on further 
improving the quality of teaching 
and learning through new and 
innovative interventions that are 
increasingly delivered in partnership 
with specialised institutions and 
individuals, including the MoE. 
Sustainability in a protracted refugee 
context is a complicated issue, as 
the refugee context is not meant to 
be sustainable. In contrast with the 
KED, whose institutional future 
is highly uncertain, those actors 
currently playing a role in education 
management at the camp level are 
likely to be similarly involved in 
community education management 
in the future, whatever that future 
holds: repatriation to Burma, 
resettlement to a third country or 
integration into Thai society. That is 
why educational NGOs have shifted 
their approach from a restricted 
focus on building the capacity of 
KED as an institution to a multi-level 
capacity-building approach with a 
stronger emphasis on strengthening 
capacities at the micro (camp) level.
Resettlement
The resettlement of an increasing 
number of refugees to third countries 
has had a major impact on camp 
communities and the education 
system in particular. Among the 
refugees opting for resettlement is a 
disproportionate number of better 
qualified people, including education 
workers. Although resettlement 
can offer excellent opportunities, 
it does make the implementation 
of educational activities in camps 
particularly complicated. It is 
difficult for NGOs to continue 
programme implementation at 
existing quality levels as many 
educational staff members are 
leaving the camps during training 
or just after having been trained. A 
completely new and inexperienced 
group of education workers has to 
be trained quickly in order to ensure 
the continuation of service delivery, 
with the risk that they too will leave 
in the short- to medium-term. 
Possible initiatives to consider 
in order to address these 
concerns include:
the establishment of ‘crash 
courses’ in teaching skills so that 
new teachers can start classroom 
teaching as quickly as possible
complementing the existing 
cascade training model with a 
more direct NGO presence in 
the camps, such as field-based 
trainers providing intensive 
ongoing support and coaching to 
new and inexperienced teachers
an intensification of 
recently established peer 
training mechanisms.
Apart from trying to adjust existing 
programmes to deal with the impact 
of resettlement, NGOs have also been 
looking to establish new activities 
for refugees planning to resettle in 
order to better equip them for life 
in a Western country. Examples 
of this are the vocational training 
and non-formal education projects 
established by ZOA Refugee Care. 
Discussions are taking place with 
the Thai MoE and other local service 
n
n
n
providers to set up short-term 
courses to prepare refugees for jobs 
– such as in the catering and care 
sectors, where reports from resettled 
refugees indicate that employment 
opportunities are more likely to 
be – and to provide them with 
recognised certification. It has also set 
up an English learning programme 
in all camps to provide refugees with 
basic English skills for resettlement. 
Interest and participation in the newly 
established programme are very high.  
Policy change and advocacy
If the RTG is unwilling to allow 
refugees to engage in economic 
activities or to access services outside 
the camps, the current mechanisms 
of service provision and the lack of 
sustainability of interventions will 
remain. There are some signs of 
changes in its approach, however. 
The RTG is gradually accepting 
that the refugee situation is likely to 
continue for the foreseeable future 
and the MoE, in particular, appears 
open to improving the educational 
opportunities of displaced persons as 
part of its commitment to achieving 
Education for All (EFA) goals.  
NGOs along the border have 
responded by complementing their 
roles of ‘basic service providers’ and 
’capacity builders’ with a third role 
as ‘lobbyists and advocates’. They are 
actively working to influence decision 
making within the RTG so as to 
improve the quality of life of refugees 
in the areas of education, training 
and livelihoods. In such lobbying and 
advocacy activities, a special focus on 
the further opening up of the camps 
is needed, to ensure that refugees 
can leave the camps to benefit from 
educational opportunities and/or to 
allow new educational opportunities 
to ‘move into’ the camps. 
Currently, the KED uses its own 
curriculum, which is predominantly 
based on the Burmese curriculum 
but which has adopted many 
components from curricula from 
other parts of the world. This has 
resulted in a curriculum lacking 
coherence among grades and 
subjects, lacking relevance to the local 
context and often lacking quality. 
Additionally, the curriculum is not 
accredited; when students finish their 
education they receive a certificate 
that has no value outside the camps. 
Based on initial discussions with 
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Since March 2004, the UK has run a 
resettlement programme, known as 
the Gateway Protection Programme, 
for ‘quota refugees’. Refugees are 
selected by UNHCR field officers 
and arrive in the UK with permanent 
legal status. To date, refugees from 
Burma, the Democratic Republic 
of Congo and Liberia have arrived 
through this programme and have 
been accommodated in cities such 
as Sheffield, Hull and Norwich. 
The majority are from the Karen 
ethnic group who have lived in 
refugee camps along the Thailand-
Burma border. The rest are from 
other groupings including Mon, Pa’O 
and Rohingya as well as Burmese 
students in opposition to the military 
regime who fled to the border areas 
following a national uprising in 
1988 and who are recognised as 
Persons of Concern to UNHCR.  
The UK government works with three 
UK organisations – the International 
Organization for Migration,2 the 
Refugee New Arrivals Project and 
the Refugee Council – to facilitate 
this resettlement. Once in the UK, 
the Refugee Council provides 
casework, housing and interpreting 
support to new arrivals for the first 
12 months, in collaboration with 
Sheffield Community Access and 
Interpreting Service (SCAIS) and 
a housing association, Safe Haven 
Yorkshire. At the end of the 12 
months, support is provided by local 
Citizens Advice Bureaux (CAB), the 
Northern Refugee Centre and the 
government’s Sure Start programme. 
There is no doubt that the 
resettlement of Burmese refugees 
allows for lives to be rebuilt and 
dignity to be regained. The camps 
in Thailand are rigidly controlled 
environments with serious gaps in 
services – particularly those services 
relating to protection, education and 
training, and the significant mental 
health needs of refugees suffered 
as a direct result of the prolonged 
nature of the conflict and lives lived 
in refugee camps. Refugees arriving 
in Sheffield have an opportunity to 
emerge from the camps’ environment 
Some 1 refugees from the Thai-Burma border have  
been resettled in Sheffield in the UK between May 2005  
and September 200. Better preparation and more  
practical assistance could have eased their integration  
into British society. 
To Sheffield with love    
Patricia Hynes and Yin Mon Thu
the MoE, there now seems to be a 
willingness to identify options for 
certifying the camp curriculum 
while keeping as much of the current 
local content as possible. This is 
a highly politicised process, with 
sensitivities among both the RTG and 
the refugee communities. However, 
the refugees now have opportunities 
that were previously out of reach. 
Recent discussions have also been 
held with the RTG to consider 
options for refugees to access 
higher education opportunities. 
An initial eight refugee students 
are to be permitted to study in Thai 
universities, paving the way for 
other refugee students in the future. 
Access to distance education in the 
refugee camps is more complicated, 
as more players are involved and 
RTG approval for internet access 
is required (a politically sensitive 
issue). Advancement on this front 
is expected to take more time and 
to require continued lobbying 
by NGOs and other actors. 
Conclusion 
Individuals and organisations 
working along the border are striving 
to provide relevant and good quality 
education within considerable policy 
and practical constraints. Given the 
protracted nature of the situation, 
however, it is now increasingly 
necessary to work beyond the relief 
model and to make strategic decisions 
based on developing the camp 
communities and their education 
system. Moreover, it is imperative 
to work proactively, lobbying and 
advocating for educational rights and 
provision, and linking this directly 
to policy changes in Thailand. 
Marc van der Stouwe (mpvdstouwe@
hotmail.com) led and advised on a 
large-scale education and training 
programme for Burmese refugees 
in Thailand, implemented by ZOA 
Refugee Care (www.zoa.nl) from 
2003 to 2007. Su-Ann Oh (suann.
oh@gmail.com) is a sociologist 
specialising in refugee education 
and has been working as a research 
consultant to NGOs along the 
Thai-Burmese border since 2005. 
1. www.karen.org/knu/knu.htm. 
2. TBBC Burmese border refugee sites with population 
figures: January 2008 www.tbbc.org/camps/populations.
htm.
3. Oh, S-A, Ochalumthan, S, Pla Law La and Htoo, J. 
(2006) ‘Education Survey 2005’, Thailand: ZOA Refugee 
Care. www.burmalibrary.org/show.php?cat=2020.
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of disempowerment but the effects 
of life in the camps impacts on the 
resettlement process and this needs to 
be taken into account when providing 
support arrangements. Although 
some counselling services were 
available for the resettled refugees, 
the waiting times and difficulties 
accessing this care were problematic. 
Extra funding is needed for 
counselling to help people deal with 
the trauma they have experienced.
Better orientation and information 
about rights and entitlements upon 
arrival in the UK could have increased 
their confidence 
– such as knowing 
that they had a right 
to use interpreters or 
could ask for help. 
Some months after 
arriving in Sheffield, 
one female refugee 
who needed repairs 
to the electricity 
supply in her new 
accommodation 
commented:  
“I don’t want to keep 
complaining to them. 
I am afraid to receive 
their anger and I am 
afraid they will ignore 
my requests because 
I keep complaining.”
This lack of 
confidence and 
their fear of authority of any kind 
are a barrier to accessing other 
services necessary for settlement. 
The need for resettlement aid 
agencies to factor in this fear factor 
became clear early on in the process 
and it was widely considered 
that the 12 months of support 
offered initially was inadequate. 
Over time, three main challenges 
were evident during this early 
period of resettlement. These are: 
language issues; problems with 
technology; and difficulties associated 
with living within a different 
culture and new environment. 
Language issues
As with many other asylum and 
new migrant arrivals within the 
UK, language acts as a barrier to 
communication, even though some 
language training is provided 
before arrival. People are made 
aware of emergency telephone 
numbers, for example, but clear 
explanations of when to use them 
and what to do and say once their 
call is answered were missing in 
the training. Communication when 
dealing with benefits agencies was 
also reported as an issue, as were 
dealing with problem or noisy 
neighbours, buying bus tickets and 
following directions or signs. 
The provision of English language 
classes is central. Those arriving 
around the UK’s September 
enrolment date can access classes, 
with childcare available for those in 
receipt of benefits. Refugee Council 
volunteers assisted with language 
homework and extra learning 
support. Children enrolled in certain 
schools were eligible for Ethnic 
Minority Assistance Support (EMAS). 
But these places were not always 
close to their homes so they needed 
to travel by bus, again experiencing 
communication problems.
The language and employment 
issues are inextricably linked. 
One Karen man reported:
“I cannot speak English. It means 
it is difficult to find a job. When 
I told the truth to the benefits 
agency they cut my benefit straight 
away for not looking for a job.”
Needing to prove intention to find 
a job is particularly difficult in these 
cases. If the officer they encounter at 
the Job Centre is particularly stern, 
and interpreters are not available, 
this puts pressure on the individual 
and may lead to misunderstandings 
and the ending of benefits. If a 
refugee finds unskilled employment, 
their inability to understand safety 
regulations may become an issue. 
Those providing refugee employment 
and training in the 
UK should be aware 
that refugees coming 
from Thailand have 
had little opportunity 
of working, as 
restrictions on 
refugees working 
outside camps were 
strictly enforced. 
The scale and 
range of obstacles 
facing refugees 
being resettled in 
an industrialised 
country without 
training for the 
employment 
sector need to be 
borne in mind.   
Many refugees may 
need to re-skill or 
gain accreditation 
for skills already gained – which 
can be both demoralising and 
disempowering. Even when they 
have the required skills, the maze 
to accreditation or further training 
again acts as a barrier. As one 
Karen refugee woman explained:
“I worked for almost 20 years as a 
qualified midwife in the camp but here 
I feel almost like a disabled person.”
Technology
Moving from a refugee camp where 
water is carried from wells every day 
to a country where hot and cold water 
run out of a tap is easily accepted. 
However, the technology involved 
in banking, computing or using the 
internet takes time to learn. Not all 
banks accept Home Office papers 
proving residence in order to open 
a bank account, something essential 
for receiving benefit payments. 
Basic banking transactions such as 
IOM staff 
member 
with a group 
of young 
Burmese 
refugees 
during a 
cultural 
orientation 
session about 
the US.
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“The UNHCR field officer turns up 
and refugees in the camps have 
to make this life-changing decision 
with no knowledge or facts about 
the countries they can go to.”1
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paying in money or using automatic 
machines to withdraw money proved 
difficult to learn. Refugees who had 
been used to using cash in camps did 
not automatically trust the banking 
system, sometimes preferring to keep 
their cash more readily accessible. 
For some new arrivals, it took around 
six months to become fully familiar 
with using kitchen appliances. 
Learning how to open doors on buses 
and trains and use lifts or escalators 
also took time. A system of volunteers 
available during the initial stages 
of resettlement would have helped 
refugees meet these daily challenges. 
Unchanged gender roles for new 
arrivals and the need to cook, wash, 
feed children, clean and shop meant 
that women had fewer chances 
to develop these skills or further 
their education. Projects to address 
this and women’s empowerment 
would be beneficial. For older 
women, building confidence in 
use of technology is essential. 
Most of these considerations have 
been well documented before and 
many of these points should be 
known. Failure to address them 
early on has contributed to the 
social worlds of Burmese refugees 
becoming smaller and smaller. 
Because of problems with transport 
and technology, some individuals 
become afraid to venture out of 
their houses and have to rely on 
other members of the group. The 
desire to live in close proximity to 
other Burmese refugees is therefore 
unsurprising and is comparable 
to the energy and effort previous 
groups refugees have put into 
secondary migration to be close 
to community members. 
A different culture 
and environment
“You all right, love?” Refugees 
arriving in Sheffield are familiar with 
the word ‘love’ in English, relating 
this to personal relationships. Upon 
arrival in Sheffield, however, they 
were surprised to find locals putting 
this word at the end of greetings 
and many were uncomfortable 
with this. Whilst this may seem to 
be a minor cultural adjustment, for 
many new arrivals it was difficult. 
After the initial shock and adaptation 
to the UK weather, the task of 
understanding the laws, systems and 
unwritten rules of a society follows. 
People experience loss of status 
(especially for those who had been 
fully employed within the camps), 
shifting gender roles and different 
cultural norms. For a Burmese or 
Karen woman, shaking hands and 
receiving a stranger’s hug, especially 
if the stranger is male, is completely 
alien. Seeing people kissing in public 
or women with short skirts will 
shock new arrivals, male or female, 
as commented on by one man: 
“I feel really shy when they kiss in 
front of me at the bus stop and I don’t 
really know where I can hide my face.”
The realisation that health and 
education are free is good news for 
all but the refugees need to adjust 
to different customs – such as those 
surrounding ante- and post-natal 
care.  Traditionally, Burmese post-
natal care involves women staying in 
the house for 45 days and following 
specific health treatments such as 
eating plain food; the UK’s focus 
on post-natal depression is not 
something Burmese women will have 
encountered previously. Furthermore, 
appointment times with doctors 
is a new concept and a motto has 
developed within the community 
of ‘Do it or cancel it’ following 
several missed appointments. 
Depression, loneliness and a lack 
of social support have all been 
identified but a stigma around mental 
health remains and counselling is 
often declined in favour of pills. 
This is due in part to translators 
coming from within the community 
and refugees’ fear of having 
their problems made public. 
Information about the laws 
surrounding child protection or 
domestic violence is provided prior to 
arrival but it has been found that the 
serious consequences of these laws 
are not fully understood. Workshops 
to discuss these issues would require 
sensitive handling but would assist 
in the process or resettlement. 
The challenge of developing a sense 
of belonging whilst maintaining 
an identity rooted in the customs 
of Burma is not easy. In contrast 
to provisions for these Burmese 
refugees, the Lao, Vietnamese and 
Khmer refugees who were resettled 
in the US during the 1980s received 
six months’ intensive language 
training and cultural orientation 
prior to departure, covering most 
of the issues highlighted within 
this article. Better orientation for 
resettlement for Burmese refugees 
should be prioritised if this 
particular durable solution is to be 
given its best chance of success. 
Policy recommendations 
Provide better information to 
refugees about resettlement 
countries prior to arrival.   
Provide good quality, accessible 
information about rights, 
entitlements and regulations  
upon arrival.
Provide extra funding for 
counselling services throughout 
the process. 
Extend the initial 12-month period 
of support. 
Use refugee advocates during 
the initial stages to help with 
bureaucracy and daily practical 
challenges.
Set up projects to address women’s 
empowerment and training.  
Provide accessible skills 
training for employment.
Regularly evaluate the aims 
and successes of the Gateway 
Protection Programme. 
Develop culturally sensitive access 
to mental health professionals.
Provide workshops in domestic 
law involving child protection 
and domestic violence on arrival.
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Additional resources 
A useful portal with links to Burmese organisations, 
Burmese support organisations worldwide ands sources  
of news about Burma and displaced Burmese:  
www.burmacampaign.org.uk/links.html
The Online Burma/Myanmar Library is an annotated, 
classified and hyperlinked index to full texts of documents 
on the Internet. It also houses a collection of articles, 
conference papers, theses, books, reports, archives and 
directories:  http://burmalibrary.org/ 
Amnesty International, Amnesty International Report 2007 
http://thereport.amnesty.org/eng/Regions/Asia-Pacific/
Myanmar 
Assistance Association for Political Prisoners, The 
Darkness we see: torture in Burma’s interrogation centres 
and prisons www.irct.org/Default.aspx?ID=159&M=News&PI
D=549&NewsID=1005 
Burma Economic Watch  
www.econ.mq.edu.au/burma_economic_watch 
CCSDPT and UNHCR, A Draft Comprehensive Plan 
Addressing the Needs of Displaced Persons on the 
Thailand/Myanmar (Burma) Border in 2006/7, CCSDPT, 
Bangkok www.tbbc.org/resources/2007-2008-ccsdpt-unhcr-
comprehensive-plan.pdf 
Center for Public Health and Human Rights, Johns Hopkins 
Bloomberg School of Public Health, The Gathering Storm: 
Infectious Diseases and Human Rights in Burma  
www.hrcberkeley.org/pdfs/BurmaReport2007.pdf   
Centre on Housing Rights and Evictions (COHRE) 
Displacement and Dispossession: Forced Migration and 
Land Rights in Burma www.cohre.org/store/attachments/
COHRE%20Burma%20Country%20Report.pdf 
Global Health Access Programme (focus on health in ethnic 
minority areas within Burma and along Burma’s borders): 
www.ghap.org/reports/ 
Huguet, J and Punpuing, S International Migration in 
Thailand, 2005  
www.iom-seasia.org/resource/pdf/SituationReport.PDF
Human Rights Watch 
Crackdown: Repression of the 2007 Popular 
Protests in Burma vol. 19, no. 18 (C), December 
2007. 
Sold to be Soldiers: The Recruitment and Use of 
Child Soldiers in Burma. October 2007. 
Out of sight, out of mind. Thai policy towards 
Burmese refugees and migrants 
All their publications are listed at:  
http://hrw.org/doc/?t=asia_pub&c=burma 
n
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International Crisis Group
Burma/Myanmar: After the Crackdown.  
January 2008
Myanmar: New Threats to Humanitarian Aid. 
December 2006. 
All their publications are listed at:  
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=2958&l=1
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, Myanmar 
(Burma): A Worsening Crisis of Internal Displacement. 
March 2007.  
www.internal-displacement.org/myanmar/overview 
Other reports are to be found at: 
www.internal-www.internal-displacement.org/countries/
myanmar
Migrant Assistance Programme Foundation (activities  
with migrants on the Thai-Burma border):  
www.mapfoundationcm.org/resoure/eng2.html 
Refugees International 
Therese M Caouette and Mary E Pack Pushing Past 
Definitions: Migration from Burma to Thailand, 
RI and Open Society Institute. 2002. www.
refugeesinternational.org/files/3074_file_burma.pdf. 
Ending the Waiting Game: Strategies for Responding 
to Internally Displaced People in Burma, 2006. www.
refugeesinternational.org/content/issue/detail/8705
Thailand Burma Border Consortium (TBBC) 
Internal Displacement in Eastern Burma: 2007 
Survey www.tbbc.org/idps/idps.htm 
Burmese border refugee sites with population 
figures: November 2007 www.tbbc.org/
camps/2007-11-nov-map-tbbc-unhcr.pdf,
TBBC resources are to found at: 
www.tbbc.org/resources/resources.htm  
UNHCR 
UNHCR Global Appeal 2008-2009 (Myanmar,  
pp247-250) 
www.unhcr.org/home/PUBL/474ac8dde.pdf
Livelihoods Programme for Refugees. Executive 
Summary. 2007.  
www.unhcr.org/publ/PROTECTION/4691ec6f2.pdf 
Pia Vogler, In the absence of the humanitarian gaze: 
refugee camps after dark, New issues in Refugee 
Research: Research Paper No. 137, December 
2006, UNHCR Policy Development and Evaluation 
Service  
www.unhcr.org/research/RESEARCH/457ff97b2.pdf
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Please refer to individual articles for links to many organisations, reports and websites. 
Below we list some additional links to resources on Burma and displaced Burmese.
PAlESTINE REFUGEES IN THE CONTEMPORARY CONTExT: A vIEW FROM UNRWA
There are 4.4 million refugees 
registered and residing in the 
countries and territories served by 
UNRWA (UN Relief and Works 
Agency for Palestine Refugees 
in the Near East), in addition to 
four to five million Palestinians 
living in the diaspora, almost 
all of whom identify themselves 
firmly as Palestine refugees. 
In the West Bank, the illegal 
separation barrier divides and 
isolates Palestinian communities, 
stifling livelihoods and affecting or 
preventing hundreds of thousands 
of people from reaching their 
jobs, families, markets, schools 
and hospitals. The barrier and its 
regime of permits, security checks, 
towers, trenches and electronic 
fences constrict movement to a 
point where normal Palestinian 
life has become a thing of the past. 
The West Bank is splintered into 
multiple enclaves, with Palestinian 
movement between sections strictly 
controlled.1 By contrast, the million 
and a half Palestinians of Gaza are 
held captive as a whole. They are free 
to move within Gaza but prohibited 
– with very few exceptions – from 
leaving it. Human rights instruments 
state that everyone has the right 
to leave any country, including his 
or her own, and to return to that 
country. Many Palestine refugees, 
particularly those in Gaza and the 
West Bank, are denied that right. 
Since last June there has been a 70% 
reduction in the supplies coming into 
Gaza. The World Food Programme 
reports that by the end of 2007, only 
just over half (56.5%) of the territory’s 
food needs were met. Owing to a lack 
of fuel and spare parts, public health 
conditions have declined steeply 
as water and sanitation services 
struggle to function. The electricity 
supply is sporadic and for some 
210,000 of the poorest people, piped 
water is available for no more than 
two hours a day. In mid-November 
2007, the World Health Organization 
reported that Gaza had less than one 
month’s supply of 91 essential drugs 
and necessary medical supplies.
The humanitarian and human 
development work of UNRWA 
and other agencies and the private 
sector is hampered by the closure 
of Karni and Sofa crossings, Gaza’s 
main access points for goods. 
Projects valued at over $370 million 
have been suspended, of which 
some $93 million are UNRWA’s 
and another $120 million those of 
other UN agencies. Restrictions 
are imposed also on bringing cash 
into Gaza, thereby crippling the 
banking system, impeding the inflow 
of badly needed remittances and 
forcing normal business activity 
to grind to a halt. Furthermore, 
seriously ill patients have been 
prevented from obtaining the 
care they require in Egypt, Jordan 
or Israel. Several thousand more 
Gazans are languishing in limbo 
in Egypt, having been denied 
entry into Gaza since the Rafah 
crossing was closed in June.
In November 2007, the Palestinian 
Federation of Industries reported 
the closure of 95% of Gaza’s factories 
and workshops, swelling the ranks 
of the unemployed by 80,000. More 
than 30% of Palestinians now live 
below the poverty line. In Gaza, 
80% of the population is now 
receiving humanitarian aid. The 
World Bank conservatively estimates 
unemployment at 44% in 2007. 2
Statistics alone, however, cannot 
convey the misery, frustration and 
poverty that threaten to engulf Gaza 
Serious deprivations feature regularly in the lives of 
Palestinians and Palestine refugees. Among them, 
measures restricting or prohibiting the movement of 
people and goods stand out as particularly severe – and 
are in blatant contravention of human rights provisions. 
Palestine refugees in the 
contemporary context:  
a view from UNRWA
Karen Abu Zayd
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Due to almost daily electricity cuts, 
Palestinian families in Gaza often have 
to eat their dinner by candllelight.
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and parts of the West Bank. Statistics 
also do not speak to the potentially 
irreversible damage being done 
to the economic foundations of 
the occupied Palestinian territory 
(oPt). Investors and entrepreneurs 
are moving their capital to Jordan, 
Egypt and elsewhere, and skills lost 
from long periods of unemployment 
are not easily regained. In addition, 
tens of thousands of Palestinians 
are applying to emigrate – a new 
phenomenon and a sad indicator 
of their living conditions.
The size of the funding pledges 
made at the Paris conference in 
December 2007 – totalling $7.4 
billion, almost $2bn more than 
the amount requested – reflects 
the international community’s 
recognition of the scale of the 
challenge and the imperative 
of solid economic and fiscal 
foundations for the oPt. They 
imply an acknowledgement of the 
indivisibility of security, socio-
economic stability and the peaceful 
resolution of the Israeli-Palestinian 
conflict. However, a more explicit 
focus on fulfilling the rights and 
freedoms to which Palestinians are 
entitled under international law is 
also needed. Without a cessation of 
hostilities and a significant increase 
in the level of respect for human 
rights, efforts towards economic 
revival will, at best, be fraught.
Issues outstanding
One outstanding question relates to 
the identity of the Palestine refugee. If 
the political challenges were resolved 
and a just settlement agreed, by what 
criteria would Palestine refugees be 
identified? UNRWA’s refugee rolls 
and the over 16 million records in 
the Agency’s archives (currently 
being digitised under the Palestinian 
Refugee Records Project) would 
certainly be the first port of call. These 
records would be an indispensable 
resource for tracing family histories, 
tracking property titles and verifying 
individual residence in mandate 
Palestine prior to 1948.  
 
An issue of possible contention is 
whether the international community 
could deny or exclude from the 
benefit of a just solution those who 
maintain their claim to be Palestine 
refugees and yet are outside 
UNRWA’s refugee records. The list 
of such claimants could be long. It 
would include refugees who are 
registered by states and governments 
but not by UNRWA; those who are 
registered neither by UNRWA nor 
any state, such as the so-called ‘non-
ID Palestinians’ (as those in Lebanon); 
and those Palestinians who fall 
within the terms of the Statelessness 
Convention. It would include those 
who for a variety of legitimate reasons 
cannot provide documentation to 
meet the UNRWA definition (proving 
that their normal place of residence 
was Palestine during the period of 
June 1946 to 15 May 1948, and that 
they lost both home and livelihood 
as a result of the 1948 conflict). 
A second outstanding issue is that of 
refugee representation. A prominent 
failing of peace processes to date 
has been the practice of shying away 
from issues deemed too thorny. The 
preference has been to concentrate 
small steps in areas where progress 
has been thought possible and to 
postpone all others to the indefinite 
future. One outcome of this approach 
has been to shunt the refugee issue 
into the shadows where it has more 
or less languished for six decades. 
This inclination to disown the 
refugee issue has as its corollary the 
silencing of the refugee voice and 
a disregard for refugee choice.
Under the universal refugee 
protection framework, informed 
individual choice is the foundation on 
which durable solutions are identified 
and applied, and this principle should 
equally benefit Palestine refugees. 
Indeed, given the complexities of 
return and settlement issues in the 
Palestinian context, informed choice 
must be the essence of any effort to 
sift through and clarify the range 
of varying Palestinian expectations 
and rights. And yet the reality of 
representational needs has not been 
reflected in practice, as witness the 
trend of peace proposals negotiated 
mainly by non-refugees. There is talk 
of resolving the refugee issue but 
there is no system or mechanism in 
place to solicit, record and respond 
to the views of Palestine refugees.3 
The way forward is towards 
Palestinian self-determination, 
and just and lasting solutions to 
the plight of refugees through 
an informed choice. But first, 
and more immediately, what 
are needed are open borders, 
freedom of movement, access for 
goods and people, and, above all, 
a unified government equipped, 
willing and able to represent, 
protect and defend Palestinian 
and Palestine refugee interests.
Karen Abu Zayd is  Commissioner-
General of UNRWA (www.un.org/
unrwa). For more information please 
contact c.xenaki@unrwa.org.
This article is extracted from a 
paper given at the International 
Association for the Study of Forced 
Migration conference, January 2008, 
Cairo. Full paper online at: www.
reliefweb.int/rw/RWB.NSF/db900SID/
LSGZ-7AWFEG?OpenDocument  
See also Greta Gunnarsdóttir’s 
article ‘UNRWA: assisting 
Palestine refugees in a challenging 
environment’: www.fmreview.org/
FMRpdfs/FMR26/FMR2604.pdf  
1. See article by David Shearer ‘Territorial fragmentation 
of the West Bank’in FMR 26 at www.fmreview.org/
FMRpdfs/FMR26/FMR2610.pdf 
2. ‘Prolonged Crisis in the Occupied Palestinian Territory: 
Recent Socio-Economic Developments’, UNRWA, 
November 2007 www.un.org/unrwa/publications/
pubs07/RecentSoEcDev.pdf 
3. The power of informed Palestinian voices was 
demonstrated in 2004 and 2005 by the Civitas Project 
www.nuffield.ox.ac.uk/projects/Civitas/index.aspx
A Palestinian 
woman 
carries a 
container 
of food she 
purchased in 
Egypt after 
crossing 
through a 
destroyed 
section of the 
border wall 
between the 
Gaza Strip 
and Egypt, 
January 2008. 
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FMR 30 IMPROvING KENYA’S RESPONSE TO INTERNAl DISPlACEMENT 
Kenya’s December 2007 presidential and 
parliamentary elections were highly 
contentious and within a few days of the 
announcement of Kibaki’s re-election as 
president, communal violence spread 
across the country. Within a few weeks 
it had led to over 1,200 deaths and over 
300,000 internally displaced people (IDPs).1
The capacity of the government, faith-
based and relief organisations to meet 
the needs of IDPs was surpassed as the 
number rose during the weeks that followed 
the outbreak of violence and reprisals. 
Crowding and inadequate water and 
sanitation supply in camps made IDPs 
susceptible to a range of diseases. Insecurity 
and violation of IDPs’ human rights by 
both state and non-state actors were 
evident when two camps in the Rift Valley 
Province were attacked in January 2008. 
While the UN Emergency Relief 
Coordinator, John Holmes, described the 
situation as a humanitarian crisis, Kenya’s 
Minister for Special Programmes ordered 
the disbanding of IDP camps with offers of 
food aid to IDPs but no guarantee of their 
security. Walter Kälin, the UN Secretary-
General’s Representative on the Human 
Rights of IDPs, raised concerns regarding 
the responsibility of both the international 
community and national authorities to 
ensure that IDPs are free to choose where 
to reside: “You can only freely choose if 
you have different options available.”
The importance of rapid and timely action 
by the government to reduce vulnerability 
of IDPs to rape and other forms of sexual 
and gender-based violence cannot be 
overstated. A June 2007 report by the 
Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre2 
of the Norwegian Refugee Council to 
the Committee on the Elimination of 
Discrimination against Women had noted 
that the rights of Kenya’s women and girl 
IDPs were being violated, although they are 
protected under CEDAW – which Kenya 
ratified in 1984. And a UN-NGO report 
released in March 2008 highlighted the 
dramatic increase in rape and sexual abuse 
during and since the post-election violence.3 
State obligations
In December 2006 Kenya signed the 
Security, Stability and Development Pact 
for the Great Lakes Region. The Protocol on 
the Protection and Assistance to Internally 
Displaced Persons arising from Article 13 
of the Pact mandated the incorporation 
of the Guiding Principles into domestic 
law. It addresses the protection of the 
physical safety and material needs of IDPs 
and obligations to prevent and address 
causes of displacement. However, Kenya 
lacks legal and institutional frameworks 
defining and recognising IDPs since it 
has not made the Guiding Principles 
on Internal Displacement national law. 
Broadly, Kenya urgently needs to:
tackle the corruption that marred 
previous attempts to compensate 
IDPs by developing a transparent 
policy environment and building 
institutional capacity
develop a policy for the restitution of lost 
property, especially land and housing
ensure access for and safety of aid 
workers in times of crisis; groups 
such as the Kenya Red Cross were 
unable to access IDPs during the 
violence because of  barricades 
erected on some main roads.
target external support for capacity 
building and policy development 
to allow the rapid deployment of 
state service delivery functions
prioritise the training and retention 
of professionals in fields such as 
security and policing as well as health 
and human rights in order to deal 
effectively with gender-based violence
train civil servants working in relevant 
ministerial departments in the relevant 
international guidelines and standards 
n
n
n
n
n
n
integrate refugee and IDP studies 
into university curricula in relevant 
disciplines in order to foster 
broader sensitivity to international 
standards and to professionalise 
humanitarian response
develop systems for accurate reporting 
and needs assessment, including use 
of geographic information systems
facilitate collaboration – among 
actors such as the Kenya Red Cross 
Society (KRCS), the government 
and faith-based groups – and 
coordinate service provision. 
Alex Otieno (Otieno@arcadia.edu) 
teaches in the Department of Sociology, 
Anthropology and Criminal Justice 
and the MA Program in International 
Peace and Conflict Resolution 
at Arcadia University, US. 
1. See IRIN country report www.irinnews.org/ 
country.aspx?CountryCode=KE&RegionCode=EAF
2. www.internal-displacement.org 
3. See following article and www.ohchr.org/Documents/Press/
OHCHRKenyareport.pdf 
 
 
Environmental lessons
Peter Njehia, Chief Procurement Officer 
of the Kenyan National Environment 
Management Authority, has commented 
on the environmental impact that 
displacement can cause. In order to meet 
basic needs in unfamiliar circumstances, 
Kenyans displaced by recent violence 
have had a negative impact on the 
environment through, for example:
degradation of forests (mainly to get 
firewood for their domestic use) in the 
areas that they have run to for safety 
improper disposal of human waste, 
which in some IDPs camps led to 
outbreaks of communicable illnesses
keeping their domestic animals in 
open areas in urban settlements. 
An important lesson, especially for 
developing democracies, is that internal 
conflict can lead to disturbance of 
already fragile environments.
n
n
n
n
n
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Over 300,000 Kenyans were displaced by post-election 
conflict between December 2007 and January 2008. Kenya 
needs a coherent policy and capacity building for addressing 
internal displacement. 
Improving Kenya’s response  
to internal displacement 
Alex Otieno 
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Detailing the findings of the rapid 
assessment of gender-based violence 
(GBV) suffered in camps,1 the UN 
Population Fund (UNFPA), the UN 
Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the 
Christian Children’s Fund (CCF) said 
the women had repeatedly expressed 
fears of sexual violence because of 
makeshift sleeping arrangements, 
where men and women were 
forced to sleep under one tent or 
out in the open. They also voiced 
concerns about lack of regulations 
in the camps, allowing men from 
the outside to enter unchecked 
by camp officials. In Nairobi in 
particular, women reported fears 
about sexual victimisation linked to 
camp design and services, including 
lighting, water/sanitation facilities, 
and availability of firewood. 
The assessment was conducted in 
North Rift Valley, South Rift Valley, 
the Coastal Region, Nairobi and 
Central Province. It examined the 
nature and scope of sexual violence 
during flight, as well as within 
the IDP camps and alternative 
settlements. The assessment also 
evaluated the capacity of both 
community- and camp-based 
programmes to prevent and respond 
to cases of sexual violence. 
The agencies said the exact number 
of cases of sexual assault in IDP 
camps was difficult to ascertain, 
not only because the camps lacked 
standardised reporting mechanisms, 
but also because of challenges 
associated with acknowledging 
victimisation. These include the 
availability of services, the level of 
awareness about the value 
of medical assistance, the 
degree of trust in police 
and other security-related 
issues, as well as the 
cultural acceptability of 
disclosing rape.  
 
The preliminary findings 
of this assessment confirm 
initial reports from 
Nairobi-based hospitals 
that sexual violence has 
increased during the 
post-election crisis that 
began on 30 December 
2007. Evidence suggests 
that perpetrators are 
exploiting the conflict 
by committing sexual 
violence with impunity, 
and efforts to protect or 
respond to the needs of 
women and girls are remarkably 
insufficient. The report notes that 
sexual violence not only occurred as 
a by-product of the collapse in social 
order during the post-election period 
but was also being used as a tool to 
terrorise individuals and families 
and precipitate their expulsion from 
the communities in which they live. 
The agencies made several 
recommendations aimed at protecting 
young girls and women from GBV. 
Camp-based and community-
based measures would help deliver 
minimum interventions to prevent 
and respond to sexual violence 
during emergency response. They 
would also shift humanitarian 
interventions to national government 
and non-government structures to 
facilitate the move from humanitarian 
to development actions as IDPs 
return home in some areas and to 
transitional settlements in others.  
The report’s recommendations 
include: 
providing support to the relevant 
government ministries and 
institutions to integrate prevention 
of GBV and gender equality 
concerns into their emergency 
plans of action and improve 
their capacity to address the 
problem of sexual violence
introducing coordination 
mechanisms for prevention and 
response programming at the 
provincial and district levels
training camp-based staff in GBV 
prevention and response standards
ensuring sufficient police presence 
in the camps, including female 
police, and allocation of technical 
and financial resources to security 
personnel to address violence 
against women and girls
improving multi-sectoral 
prevention and response to GBV 
at the community level, through 
sustained support to sectors such 
as health, legal/justice, security 
and psychosocial, with a special 
focus on gaps such as availability 
of forensic examiners, legal aid 
services and judicial response
conducting widespread 
community education aimed 
at prevention and ensuring 
survivors know how and 
where to access services. 
Jane Some (Jane@irinnews.org) 
works for IRIN, the humanitarian 
news and analysis service of the 
UN Office for the Coordination of 
Humanitarian Affairs. IRIN’s IDP/
refugee coverage page is at www.
irinnews.org/Theme.aspx?Theme=REF
1. The full report is online at www.ohchr.org/Documents/
Press/OHCHRKenyareport.pdf
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GBv IN POST-ElECTION KENYA
People 
displaced by 
post-election 
violence, 
Nairobi, 
Kenya.
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An assessment by three agencies has found that the risk of 
rape and sexual abuse remains high for thousands of young 
girls and women displaced by Kenya’s post-election crisis.
GBv in post-election Kenya
Jane Some
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In 2008, the Brazilian National 
Committee for Refugees (CONARE) 
celebrates its 10th anniversary. 
Created by the 1997 Refugee Act, 
CONARE is an inter-ministerial 
and inter-institutional body 
which works to determine refugee 
eligibility, promote refugee-related 
public policies, design and evaluate 
resettlement activities and regulate 
the legal framework for asylum in 
Brazil. The Committee comprises 
representatives of the ministries of 
Justice, Foreign Relations, Labour, 
Health and Education, plus the 
Federal Police Department and 
Caritas Arquidiocesana, an NGO 
long engaged in refugee protection 
and assistance in the country. 
UNHCR has observer status. 
As the first forum in Latin America 
where government, civil society 
and the UN work together to design 
refugee policies and procedures, 
CONARE has a lot to celebrate. 
The 1997 Refugee Act was the first 
legislation in South America to 
consider “severe and generalised 
violations of human rights” as 
legitimate grounds for refugee 
status and became a model for other 
countries in the region.1 UNHCR 
considers the asylum procedure 
in Brazil one of the fairest and 
most democratic in the world.     
The Act has been further clarified 
and expanded by CONARE. In 
particular, one subsequent resolution 
expands refugee status to family 
members.2 Not only are a refugee’s 
legal companion and under-aged 
children eligible for refugee status 
but also parents and under-aged 
orphan siblings, grandchildren, great-
grandchildren, nephews and nieces. 
In this, CONARE went beyond what 
is required by the 1951 Convention 
and has promoted a broader notion 
of the refugee’s right to family life.    
Eligibility decisions made by 
CONARE have recognised gender-
based persecution, given special 
consideration to children and other 
vulnerable groups, and acknowledged 
the complementarity between 
asylum and internal displacement.3 
The Committee also chose not 
to abide by new legal doctrines 
such as ‘internal flight alternative’ 
and ‘safe third country’, so as to 
preserve a case-by-case approach 
to dealing with each situation. 
Asylum and integration
According to the Refugee Act, asylum 
seekers in Brazil enjoy rights to work 
and temporary residence and are 
entitled to use the public health and 
education systems until a decision 
on their cases is reached. They are 
also permitted to move around freely 
within Brazil. Assistance during 
the asylum procedure is provided 
by a network – the largest refugee 
support network by far in Latin 
America – of some 96 civil society 
organisations, in close partnership 
with the government and UNHCR. 
Shelter, language classes and some 
free legal aid are offered to claimants 
in several states. CONARE has 
prioritised training of those involved 
in the asylum process. In 2007, the 
Committee’s technical staff, with 
UNHCR, travelled around the 
country doing capacity building 
on the national eligibility system 
with NGOs and federal police 
officers. This has led to significant 
improvements in the quality of the 
refugee determination procedure. 
A reflection of the fairness and 
professionalism of the asylum system 
has been the increased number of 
people seeking protection in the 
country. In 1998, when CONARE 
was newly formed, Brazil had 1,991 
recognised refugees within its 
borders. That number increased to 
2,884 in 2002. Now, Brazil hosts 3,857 
refugees of 70 different nationalities.
Social and economic integration has 
been the biggest challenge to date. 
Although refugees are entitled to all 
basic public services, some of their 
specific needs and vulnerabilities 
are not being met. UNHCR tries to 
address these needs and for years 
has been the main funder of shelter 
and local integration programmes, 
with its contribution complemented 
by government funds of US$ 
470,000 for 2005-07. These resources 
are transferred directly to Caritas 
Arquidiocesana which implements 
social integration activities for 
refugees, such as Portuguese 
lessons, psychological assistance and 
employment training. Food, health 
care and financial support may also 
be provided for up to six months. 
The private sector is beginning to 
be involved in local integration 
initiatives. Professional capacity 
building has been offered by 
the National Associations of 
Enterprise (SENAI) and Commerce 
(SENAC), while the Chamber of 
Commercial Entrepreneurs (SESC) 
incorporates refugees in its health 
and education programmes, as well 
as offering technical training. 
Finally, integration is also boosted 
by the inclusive nature of Brazilian 
legislation. In contrast with many 
other countries which operate 
temporary protection schemes, 
forced removals and restrictions 
on permanent residency, refugees 
in Brazil are allowed to apply 
for a permanent visa and for 
citizenship after six years of 
residence in the country.   
Resettlement 
Brazil has been strengthening its 
position as an emerging country of 
resettlement. Since the signing of the 
Resettlement Agreement between 
the government and UNHCR in 
1999, the country has resettled 373 
people of seven different nationalities. 
The international solidarity and responsibility sharing evident 
in refugee protection in Brazil contrast sharply with the 
restrictive trends seen in many other countries.    
Brazil: ten years of  
refugee protection 
Maria Beatriz Nogueira and Carla Cristina Marques
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The International Organization for 
Migration (IOM)’s involvement in 
the problem of human trafficking 
in Japan dates back to 1996 when 
it published a report exposing the 
unacceptable situation of Filipino 
women trafficked to Japan. That 
report and earlier warnings by NGOs 
received little public attention. In 
2003, however, the UN Committee 
on the Elimination of Discrimination 
against Women1 recommended that 
the Japanese government increase its 
efforts to combat human trafficking 
and in 2004 the US Department of 
State’s annual Trafficking-in-Persons 
Report2 dishonourably listed Japan 
in the Tier 2 Watchlist, triggering a 
greater readiness on the government’s 
part to acknowledge the problem 
of human trafficking in Japan. 
An Inter-Ministerial Task Force, 
established in April 2004, adopted the 
National Action Plan in December 
of that year and the Plan came into 
force in April 2005.3 Meanwhile, the 
Japanese parliament approved the 
ratification of the Protocol to Prevent, 
Suppress and Punish Trafficking 
in Persons, Especially Women and 
Children (the Palermo Protocol) 
Supplementing the UN Convention 
Against Transnational Organized 
Crime.4 A number of laws and 
regulations were amended over the 
it has been three years since Japan launched its first national 
Action plan of Measures to Combat Trafficking in persons. 
Counter trafficking in Japan
Naoko Hashimoto
CONARE prioritises the protection 
of two distinct vulnerable groups: 
refugees without legal and physical 
protection, and women at risk. 
The special attention to vulnerable 
women, particularly women heads 
of household and/or victims of 
violence, has rendered extremely 
positive results in terms of local 
integration. It is estimated that 20% 
of resettled refugees in the country 
are women heads of household.    
In 2004, in the framework of 
the Mexico Plan of Action for 
Strengthening the International 
Protection of Refugees in Latin 
America,4 Brazil proposed a 
pioneering regional initiative 
called the Solidarity Resettlement 
Programme. Grounded in 
principles of international solidarity 
and responsibility sharing, the 
Programme invites countries to offer 
resettlement to refugees presently 
hosted by those countries which 
are disproportionately affected 
by massive flows in the region 
– such as Ecuador and Costa Rica 
which receive large contingents of 
people fleeing from Colombia.  
This Programme has not only 
succeeded in boosting resettlement 
in countries such as Chile and 
Argentina but has also significantly 
strengthened the Brazilian initiative. 
In a decentralisation effort, 22 cities 
across the country have become 
part of the Solidarity Resettlement 
Programme, plus 80 new partners 
from the private and public sectors. 
New resettlement missions to Ecuador 
have been scheduled and CONARE 
regularly approves refugees 
from Colombia for admission.
Another ground-breaking innovation 
of the Brazilian programme has 
been the emergency resettlement 
procedure, set up in 2005, whereby 
refugees at immediate risk can 
have their resettlement applications 
examined within approximately 
72 hours. If resettlement is agreed, 
their arrival in Brazil takes place 
within a maximum of seven 
days. Since the end of 2007, 60 
cases have been successfully 
presented under this procedure. 
 With solid resettlement experience 
in Latin America, CONARE has since 
decided to expand its programme 
beyond the region’s borders. In 2007, 
a group of 108 Palestinian refugees 
arrived in Brazil from the Ruweished 
camp in the Jordanian desert, fleeing 
persecution in Iraq and having 
been denied protection by several 
traditional countries of resettlement. 
Future challenges
Despite ten years of positive 
developments, many challenges 
remain, the biggest being refugee 
self-sufficiency and sustainability. 
Deficiencies in education and 
professional training make it difficult 
for some refugees to find proper 
jobs or earning opportunities in the 
country – something of course shared 
with some Brazilian nationals.
Decentralisation of refugee care is 
also a big challenge for a continent-
sized country like Brazil. New 
investments, partnerships with 
local governments and public 
information campaigns are being 
implemented in order to improve 
the quality of refugee reception 
and assistance in all parts of the 
country, as well as to optimise asylum 
proceedings and local integration. 
In sum, the Committee’s main 
challenge is to reduce refugee 
exclusion from full integration by 
facilitating their access to social 
benefits as well as by encouraging 
further involvement of the private 
sector. We believe the tripartite 
structure – government, civil 
society, UN – established for the 
implementation of refugee policy in 
Brazil is CONARE’s biggest asset and 
a possible model for other national 
committees around the world.  
Maria Beatriz Nogueira (mb_
nogueira@yahoo.com) is Associate 
Researcher of the Institute of 
International Relations, University 
of Brasilia, and Technical Advisor to 
CONARE. Carla Cristina Marques 
(carla.marques@mj.gov.br ) is a 
Resettlement Officer at CONARE.
1. See José H Fischel de Andrade and Adriana Marcolini, 
‘Brazil’s Refugee Act: model refugee law for Latin 
America?’, FMR 12: www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/
FMR12/fmr12.13.pdf 
2. The extension of the condition of refugee to family 
members is enshrined in article 2 of the Law 9.474/97. 
3. CONARE (2007) O reconhecimento dos refugiados 
pelo Brasil: comentários sobre as decisões do CONARE, 
Brasília, CONARE/ACNUR.
4. Full text at www.acnur.org/biblioteca/pdf/3453.pdf  
See also William Spindler, ‘The Mexico Plan of Action: 
protecting refugees through international solidarity’, 
FMR 24: www.fmreview.org/FMRpdfs/FMR24/FMR2438.
pdf
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following months to prevent human 
trafficking, to protect trafficked 
victims5 and to criminalise the act 
of human trafficking – unusually 
rapid action for the Japanese 
government, particularly given the 
high sensitivity attached to human 
rights issues of migrants in Japan.  
Representing the human rights and 
the best interests of each victim, 
IOM has set up a broad range of 
protection and assistance activities 
for victims in Japan in coordination 
with other concerned parties6 
while in the countries of origin 
IOM’s work emphasises the need 
to empower survivors in order to 
facilitate recovery and rehabilitation 
as well as to prevent them being 
re-trafficked and to provide 
alternative livelihood including 
the option of regular migration. 
Victim identification: 
a challenge
IOM has helped 128 victims identified 
in Japan to voluntarily return to and 
reintegrate in their country of origin 
over the last three years. No-one 
knows the actual number of trafficked 
people in the world7 but the number 
is low considering that more than 
nine million non-Japanese persons 
entered Japan during 2007 alone.
 Conditions in Japan are conducive to 
attracting traffickers: such as limited 
legal opportunities for migration, 
increasing demand for cheap labour 
in some service sectors and Japan’s 
significant economic advantage 
over most of its neighbours. One 
can assume that this small number 
of identified victims does not 
reflect the true reality but rather 
reflects the difficulties associated 
with outreach to potential victims 
and victim identification given the 
ever more sophisticated control 
techniques employed by traffickers.
All the victims identified are women 
and girls. This confirms the strong 
gender-stereotype attached to 
trafficking in Japan, even though 
not all these were subject to sexual 
exploitation; some were exploited 
for their labour. Contrary to the 
general expectation that many victims 
would be rescued from the red-light 
districts in Tokyo, most victims 
were working in bars and pubs in 
smaller cities and towns and many 
victims were found in rural areas. 
The majority of 
victims come from 
either the Philippines 
or Indonesia, with a 
handful of victims 
from Thailand and a 
few from Colombia, 
China and the Republic 
of Korea. This is 
contrary to the general 
expectation that the 
majority of victims 
would be Colombian, 
Filipino and Thai, and 
indicates how quickly 
traffickers adapt to 
the development of 
counter-trafficking 
measures and shift 
their trafficking routes 
and target countries.  
The types of visa used 
to enter Japan were 
mostly ‘entertainer’s 
visa’ or ‘temporary 
visitor’s visa’. After the 
government revised 
its visa procedures, 
the number of victims 
entering Japan as 
‘entertainers’ fell by 
75%. More recently, 
there has been an 
increase in the number 
of victims using a 
‘spouse’ visa – which makes it more 
difficult for the authorities to detect 
possible or de facto trafficking cases 
since they would need to intrude into 
people’s private lives. Surprisingly, 
the majority entered Japan with 
authentic passports and other 
immigration documents, suggesting 
that tightening up of immigration 
controls alone cannot eliminate the 
phenomenon of human trafficking.  
Victim identification involves far 
more than an interview through 
an interpreter. It involves gaining 
the trust of someone who has been 
tortured, traumatised and brain-
washed by traffickers not to trust any 
authorities. It involves giving them 
time to recover to a point when they 
are willing to reveal their secrets 
to a stranger. It involves listening 
– and helping them to retrieve some 
control over their life in an alien 
environment. The IOM Handbook 
on Direct Assistance for Victims of 
Trafficking8 has been translated 
into Japanese for this purpose.
Strengthening counter-
trafficking measures 
IOM suggests the following 
measures to further strengthen 
the actions that Japan is taking 
against human trafficking:
Train more staff working for 
National Police Agency and 
Immigration Bureaux in victim 
identification.
Provide and train bilingual case-
workers and counsellors, and 
ensure closer, flexible cooperation 
between public shelters and 
private shelters run by NGOs, as 
the latter often have trained and 
qualified bilingual case-workers. 
Diversify activities for survivors 
in shelters: victims, even those 
contributing to prosecutions, are 
forbidden by their temporary 
residence status from securing 
paid work. They should be entitled 
to work for decent wages, attend 
educational activities and receive 
vocational training. This would 
n
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Many asylum seekers suffer from 
health problems arising from 
their flight and the violence that 
preceded it: most often problems 
of physical movement and mental 
and psychiatric problems such as 
depression, fear and post-traumatic 
stress disorder (PTSD). Research 
on Iraqi asylum seekers showed a 
high incidence of psychiatric illness 
(42%) among asylum seekers that 
recently arrived in the Netherlands. 
Of this group, one quarter suffer 
from depression and approximately 
another third from PTSD. It is clear 
that these psychiatric problems 
were present during the asylum 
hearings and that they interfere 
with the outcomes of those hearings, 
resulting too often in a rejection 
of the application for asylum. 
In the Netherlands, as elsewhere in 
Europe, medical and psychological 
knowledge and tools are little 
used in the appraisal of an asylum 
application. Physical scars, medical 
and psychological complaints as well 
as accompanying behavioural and 
socio-cultural problems are often not 
examined. The asylum authorities 
appear not to consider the possible 
relation of these health problems with 
experiences of violence and torture.
Medical and psychological research 
in the field of traumatisation 
indicates interference with memory 
and incapacity to recall events. As a 
consequence some asylum seekers 
are unable to give a complete and 
coherent account of their flight. 
The story the asylum seeker tells to 
the authorities during the hearing 
is pivotal, frequently meaning the 
difference between a residence permit 
and expulsion. In other cases asylum 
seekers will remain silent about 
what happened in order to protect 
themselves against painful memories, 
or they may find it indecent to 
talk about the events because it is 
culturally inappropriate to do so. 
Impediments to giving 
a proper account
A Togolese woman applies for 
asylum in The Netherlands. During 
her interview she cries and tells 
the interviewing officer that she 
does not feel in good health, that 
she has difficulty sleeping and is 
fearful of men and of loud noises. 
She says she is confused about what 
exactly happened to her. Although 
the asylum authorities push her 
to describe her experiences, she 
says she cannot talk about them. 
The Immigration and Naturalization 
Service (IND) rejects the application. 
Because the woman did not submit 
any documents to support her claim, 
the IND does not deem her asylum 
story credible. She is placed in 
detention awaiting deportation. In 
the detention centre she is visited by 
a doctor who diagnoses depression 
and severe anxiety. It is difficult to 
diagnose her properly because of 
her emotional instability, her lack 
of concentration and her inability 
The Care Full initiative – a joint project of Pharos, Amnesty 
International (Dutch section) and the Dutch Council for 
Refugees – seeks to create more awareness of  
the importance of medical considerations in the  
asylum procedure. 
Medical examinations within 
EU asylum procedures 
Erick Vloeberghs and Evert Bloemen
encourage survivors of trafficking 
to cooperate with law enforcement 
agencies, in turn increasing the 
prosecution of perpetrators and 
preventing future trafficking cases.
Ensure that prosecutions are based 
on a human rights perspective and 
a victim-centred approach: victims 
contributing to prosecutions put 
their own safety and security 
– and that of their families and 
friends – at risk but very few are 
accompanied by case-workers 
or lawyers representing their 
rights, and they are therefore 
hampered from making informed 
and independent decisions.
Introduce measures for cases 
where the victim is unable or 
n
n
unwilling to return: if counter-
trafficking measures are not to 
be seen as another form of anti-
migration or refugee containment, 
clearer and more flexible 
strategies are needed to enable 
local integration or third-country 
resettlement of victims who have 
a ‘well-founded fear’ of retaliation 
by perpetrators, persecution by 
their society of origin, or any other 
form of serious human rights 
violation in the event of return.9 
Naoko Hashimoto (NHASHIMOTO@
iom.int), a former student at 
the Refugee Studies Centre, is 
Programme Coordinator of IOM 
in Tokyo (www.iomjapan.org). 
This article reflects the personal 
opinions of the author and does not 
represent the official views of IOM. 
1. www.un.org/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/committee.htm 
2. www.state.gov/g/tip/rls/tiprpt/ 
3. For details of the National Action Plan, see www.mofa.
go.jp/policy/i_crime/people/index_a.html
4. Text of protocol online at www.uncjin.org See also 
FMR 25 on ‘People trafficking: upholding rights and 
understanding vulnerabilities’ at www.fmreview.org/
FMRpdfs/FMR25/FMR25full.pdf
5. Victims: while most individuals trafficked are in fact 
‘survivors’ of an extreme situation, the term ‘victims’ 
is used in this article, in accordance with the relevant 
international legal instruments. 
6. More details of IOM’s counter-trafficking activities in 
Japan are available at www.iomjapan.org/act/trafficking.
cfm 
7. See Richard Danziger ‘Where are the victims of 
trafficking?’, FMR 25 , online at www.fmreview.org/
FMRpdfs/FMR25/FMR2504.pdf 
8. Available at http://iomjapan.org/archives/IOM_
HandbookonVictimAssistance.pdf 
9. For more details of the asylum-trafficking nexus, see 
UNHCR Guidelines on International Protection: www.
unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/refworld/rwmain?page=searc
h&docid=443679fa4
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or unwillingness to respond to 
questions. The doctor treats her 
with psychiatric drugs. Deportation, 
however, cannot be arranged so 
she is released from detention and 
lives illegally in the Netherlands. 
Two years later she is hospitalised 
in a psychiatric clinic for aggressive 
behaviour and hallucinations. The 
clinician diagnoses chronic PTSD 
with psychosis. During the treatment 
in the clinic she is able to tell her 
story of ill-treatment and rape by the 
military forces in her home country. 
The psychiatrist contacts the lawyer 
and sends him the appropriate 
medical information. The lawyer 
starts a new asylum application 
explaining the link between the 
traumatic events she was not able 
to recount during the first asylum 
interview and her psychiatric 
condition. Because of treatment 
received, she is able to recount 
her whole story during the 
interview for her second asylum 
claim. Within a few months 
the IND grants her asylum.
This case reflects the culture of 
disbelief among asylum authorities 
in Europe, within which the asylum 
seeker has to prove that they were 
tortured, raped, or beaten. It is not 
always possible, for example, for 
women who have been raped to talk 
about this at the first interview. In 
fact, can a woman be expected to 
talk about these things at all, when 
she sometimes dare not even tell her 
own husband, in case he rejects her? 
Memories of traumatic events such 
as torture can be incomplete. There 
is evidence that asylum seekers 
experience a phenomenon known as 
‘boundary restriction’ – a narrowing 
of focus that causes a failure to 
remember information that is on 
the visual or acoustic periphery of 
the traumatic experience. Asylum 
authorities, however, often question 
asylum seekers about peripheral 
details of traumatic events such as the 
number of persons or windows in the 
room where the torture took place, the 
colour of the uniforms or the wall, the 
date or duration of events, and then 
draw conclusions about credibility 
on the basis of these details. 
Care Full initiative
The Care Full initiative was 
launched in 2006. It aims to improve 
refugee status determination (RSD) 
procedures for victims of torture 
and ill-treatment by encouraging 
authorities to take better account 
of the psychological, socio-cultural 
and physical factors that inhibit 
asylum seekers from presenting a 
coherent and complete history of their 
experiences. The initiative stresses 
the need for a full examination, 
conducted in accordance with 
guidelines set out in the 1999 Istanbul 
Protocol on the investigation and 
documentation of torture. It argues 
that any medical or psychological 
conditions must be given proper 
weight within the process of 
refugee status determination. 
In 2006 the Care Full Initiative 
published Care Full: Medico-legal 
reports and the Istanbul protocol in 
asylum procedures1 which included 
chapters on the physical after-
effects of torture and ill-treatment; 
psychological and psychiatric factors 
affecting the ability of asylum seekers 
to speak about their experiences 
during the asylum procedure; an 
assessment of the use in ten European 
countries of medical reports in 
the asylum procedures; the use of 
medical reports at the European 
Court on Human Rights and by the 
Committee Against Torture (CAT); 
and the use and impact of the Istanbul 
Protocol in asylum procedures. 
In early 2007 the Initiative 
published a set of Principles and 
Recommendations2 – distributed 
to NGOs in Europe and endorsed 
by 35 organisations – to bring to 
the attention of politicians and 
policy makers, both nationally and 
internationally, the need for medical 
and psychological examination 
in the asylum procedure. 
A common European 
asylum system
Given current attempts to harmonise 
asylum procedures across Europe, 
Care Full’s goal has been to search for 
and promote ways for the Istanbul 
Protocol to become an integral part 
of asylum procedures in Europe. 
European Community law recognises 
the particular needs of survivors 
of torture and addressing their 
particular needs is a major element 
of the European Commission’s plans 
for the next stage of the creation of a 
common European asylum system. 
Member States, however, are far from 
meeting the standards they have set. 
In the EU Qualification Directive 
(which Member States should all 
have incorporated into national 
law by 10 October 2006) there are 
implicit and explicit references to 
the use of medical examination and 
medico-legal reports. UNHCR, in its 
reaction to the EU Green Paper on 
the future of the Common European 
Asylum System, declares itself 
to be “concerned that vulnerable 
asylum seekers and refugees are 
not always properly identified… 
The use and weight of medico-
legal reports in asylum procedures 
vary widely.” After referring to the 
Istanbul Protocol, UNHCR also 
states that “initiatives aimed at 
identifying and developing good 
practices to address these challenges 
would be highly desirable.”3
In short, UNHCR and many NGOs 
in Europe believe that including 
proper medical examinations and 
requiring a medico-legal report in 
refugee status determination would 
improve the process. It would most 
certainly reduce the number of 
appeals as well as the number of 
revised asylum determinations based 
on medical facts that are presented 
at a later date. Furthermore, asylum 
seekers would feel that their 
experiences and situations were being 
recognised – which might in turn 
help them regain a sense of justice, 
acceptance, well-being and health.
Istanbul Protocol 
The Istanbul Protocol (Manual on the Effective Investigation and Documentation of Torture 
and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment) published by the UN 
has been developed by medical and legal professionals and human rights organisations. 
It provides guidelines for examinations and for documenting torture and ill-treatment. 
It is considered international accepted good practice to make explicit provision – alongside 
the legal investigation – for a (forensic) medical and psychological examination. Protocol 
online at www.pharos.nl/uploads/_site_1/Pdf/Documenten/istanbul%20protocol.pdf
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The capacities of tertiary institutions 
within Afghanistan are very limited 
and, with some three million 
Afghans still in Pakistan and Iran, 
the need for higher educational 
opportunities – via DAFI or 
other avenues – for Afghans in 
neighbouring countries remains high. 
Afghanistan has been a focus of 
the DAFI programme from the 
outset, with enrolment of students 
from Afghanistan reaching a peak 
of 447 in 2003.1 External factors, 
however, inevitably influence the 
programme. As a result of the mass 
return of Afghans since 2002 the 
overall number of students enrolled 
in Iranian and Pakistani universities 
has fallen considerably. Iran stopped 
admitting new Afghan tertiary 
students in 2004 as a result of an 
active repatriation policy. This policy 
was lifted in 2007 and Iran is currently 
the country receiving the highest 
number of Afghan refugee students. 
In 2005, due to an overall gender 
imbalance in the DAFI programme 
and as UNHCR tried to specifically 
target girls’ education, only female 
students were permitted to enrol in 
the DAFI programme in Pakistan. 
The available level of funding set the 
overall targets for the programme 
in this and other regions. Host 
countries need to have policies 
that are compatible with the needs 
of refugees. If refugees are not 
allowed to enrol in university, need 
special permission or are charged a 
prohibitive ‘international’ student 
rate, implementing a scholarship 
programme becomes considerably 
more difficult. Globally, the average 
cost of each DAFI student is 
approximately $2,000 per annum.
To ensure the long-term success of 
the Afghan intervention, numerous 
challenges have been addressed. 
DAFI has focused on motivating 
female participation in the 
programme, seeking gender parity. 
In recent years female enrolment 
among Afghan refugee students 
has increased. Women now 
comprise 54% of Afghan DAFI 
students, considerably above 
the global average of 39% in 
2006. These women are role 
models for Afghan women and 
girls; their example may help to 
promote education and motivate 
families and girls themselves to 
further their own education. 
Lack of coordination among donors 
supporting tertiary education 
for Afghans has been a problem. 
A large number of education 
advisors and funding agencies 
adopting different approaches 
have created competing structures 
to support refugee programmes 
outside the country. This has led 
to fragmentation and confusion 
within the Afghan education 
system, complicating education 
and return for young refugees. 
UNHCR and partners realised the 
need to counsel each refugee on their 
future studies and plans and have 
organised workshops in countries of 
asylum on a range of subjects, from 
job market information and HIV/
AIDS awareness to general questions 
regarding return to Afghanistan. 
Since 12, UNHCR has been implementing the Albert 
Einstein German Academic Refugee Initiative (DAFI), a 
German government-funded programme to provide tertiary 
education for refugees in countries of asylum. Afghans have 
comprised the largest group of DAFI students. 
Tertiary refugee education in 
Afghanistan: vital for reconstruction 
Claas Morlang and Carolina Stolte
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The Care Full Initiative is 
currently focusing on:
raising awareness among EU 
politicians, governments and 
medical professionals in order 
to work towards incorporation 
of medical examination and the 
writing of medico-legal reports 
within the asylum procedure
n
developing at the national level 
(in the Netherlands) a procedure 
based on the Istanbul Protocol 
guidelines to incorporate a medical 
and psychological examination 
into asylum procedures
supporting and developing 
initiatives to train staff of asylum 
authorities in the medical and 
n
n
psychological aspects of RSD 
and in early identification of 
vulnerable asylum seekers. 
Erick Vloeberghs (e.vloeberghs@
pharos.nl) is Head of International 
Affairs and Evert Bloemen 
(e.bloemen@pharos.nl) is a medical 
doctor and trainer/advisor at 
PHAROS (www.pharos.nl).
1. René Bruin, Marcelle Reneman & Evert Bloemen (2006) 
Care Full: Medico-legal reports and the Istanbul protocol in 
asylum procedures, Utrecht/Amsterdam: Pharos/Amnesty 
International/ Dutch Council for Refugees.
2. Principles and Recommendations (2007) www.pharos.
nl/uploads/_site_1/Pdf/Documenten/Care%20Full%20Pri
nciples%20%20Recommendations.pdf 
3. The UNHCR reaction to the Green Paper can be found 
at: http://ec.europa.eu/justice_home/news/consulting_
public/gp_asylum_system/news_contributions_asylum_
system_en.htm 
Signing up to the Care Full initiative
Organisations outside Europe are also welcome to sign up to the Care Full Principles 
and Recommendations. Supporting organisations are listed in this document – 
which is regularly updated and can be used throughout Europe to lobby on the 
national level. Please contact Erick Vloeberghs at e.vloeberghs@pharos.nl. 
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Evidence of success
As part of a global assessment of 
DAFI’s impact, in 2007 UNHCR 
sent a questionnaire to ex-students.2 
Responses from the Afghan cohort 
show the direct link between a 
refugee programme focused on 
tertiary education and national 
reconstruction. By educating Afghan 
refugees in neighbouring countries, 
DAFI has provided them with the 
skills needed for sustainable return 
and made the move back home a 
more viable option for the future for 
many students and their families. 
The impact of returned university 
graduates on the reconstruction 
of Afghanistan is clearly visible. 
Refugees who have received a uni-
versity education in the region have 
both the skills and the entrepreneurial 
willingness to return early. This 
has helped to bring academically 
qualified human resources to an area 
that has experienced a considerable 
drain of vital brainpower. While 
there was still considerable room 
for individual choice, students 
were encouraged to undertake 
much needed employment- and 
development-oriented degree 
programmes. As a result, the different 
fields of study and, subsequently, 
work within the Afghan group of 
DAFI students currently represent a 
broad spectrum, reflecting all needs 
of a country which did not have 
proper functioning universities for a 
number of years. 
The majority of returned graduates 
now work in Herat or Kabul. Over 
70% work as civil servants or as NGO 
managers, with the remainder in the 
private sector. Research indicates 
that Afghanistan faces an acute lack 
of qualified managerial personnel. 
As a result of DAFI encouragement, 
around a quarter of DAFI’s Afghan 
students now focus on management 
and economics studies. Another 
area of special intervention has been 
support of rural communities and 
long-term food security. DAFI has 
supported many students to study 
agriculture, especially in Faisalabad 
in Pakistan. Approximately 20% of 
the Afghan students are currently 
enrolled in subjects related to 
agriculture/fishery and forestry.
Examples of the success of the 
programme can be found at all 
levels of Afghan society. One DAFI 
graduate is the deputy director of 
the Ministry of Counter Narcotics, 
another heads Afghanistan’s National 
Assembly and another works for 
the National Standards Authority. 
A number of DAFI graduates are in 
senior positions in NGOs, providing 
expertise on human rights, gender 
issues, humanitarian interventions 
and social service delivery.  
 
“DAFI scholarships have made 
a substantial contribution to the 
education and development of many 
young, talented refugees, enabling 
them to expand their horizons and 
explore their potential. Through the 
scholarships for higher education, 
DAFI has given thousands of young 
men and women the means to break 
the cycle of violence and deprivation. 
During my missions abroad I have 
met DAFI scholars and graduates on 
several continents and have seen 
firsthand their experience put to 
work for the good of the community. 
The value of this education cannot 
be overestimated. It gives refugees 
the hope to imagine a brighter 
future for themselves and their 
communities and the skills and 
determination to realise their goals.”
António Guterres, UN High 
Commissioner for Refugees
 
Conclusion
Tertiary refugee education is not a 
priority compared with the other 
levels of education, especially 
primary. However, research into 15 
years of experience with the DAFI 
scholarship programme has proven 
that the benefits for development 
are high. Scholarship programmes 
can and do work, provided they are 
carefully implemented and funds 
efficiently allocated. It makes sense for 
refugees to study in countries that are 
close to their countries of origin – both 
in geographical and cultural terms as 
it makes returning home more likely. 
Funding for tertiary education must 
be geared towards sustainable results. 
Students will benefit most from 
courses that teach them to 
work with regionally available 
resources. Especially in the cases 
of medicine and engineering, it is 
counterproductive to learn to handle 
equipment and materials that will 
be in short supply once graduates 
start working in their communities. 
UNHCR does not fund scholarships 
for multi-year courses like medicine; 
they are too expensive and tie up 
funds for too long. On the other 
hand, UNHCR does fund paramedic 
courses because graduates deliver 
valuable services. A similar cost-
benefit consideration applies to post-
graduate studies. Instead of paying 
for one student to get a PhD, it makes 
more sense to help two students reach 
a first degree.
Unsurprisingly, three quarters of 
global refugees educated by DAFI 
report earning above average 
incomes. However, the benefits of 
tertiary refugee education transcend 
the individual student as they greatly 
benefit communities and nations 
emerging from conflict. The return 
of qualified human resources to a 
post-conflict area is a vital component 
for durable reconstruction. 
The Afghan example shows that 
tertiary refugee education can directly 
contribute towards reconstruction 
in a country that still struggles with 
protracted conflict. The fact that, 
globally, 94% of returning DAFI 
graduates find employment back 
home highlights the need for their 
skills. The fields of study chosen by 
Afghan students, the sectors in which 
they have found employment and 
the gender balance among refugee 
students are all positive indicators of 
future change. UNHCR has shown 
that in Afghanistan, as elsewhere, 
refugee scholarship programmes are 
highly relevant and that all forms of 
humanitarian intervention must be 
linked to long-term development. 
Claas Morlang (morlang@unhcr.
org) is UNHCR’s Education Officer, 
Geneva. Carolina Stolte (stolte_
carolina@yahoo.com) is completing 
a PhD at Leiden University. This 
article is written in a personal 
capacity and does not necessarily 
represent the views of UNHCR.
For more information about 
DAFI see: www.inwent.org/ez/
articles/065278/index.en.shtml. 
The November 2007 evaluation of 
DAFI is at: www.unhcr.org/protect/
PROTECTION/47b4083d2.pdf
1. In 2006, 1,067 DAFI students from 37 countries were 
enrolled in courses in 38 countries.
2. www.unhcr.org/protect/PROTECTION/4603d6954.pdf
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Colombia has a long history of 
conflict-induced displacement. 
Most displaced persons, estimated 
to be as many as four million,1 seek 
refuge internally, in a constant flow 
from rural areas to the fringes of 
Colombia’s expanding cities. In 
1997 Congress passed a law which 
granted extensive rights to IDPs. 
Successive governments, however, 
failed to implement the law, 
limiting themselves to providing 
humanitarian aid to fewer than 
30% of IDPs and having marginal 
impact on improving education 
and health provision. Between 1997 
and 2003, the Constitutional Court 
ruled 17 times that the fundamental 
rights of IDPs were violated.
In a landmark ruling in 2004,2 the 
Court concluded that local and 
national authorities in different 
parts of the country had failed to 
protect a wide range of fundamental 
rights, including those pertaining 
to education, health, work, income 
generation and physical safety. They 
declared the problems so severe that it 
amounted to an unconstitutional state 
of affairs. Two structural problems 
were identified. Firstly, the resources 
assigned by the government were 
insufficient to fulfil its obligations 
under international and national law. 
Secondly, institutional capacities on 
all levels were insufficient to attend to 
the needs of the displaced population. 
Rather than initiate criminal 
prosecution of individual officials 
who had not fulfilled their 
obligations, the Court instructed the 
government to find the necessary 
resources and to provide detailed 
information regarding IDPs and 
policies relating to them. Most 
notably, it ordered the establishment 
of outcome indicators for the effective 
enjoyment of rights of the displaced 
population. In other words, the Court 
demanded that the government 
diagnose the problem, respond 
to it and establish mechanisms to 
monitor the effectiveness of policies.
The government dithered in deciding 
on adequate outcome indicators, 
making it impossible for the Court to 
assess progress. The Court asked the 
Civil Society Monitoring Commission, 
the Inspector General’s Office, the 
Human Rights Ombudsman, the 
Comptroller General of the Republic 
and UNHCR to provide technical 
documents to help establish outcome 
indicators. Based on the input from 
these organisations, the Court then 
established a series of guidelines 
for the indicators, including that 
they should be quantifiable and 
comparable, providing information 
about IDPs’ lives and living conditions 
rather than institutional aspects of 
the government’s performance.
Firstly, the Court said the indicators 
should allow measurement of 
progress in overcoming the problems 
and identify obstacles hindering the 
adoption of remedial measures. The 
indicators should thus say something 
meaningful about the impact of 
government policies. If the policies 
are unsuccessful in changing the lives 
of IDPs for the better, the indicators 
should signal ways to improve them.
Secondly, the indicators should 
measure the fulfilment of the policies’ 
goal, namely the realisation of IDP 
rights and, in particular, the effective 
enjoyment of rights in every phase of 
displacement. The specific needs of 
particular groups such as children, 
women, the disabled and indigenous 
communities should be considered.
Thirdly, the indicators should be 
significant. They should provide 
information about essential, rather 
than dispensable, aspects of IDP 
rights and the policies’ impact on 
them. This is a key concept, since 
monitoring is a demanding and 
expensive process. In addition, the 
Colombian law protects the fundamental rights of IDPs but 
the country lacks policies to guarantee respect for those 
rights. This structural gap is recognised by the Constitutional 
Court, the highest judicial organism of the state, and recent 
developments offer hope of change. 
Measuring the enjoyment  
of rights in Colombia   
Jacob Rothing and Marco Romero
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selection of indicators should not 
depend on what information is 
accessible but on IDP rights. Nor 
should IDPs be simply incorporated 
into existing government programmes 
aimed at the general population. 
IDP rights
Two Court Orders adopted indicators 
for the right to housing, health, 
education, food, income generation, 
identity, economic stabilisation, and 
the right to life, integrity and liberty.3 
However, other outcome indicators 
have yet to be developed and there 
is still a lack of clarity with respect 
to the relation between the different 
phases of displacement. While 
significant improvements have been 
made in the access to rights for IDPs 
during displacement, only modest 
changes have been made in the phases 
of prevention and durable solutions. 
With more than 200,000 people 
forcibly displaced every year in 
Colombia, there is an urgent need 
for policies to prevent further 
displacements taking place. The 
government understands prevention 
as having or regaining control over 
territory. While the presence and 
proper functioning of civilian state 
institutions are key ingredients of this 
policy, military operations are often 
their only expression. Furthermore, 
while military control is an important 
preventive factor, it also can be part 
of the problem as armed activity 
significantly increases the risk of 
displacement. Thus, the emphasis 
on a military rather than a civilian 
presence in conflict zones and the 
failure to design an efficient early 
warning system must be dealt with 
in order to provide a comprehensive 
prevention policy. Meanwhile, the 
highly politicised nature of such 
a policy seems to make the Court 
reluctant to take a stand on the issue. 
This is perhaps against the Court’s 
better instincts but it could also be 
interpreted in light of their desire to 
look for consensus wherever possible. 
The discussions regarding the 
establishment of outcome indicators 
for comprehensive reparation have 
not been straightforward because they 
reflect controversial political issues 
nationwide. In the light of continuing 
expulsions of the civilian population 
by paramilitary groups or their 
successors,  it is difficult to ask victims 
to cohabit with the perpetrators 
and to trust in guarantees that 
there will be no repetition of 
crimes. But despite a questionable 
demobilisation process and the fact 
that paramilitary forces continue to 
exercise political and social control 
through the use of violence in large 
parts of the country, the construction 
of effective reparation policies for 
the IDP population should be a 
priority for at least the next 10-15 
years. The establishment of outcome 
indicators for the right to reparation 
is a significant part of that effort. 
The main indicator of effective 
enjoyment proposed by the 
government in March 2007 is defined 
as: “Persons who request it can 
access the mechanisms of justice, 
restitution and protection.”4 The 
proposed complementary indicators 
measure the ratio of people who are 
able to access mechanisms of justice 
compared to those that request it 
– and the ratio of those displaced 
persons or ethnic communities 
who have their property legally 
protected compared to those who 
apply for such protection. Lastly, the 
government suggested including the 
right to family reunion through an 
indicator which would measure those 
who had received financial support to 
reunite with their family as compared 
to the total number of people who 
had applied for such support.
The Attorney General’s Office, 
however, commented that access to 
justice does not necessarily amount 
to reparation and that the indicator 
should instead be oriented towards 
access to mechanisms of justice 
which can achieve reparation. 
In the view of the Civil Society 
Monitoring Commission and 
UNHCR, the indicators proposed 
by the government emphasised only 
some components of comprehensive 
reparation, namely truth and justice, 
but did not measure the extent to 
which the IDPs were indemnified for 
material and non-material losses as a 
result of their displacement. UNHCR 
also pointed out that an indicator 
cannot be expected to measure a 
policy in which the question of how 
to repair the damages caused by 
the violation has not been defined. 
Instead UNHCR recommended some 
elements which could be the subject 
of monitoring by indicators, including 
equal treatment for IDPs compared 
to other victims of serious crimes, the 
degree to which the IDPs participate 
in programmes designed to assist 
them, access to legal assistance and 
access to mechanisms for demanding 
restitution of goods and land. 
After considering these observations, 
the Constitutional Court rejected 
the government’s indicators 
because they excluded essential 
aspects of the right to reparation. 
What’s next?
If this process is eventually 
successful, it will represent important 
achievements. Colombia’s justice 
system will have gained substantial 
legitimacy, legal complaints 
mechanisms will have demonstrated 
their efficacy, and the Colombian 
state will have acquired important 
experience as to how to undertake 
social policy development during a 
humanitarian crisis. Conversely, if 
the rights continue to be unfulfilled 
at current levels, this process will lay 
bare the government’s incapacity to 
deal with the conflict’s humanitarian 
consequences, and the situation 
is likely to deteriorate further. 
Meanwhile, the Court’s indicators 
provide a detailed and extremely 
useful tool which all donors should 
incorporate into their humanitarian 
strategies in Colombia – and the 
whole process offers valuable 
lessons for policymakers elsewhere 
Jacob Rothing (jacob.rothing@
nrc.org.co) is an advisor at the 
Norwegian Refugee Council 
(NRC) in Colombia. Marco 
Romero (marcoromero@codhes.
org) is President of the Consultoria 
para los Derechos Humanos y 
Desplazamiento (CODHES) and 
a leading member of the Civil 
Society Monitoring Commission, 
commissioned by the Constitutional 
Court to monitor the development 
of Colombia’s IDP policies.
Court Orders relating to the 
establishment of the indicators 
can be found at www.codhes.org, 
www.nrc.no and www.idmc.org. 
1. The government has only been registering IDPs 
over a 10-year period. The numbers registered over 20 
years by the Consultoria para los Derechos Humanos 
y Desplazamiento (CODHES) indicate more than four 
million IDPs.
2. Constitutional Court ruling T-025/2004_
3. AUTO 109/2007 and AUTO 233/2007
4. Court Order 109 of 2007: 20
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In 2006, a deterioration of security in 
North East Sri Lanka was beginning 
to put a strain on the already fragile 
ceasefire between the government 
and the LTTE (the Liberation Tigers 
of Tamil Elam). On 2 August the 
Muslim majority town of Muttur (in 
Trincomalee District) was attacked 
and besieged by the LTTE. Efforts 
by aid agencies, the UN and the Red 
Cross to negotiate a humanitarian 
corridor into the town came to 
nothing. A few days later, most 
of the inhabitants fled. Diverted 
from their preferred destination by 
military action, the IDPs walked 
to the Singhalese majority town 
of Kanthale, an area already 
experiencing inter-ethnic tensions 
because of the proximity of fighting. 
Local government authorities were 
unable to cope with the needs of the 
IDPs, who numbered some 57,000. 
With the influx of tens of thousands 
of IDPs, the Kanthale area, already 
an under-resourced region, was 
extremely tense and violence was 
common. Most NGOs had left but 
UMCOR and MA were still working 
in the area. As the crisis developed,  
the two agencies gravitated towards 
each other and within a couple of 
days were working together, setting 
up a joint field office and warehouse, 
and sharing staff, vehicles, aid 
supplies and logistical support.  They 
and their local partners responded 
to the crisis by providing emergency 
water, shelter, medical, food and 
non food items for IDPs and, later, 
logistical support and coordination 
assistance for the international NGOs. 
This partnership enabled economies 
of scale and effective coordination 
but also had some other, unexpected 
outcomes. Both agencies worked in 
coordination with their respective 
faith and community leaders 
and councils to coordinate the 
mobilisation of thousands of 
volunteers who brought food and non 
food relief items to the IDP camps 
and distribution centres. MA engaged 
with the imams, the coordinating 
council for Muslim theologians and 
communities, discussed the impartial 
nature of humanitarianism with 
them and vouched for UMCOR 
staff’s neutrality. Discussions centred 
on the imperative of both faiths 
to serve humanity and reduce the 
suffering of the disadvantaged. This 
was language which people could 
understand and relate to. UMCOR 
did the same through local Methodist 
priests in Christian areas – and with 
Hindus whom the priests knew. 
Soon those villages where UMCOR 
workers had been held at gunpoint 
and attacked by villagers a couple 
of weeks previously welcomed 
both UMCOR and MA staff. 
MA and UMCOR jointly approached 
the local Buddhist chief monk to 
ask for help in bringing aid to the 
beleaguered Buddhist community 
– a community which was suspicious 
of NGOs and other ethnic and faith 
communities. The chief monk was 
surprised by the joint approach 
by organisations whose faiths are 
commonly portrayed by the media 
as enemies (and therefore perceived 
as such by communities) but agreed 
to speak with his constituents; 
inter-faith cooperation flourished 
around the humanitarian relief 
efforts, with the Buddhist temple 
becoming an aid distribution centre.
This partnership continued once 
the emergency was over and the 
security situation had improved. 
When the IDPs were able to 
return home some months later, 
both organisations provided 
reconstruction and other return 
assistance. Following the emergency 
response, the two partners reviewed 
their joint operations, identifying 
key attributes of the partnership 
as well as wider opportunities for 
how faith-based organisations 
(FBOs) can work together to 
improve operational effectiveness: 
The ability to work effectively in an 
insecure environment:  
The sight of two different FBOs 
working together had a calming 
effect in many conflict-affected 
communities. It is doubtful if this 
could have been achieved in such 
a short space of time without local 
faith leaders being engaged by an 
FBO with which they could identify. 
The ability to work for common 
causes:  
The common belief in serving 
humanity contributes to the ability 
to work together and can largely 
eliminate the competitiveness over 
resources in relief and development.  
Working within networks:  
Religions offer cultural, social and 
political networks unsurpassed by 
any other. An FBO can ‘plug into’ 
this network, gaining immediate 
access to faith leaders –  community 
‘gatekeepers’ – and thus an 
entry point to communities.  
Sustainable empowerment and 
programming:  
In traditional societies, making 
sustainable progress in empowering 
minorities and vulnerable groups 
(such as women) without exposing 
them to danger is difficult. However, 
although some faith leaders may 
wish to preserve traditional roles, 
most have the wellbeing of their 
communities at heart and can be 
agents for change. By working with 
these leaders, a long-term process 
of empowerment in its truest 
sense was initiated. The long-term 
presence of faith representatives 
in communities enables relief and 
A strategic partnership between the United Methodist 
Committee on Relief (UMCOR)1 and Muslim Aid (MA)2 in 
Sri lanka, now formalised into a worldwide partnership 
agreement, offers a model for effective, community-based, 
culturally appropriate and sustainable assistance provision. 
Faith, relief and development: 
the Sri lanka experience   
Guy Hovey and Amjad Saleem
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development programmes to be 
supported long after the original 
implementing partner has left. 
Peace, reconciliation, respect  
and understanding:  
Peace does not emanate from high-
level political agreements but from 
communities on the ground. One 
of the most surprising aspects of 
the partnership was that it was the 
first time the majority of people 
had witnessed different faiths 
working together in a tangible 
manner. This is perhaps the area 
within which this partnership 
will be most effective – acting as a 
link between inter-faith dialogue 
and communities, translating 
rhetoric into practical action which 
demonstrates the benefit of dialogue 
to disadvantaged communities.
Challenges
Cooperation between the two NGOs 
has developed beyond Sri Lanka 
and on 26 June 2007, following 
intense negotiations, a worldwide 
partnership agreement was signed in 
the House of Commons in London. 
However, the partnership has 
not been welcomed unanimously 
and various problems were 
encountered during negotiations: 
Formalising the partnership:  
The success of joint programming 
often depends on relationships 
between individuals, making 
partnership vulnerable. The concern 
that the Sri Lankan experience 
owed more to personal friendships 
between staff members of Muslim 
Aid and UMCOR was discussed and 
a pilot joint funding application was 
initiated in Indonesia where the two 
organisations had not been thrown 
together by force of circumstance. It 
was found that, with the leadership 
of the two organisations explaining in 
detail the partnership and the ideals 
behind it, the application process 
and all the joint assessments that 
this entailed proceeded smoothly 
and lasting links were made. 
Resistance from the supporter 
base: Within all faiths, as in secular 
society, there is a wide spectrum 
of opinion. The negative reaction 
of some people in the Christian 
community in the US can be viewed 
on various blogs while some in the 
Muslim community have reportedly 
voiced comparable opinions. This 
is only to be expected. It was found 
that many misunderstood the nature 
of the FBO – as a professional relief 
and development organisation as 
opposed to a proselytising agent. 
The dissension, however, provided 
an opportunity for people to discuss 
the changing face of relief and 
development and the importance 
of inter-faith partnerships.
The erosion of identity:  
Concern was voiced that the 
partnership would dilute the Islamic 
identity of MA and the Christian 
identity of UMCOR – that the coming 
together of the two would produce a 
compromised organisation not at ease 
with itself. This is a valid concern. 
However, the partnership comes 
together mainly around operational 
and advocacy issues. While the 
partners may disagree on theological 
issues, there are many more areas 
concerning the world’s disadvantaged 
that they do agree upon.  
The distraction of faith leaders: 
Some community faith leaders 
were exposed to the international 
humanitarian field for the first 
time and, recognising its potential, 
became involved in NGO work. Their 
involvement caused concern that they 
were being taken away – at a time 
of crisis – from ministering to the 
spiritual needs of their communities. 
Clearly a delicate balance between 
the two needs to be identified early 
in an operation to operationalise 
a ‘do no harm’ approach.
Keeping the partnership relevant:  
The Sri Lanka experience 
demonstrated that the success of 
the partnership was its relevance 
to communities and that high-
level dialogue, although crucial, 
has limited meaning at grassroots 
level. As the partnership model is 
taken up, analysed and debated by 
academia, governments and other 
interested parties, a challenge will 
be to ensure that it remains practical, 
relevant and rooted in communities. 
Next steps
The idea of faiths operating together is 
not new3 but has to date largely been 
limited to inter-faith dialogue and 
some cross-funding initiatives. In Sri 
Lanka the UMCOR-MA partnership 
demonstrated that there is a huge 
untapped potential in engaging with 
faith. The two organisations believe 
that faith represents a significant pillar 
of grassroots relief and development 
which has remained sidelined due 
to its potentially sensitive nature. 
However, virtually all faiths, however 
different they may be theologically, 
have a common purpose to serve 
humanity and aid the disadvantaged. 
The Commonwealth Foundation in 
the UK invited UMCOR and MA to 
present their partnership model at 
the 2007 Commonwealth Heads of 
Government meeting in Kampala 
where it generated significant 
interest. Over the coming 12 months 
the partners will be rolling out and 
further developing the model with the 
assistance of academics, practitioners, 
faith leaders and communities. 
2008 will see joint country directors’ 
meetings, further meetings between 
senior, middle and lower management, 
joint activities at the field level 
and joint partnership projects with 
communities of all ethnicities in Sudan, 
Lebanon, Sri Lanka and Indonesia.
This partnership is not exclusive and 
is open to all non-proselytising faith-
based organisations. The longer-term 
vision is for a consortium of FBOs 
working together at the community 
level to bring relief, development, 
peace, reconciliation and mutual 
respect and understanding in a 
world where faith is increasingly 
manipulated as a tool to drive 
conflict rather than resolve it.  
Guy Hovey (guy@umcor-regional.
org) works for the United Methodist 
Committee on Relief (and was 
in Sri Lanka 2006-07). Amjad 
Saleem (amjad@muslimaid.org) 
has been the Muslim Aid Country 
Director in Sri Lanka since 2005.
1. http://new.gbgm-umc.org/umcor/work/fieldoffices/
partners/muslim-aid/
2. http://ramadan.muslimaid.org/Page170.asp
3. eg Geneva-based Action by Churches Together (ACT) 
International http://act-intl.org/
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Over the last decade, the UK government 
has identified tackling social exclusion 
as a central objective, setting up a Social 
Exclusion Unit and in 2003 launching the 
National Action Plan (for Social Inclusion). 
A 2004 report by the Unit identified people 
seeking asylum in the UK as amongst 
those most at risk of social exclusion1 and 
a joint study by Oxfam and the Refugee 
Council in 2002 concluded that “asylum 
seekers are forced to live at a level of 
poverty that is unacceptable in a civilised 
society.”2 Asylum seekers with an ongoing 
claim are entitled to a weekly amount of 
benefit which falls below the UK poverty 
line. The result is hunger, and inability to 
buy clothes or shoes, pay fares to attend 
appointments, or make phone calls to 
stay in touch with friends and solicitors. 
In 2006 I interviewed four asylum seekers 
and one person who had been granted 
refugee status. Grace from Zimbabwe 
was anxious about paying for transport. 
The timing of her compulsory reporting 
sessions with the Immigration Directorate 
requires her to travel on public transport 
at peak times, costing around £5 a week: 
“£5 sounds like nothing, but when you 
have [only] a small amount to start with, 
it is a lot.” In order to obtain cash for 
transport, Patrice from Côte D’Ivoire 
is forced to sell the vouchers which 
are his only entitlement, sometimes to 
unscrupulous neighbours for significantly 
less then their value: “Sometimes I get 
desperate – but if I don’t report to the 
Immigration office, I am breaking the law.”
Those falling foul of the asylum legislation 
commonly end up unsupported and 
destitute, either sleeping rough or staying 
illegally with other asylum seekers in 
often overcrowded accommodation, 
reliant on handouts from friends or 
charities. The level of social exclusion 
caused by destitution can lead to severe 
exploitation. A 2006 Amnesty International 
report found that some interviewees had 
turned to prostitution, and that “young 
girls were possibly given floor space in 
exchange for sexual favours”3, whilst 
Edem, a very vulnerable young man 
from Sierra Leone, indicated that he had 
entered into an exploitative relationship 
with an older man, exchanging sex for 
food and clothing. Vulnerability to highly 
exploitative illegal employment in the 
informal sector is another issue of concern.
A contributing factor to social exclusion 
amongst asylum seekers is the denial 
of the right to work, causing severe 
implications for them, both materially 
and in terms of their participation in UK 
society. Lack of access to the workplace 
makes it difficult for adult asylum seekers 
to interact with the general population, 
leaving them socially isolated and 
aggravating feelings of marginalisation 
and exclusion. It also leaves those who 
do achieve refugee status ill-prepared 
for participation in society through the 
employment market, as has been the 
case for Sami from Kurdistan. During 
our discussion he bemoaned his lack of 
success with job hunting, blaming his 
two-year absence from the workplace 
whilst he was seeking asylum: “At home 
I did the same job for years. Here it is 
different, with long forms and interviews. 
If I had got involved with this when 
I arrived, then fine – but now I am 
starting from scratch.” Yolanda, a highly 
qualified medical professional from 
Cameroon, shares his frustration: “To not 
be able to share your skills is depressing. 
Maybe if we were allowed to show our 
skills, people would not despise us.”
In addition to these material forms of 
exclusion, the portrayal of asylum seekers 
in the UK media is overwhelmingly 
negative, consistently portraying 
people seeking asylum as ‘cheats’, 
‘liars’ and ‘scroungers’. And far from 
challenging media misrepresentation, 
successive British politicians have even 
led and legitimated public hostility. 
Short of deportation, the most extreme 
form of exclusion from society is 
imprisonment. Indeed, around 14% of 
asylum seekers in the UK are detained 
in Immigration Removal Centres at 
some stage during their claim. These 
centres, while officially not prisons, 
are indistinguishable in practice, as 
reflected in Sami’s description: “I 
felt like I was in a prison – all these 
procedures…taking finger prints, 
photos…” This equation between 
detention and criminality is keenly felt 
by many detained asylum seekers who 
cannot understand what crime they have 
committed to warrant their detention. 
Another practice more commonly 
associated with criminals was 
experienced by Grace, who was fitted 
with an electronic ankle tag on arrival 
in the UK. Immigration officials did not 
explain to Grace why she was being 
tagged, and she spent her first weeks 
in the UK wondering what crime she 
had committed. She described feeling 
humiliated and stigmatised by the tag, 
which was clearly visible and provoked 
curiosity and animosity amongst both 
other asylum seekers and members of 
the host community. “The only things 
I had brought to wear were skirts so 
everybody could see it… People were 
staring in the street. Even the other 
women in the building were asking 
me ‘what did you do wrong?’.”
The experiences of social exclusion 
described by Patrice, Grace, Yolanda, 
Edem and Sami are far from unusual. 
Exclusion results from negative views 
of asylum seekers as a threatening 
and burdensome ‘other’ by the media 
and politicians, and as a consequence 
of government asylum policies which 
create hardship and which limit social 
inclusion through enforced poverty, 
equation with criminality, and denial 
of the right to work and contribute 
meaningfully to the host society. 
Demelza Jones (demelzajones@hotmail.
com) has recently completed an MA 
in Global Citizenship, Identities and 
Human Rights at the University of 
Nottingham, UK, and has been working 
with refugees and people seeking asylum 
on community projects in central 
England. Names of interviewees and their 
countries of origin have been changed.
1. www.cabinetoffice.gov.uk/upload/assets/www.cabinetoffice.
gov.uk/social_exclusion_task_force/publications_1997_to_2006/
tackling.pdf 
2. Penrose, Jan, 2002 Poverty and Asylum in the UK. London: The 
Refugee Council and Oxfam. p4
3. Amnesty International, 2006 Down and Out in London: The 
Road to Destitution for Rejected Asylum Seekers, p15: www.
amnesty.org.uk/content.asp?CategoryID=10682 
People seeking asylum in the UK are at great risk of social 
exclusion but successive government asylum policies have 
aggravated rather than alleviated this problem.
New UK underclass 
Demelza Jones
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The difficulties faced by humanitarian 
agencies in Burma are far from unique 
to that country. In Burma, Iraq, 
Darfur, Uganda, Chechnya and other 
countries, the space for humanitarian 
action is being increasingly restricted, 
due either to increasing violence 
against humanitarian aid workers or 
to increasingly hostile state regulation 
of the action of international agencies 
or, as in Burma, to a combination 
of both these factors. The strategies 
being adopted in response bear 
remarkable similarities in different 
settings. In particular, the increasing 
use of ‘remote’ approaches to 
operational intervention is striking.
In Burma, the lack of access to 
vulnerable populations has led to 
the development of cross-border 
interventions through networks 
of local staff, agents and partner 
organisations. In Iraq, insecurity 
and restrictions on the movements 
of international staff members have 
prompted agencies to develop 
operational strategies that depend 
upon local community organisations 
to undertake the planning and 
implementation of relief activities. 
In northern Uganda, Darfur and 
Chechnya, international agencies 
have adopted ‘remote control’ 
methods of intervention whereby 
relief operations are implemented 
by local teams who are coordinated 
from a ‘safe’ location at some distance 
from the actual site of intervention. 
‘Remote’ interventions may 
appear to be the best and most 
pragmatic approach to fulfilling 
the humanitarian imperative under 
highly constrained circumstances. 
In addition, it could be said that, by 
drawing on and developing local 
capacities, these interventions can 
improve levels of local participation 
and ownership, and thereby lay 
the foundation for a sustainable 
transition from relief to development 
while simultaneously sowing the 
seeds for a gradual democratic 
transformation of society.
Humanitarian action in Burma has 
become politicised to a remarkable 
degree as it is now bound up with 
the overarching agenda of the UN 
to promote deep-seated economic 
and political reform, which is seen 
as fundamental to addressing the 
‘root causes’ of the humanitarian 
crisis. Thus the humanitarian has 
become almost indistinguishable 
from the political in what has 
been called the “UN cacophony” 
on Burma, whereby almost every 
issue area is placed firmly under 
the umbrella of democratisation. 
With the developing norm of the 
Responsibility to Protect, it appears 
likely that such approaches will 
become more common. From Sudan 
to Somalia, and from Iraq to the 
Democratic Republic of Congo, 
the international community is 
increasingly seeking to link the 
humanitarian agenda with the 
need for state transformation 
and the development of good 
governance. But the potential 
dangers associated with seeking to 
link the political to the humanitarian 
are significant, and may have 
serious impacts upon humanitarian 
space itself if such linkages are 
seen to challenge the sovereign 
power of the state in question.
Humanitarian operations using 
local proxies might also put both 
beneficiaries and local staff in danger 
of violence or political persecution. 
And while the use of local civil society 
may be seen as an effective means 
of empowering local civil society 
and building a possible movement 
for change from the grassroots, 
under authoritarian conditions 
such as those found in Burma such 
approaches may directly expose local 
civil society actors to oppression.
Such political interventions and 
innovative approaches to finding 
humanitarian space raise a number 
of challenging questions about the 
appropriateness of these forms of 
intervention when considered from 
legal, political or even humanitarian 
protection perspectives. Joining 
up research on rights and related 
issues across institutional (academic, 
advocacy, practitioner and policy) 
and geographical contexts would 
help strengthen international 
understanding of the human rights, 
development and engagement 
challenges facing the international 
community in Burma and elsewhere.
Simon Addison (simon.addison@
qeh.ox.ac.uk) is Senior Research and 
Policy Liaison Officer at the Refugee 
Studies Centre (www.rsc.ox.ac.uk). 
 
This article draws upon discussions 
that took place during a workshop 
entitled ‘Displacement and 
Humanitarianism: A Permanent Crisis 
in Burma?’ that was hosted by the 
Refugee Studies Centre on 29 February 
2008. A selection of papers from the 
workshop will be published, including 
in the RSC Working Paper Series.
The main presentations focused 
on regional powers, the role of the 
UN, protection and human rights, 
chronic emergency in eastern Burma, 
activities and debates relating to 
humanitarian assistance to IDPs, 
the role of cross-border approaches, 
and statelessness. The workshop 
was organised by Eva-Lotta Hedman 
(eva-lotta.hedman@qeh.ox.ac.uk), 
Senior Research Fellow at the RSC.
The analysis here is that of the 
author and does not necessarily 
reflect the views of the 
participants at the workshop.
Humanitarian  
space in a  
fragile state
REFUGEE STUDIES CENTRE
Simon Addison
Circumstances in Burma highlight the difficulty of maintaining 
humanitarian space in so-called ‘fragile states’.
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A seat at the table for IDPs 
Donald Steinberg
Early returns of IDPs are often pushed by impatient 
negotiators seeking good news from stalled processes 
but the premature return of displaced persons in 
the absence of security and sustainability can lead 
to new displacement and further instability. IDPs 
themselves are best positioned to know when it is 
wise and safe to return. They know what they need in 
terms of assistance packages, training opportunities, 
transport and rebuilding of basic social services. 
Sidelining of IDPs means that they often view peace 
processes as belonging to armed combatants, not to 
themselves. They thus will not serve as a countervailing 
force to press combatants to meet their commitments. 
As the following article by David Lanz shows, 
the exclusion of Darfur IDP representatives at the 
Abuja talks was a key reason for their failure.
In the absence of IDPs at the table, too often maniacal 
combatants – such as Angola’s Jonas Savimbi, Sierra 
Leone’s Foday Sankoh and Uganda’s Joseph Kony 
– claim to represent ‘the disempowered people’ in 
peace negotiations. Frequently, their first demand is for 
amnesty for all crimes that they, their supporters and 
the opposite side committed during the conflict. Such 
amnesties too often mean that men with guns forgive 
other men with guns for crimes committed against 
powerless civilians. Amnesties can put a cynical cancer 
in the centre of a peace process, ignore IDP rights for 
compensation and property restitution, and undercut 
rule of law and justice after the guns go silent. 
In addressing these issues, many questions need  
to be answered. 
Who should speak on behalf of IDPs?  
The leaders of the communities from which the 
displaced came may have been killed, displaced 
or discredited, and IDP camps do not generally 
have the stability to elect their own leadership. 
Those who present themselves as leaders in 
IDP camps may not be innocent victims but 
perpetrators of violence – such as in secured 
areas of Rwanda following the 1994 genocide. 
n
How can IDPs be empowered to contribute to  
peace negotiations?  
Typically, IDPs from marginalised groups, such as the 
Afro-Colombian community in Colombia, lack the 
skills needed to participate in diplomatic negotiations. 
Training for their participation is essential, and must 
take place early and in a culturally appropriate manner. 
When is IDP engagement most important?  
Issues such as compensation for displacement, 
accountability and restoration of land rights are 
particularly tense, and can disrupt fragile peace 
processes if introduced too early. Some have 
suggested that these questions should wait until 
negotiation of a ceasefire and an agreement on the 
disarmament and demobilisation of armed forces. 
How can IDP engagement facilitate post-conflict  
civil society?   
Innovative programmes to use IDPs as 
planners, implementers and beneficiaries of 
resettlement and reconstruction programmes 
can help strengthen civil society. 
The lack of local pressure to include IDPs in these 
processes means that the international community 
must often take the lead to ensure their participation. 
We need not be diffident when advocating IDP 
engagement in the face of claims that we are meddling 
in internal affairs. Today, internal disputes invariably 
represent threats to international peace and security as 
waves of instability flow easily across porous borders. 
Today’s IDP is tomorrow’s refugee, and insecure 
areas within countries quickly become breeding sites 
for international trafficking in arms, persons and 
drugs, and potential training sites for terrorists. 
As international mediators press for IDP engagement, 
they must receive the full backing of the UN Security 
Council, UN peacekeepers and all UN humanitarian 
agencies. They must all reiterate that IDPs are not 
mere victims of conflict but an essential piece of the 
puzzle in making and sustaining peace. Peace processes 
must benefit from their knowledge of local conditions, 
their power to generate civil society support for 
agreements, their willingness to return and rebuild 
stable societies, and their commitment to the future of 
their countries. In the pursuit of peace, we must make 
them part of the solution, not part of the problem. 
Donald Steinberg (dsteinberg@crisisgroup.org) 
is Vice President for Multilateral Affairs for the 
International Crisis Group (www.crisisgroup.org). 
The ideas outlined here are more fully developed at: 
www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5263&l=1 
n
n
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Excluding IDPs from peacemaking and 
post-conflict reconstruction means that 
the issues of greatest interest to them 
– resettlement, rebuilding of basic social 
services, clearance of landmines and 
security sector reform – are often ignored 
by the armed combatants participating in 
the talks.
IDPs were only marginally involved in the protracted 
negotiations in the Nigerian capital, Abuja, which after 
seven rounds of talks concluded with the Darfur Peace 
Agreement (DPA) in May 2006. The DPA has not been 
implemented and it may have made things worse. The 
Abuja process was deeply flawed, a textbook example 
of how not to arrange peace negotiations. The final text1 
was written entirely by the African Union mediation team 
and its Arabic version made available to the parties only a 
few days before the expiration of an unrealistic deadline 
imposed by the UN Security Council. In order to close 
the deal, high-level representatives from the US and UK 
flew into Abuja to twist arms. No space was given for 
the parties to shape the agreement or to get input from 
their constituencies. In the end, the Sudanese government 
and Minni Minawi (the leader of a faction of the Sudan 
Liberation army/Movement – SLA/M – one of the main 
rebel groups locked in conflict with the government) 
signed while Abdel Wahid, Minawi’s rival and the 
original leader of SLA/M, and Khalil Ibrahim, leader of 
the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), refused. 
The Abuja talks were not inclusive. While some civil 
society groups were present, their degree of independence 
and representativeness was highly questionable. 
IDPs in Darfur were neither informed nor consulted. 
Within a few days of signing, large and at times violent 
demonstrations against the DPA erupted in camps across 
Darfur. IDPs complained that the agreement did not 
sufficiently address their security concerns, nor provide 
adequate compensation for those who have lost their 
houses and land in the course of the conflict. The protests 
were probably encouraged by Abdel Wahid and his 
supporters among the Fur – Darfur’s largest non-Arab 
group. However, it was clear that all IDPs, regardless 
of their tribal origin, felt that the DPA did not address 
their concerns and were angry at their exclusion.
Their frustration highlights the main recommendation 
arising from a recent report from the Brookings-Bern 
Project on Internal Displacement. ‘Addressing Internal 
Displacement in Peace Processes’2 makes a general case for 
involving IDPs in peace processes. There are three specific 
reasons why this is crucially important in Darfur: the 
massive scale of the displacement; the centrality of land 
dispossession in conflict and any long-term resolution; 
and the politicisation of IDP camps as a result of efforts 
by the government of Sudan and the rebel movements 
to win support and secure military advantage. 
Involving IDPs in the Darfur peace process is not 
idealism or part of an activist agenda. It is based on the 
pragmatic realisation – and lessons learnt from the DPA 
– that sustainable peace will only be possible if concrete 
solutions are found for IDPs. Their needs must be 
satisfied and they must feel they are integrally involved. 
The UN Special Envoy to Darfur, Jan Eliasson, and his 
AU counterpart, the Tanzanian diplomat Salim Ahmed 
Salim, seem to have understood this. In the beginning 
of their post-Abuja re-launch of the peace process, they 
made a deliberate effort to reach out to IDPs. They 
visited camps and held talks with IDP representatives 
so as to better grasp their interests and expectations. 
There now seems to be consensus on the principle that 
IDPs do need to be a part of the peace process. The real 
difficulty, however, is figuring out how to involve them. 
Multi-track diplomacy
Peace processes consist of multiple actors and ‘tracks’. 
Track One diplomacy refers to official negotiations 
between conflict parties; Track Two involves unofficial 
interactions between influential actors from civil society; 
and Track Three covers grassroots conflict resolution 
initiatives. The challenge in Darfur and elsewhere is to 
combine different tracks and to ensure complementarity. 
Following the failure in late October 2007 of peace talks 
in the Libyan city of Sirte, Eliasson and Salim now face 
the challenge of developing a multi-track approach that 
satisfies the needs of IDPs without jeopardising the 
process. Logically, it seems desirable to give IDPs a seat 
at the negotiating table. However, as Donald Steinberg, 
Vice President of the International Crisis Group, points 
out: “there may be occasions where it is wise to include 
only the principal armed parties in the initial stages of 
a peace negotiation, as long as it is clear that the voices 
of other key actors – including IDP representatives 
– will be heard and heeded shortly thereafter.”3 
In Darfur, the formal inclusion of IDPs in official 
peace talks raises two significant problems. Given 
their lack of experience, IDP representatives would be 
susceptible to manipulation. They could become proxies 
in a power struggle between the government and the 
rebel movements, unable to independently defend the 
interests of their constituents. Furthermore, it would be 
The UN estimates that there are 2. million 
IDPs in Darfur – over one third of the total 
population. There can be no meaningful 
peace process without their involvement. 
giving iDps a formal seat in official peace 
negotiations is problematic but there are 
other ways to ensure their participation.
Involving IDPs in the Darfur 
peace process 
David Lanz
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very difficult to identify legitimate IDP representatives. 
A microcosm of Darfuri society, IDPs are extremely 
heterogeneous – divided regionally, politically and 
between tribes. Selecting a small number to represent 
IDPs at peace talks could exacerbate tensions. 
An alternative to direct Track One participation is to 
establish a parallel civil society forum for IDPs and other 
civil society groups. This forum – and its component 
thematic working groups – could work alongside official 
negotiators. Its decision-making power and coordination 
with Track One negotiations would have to be clarified. A 
parallel civil society forum would enhance the legitimacy 
of the peace talks, provide valuable thematic input and 
keep parties in check, preventing them from negotiating 
an incomplete and unsustainable pact between warring 
elites. The selection of IDP and civil society representatives 
remains tricky but, given that the parallel forum could 
accommodate a relatively large number of delegates, the 
AU-UN joint mediation team should be able to manage it.
Parallel Track Two initiatives are crucial. These should 
involve IDPs alongside other local government 
officials, tribal leaders, academics, partners of Sudanese 
and international humanitarian organisations, and 
representatives of women and youth groups. They 
would meet on a regular basis to exchange views and 
build trust. They could help the high-level mediators 
build grassroots support for the peace talks. The Civil 
Affairs Section of UNMIS has suggested that Track Two 
meetings be held separately for IDPs, tribal leaders 
and other civil society groups in each of Darfur’s three 
regional capitals – El Fasher, El Geneina and Nyala. Their 
precise structure as well as the lead organiser is yet to 
be decided. What matters is that Track Two initiatives 
complement official negotiations and that those who 
participate are as representative and independent as 
possible. It will also be important to ensure their safety.
Eliasson and Salim should engage IDPs as frequently 
and regularly as possible in the build-up to any actual 
peace talks. AU-UN mediators need to travel to IDP 
camps, interact with camp leaders, brief them of 
higher-level developments and ensure their input. 
Transparency and regular dissemination of information 
are particularly important if the peace talks take 
place outside of Darfur. Otherwise it will be easy for 
opportunistic rebel leaders to spread misinformation 
and mobilise IDP opinion against them. It will also be 
important not to arouse unrealistic expectations of what 
peace negotiations can achieve. Otherwise, the UN and 
AU will lose credibility among IDPs in the long run.
If a peace deal is reached, it is likely that details about 
implementation will be determined by a range of oversight 
committees focusing on property claims, compensation, 
disarmament and reconstruction projects. These matters 
are of direct concern for IDPs and Darfuri civil society 
and they must be given real decision-making powers.
Conclusion
Whether a peace deal will be reached remains highly 
uncertain. The rebel movements are fragmented, the 
Sudanese government is reluctant to re-negotiate the DPA 
and the international community is struggling to adopt 
a common position. However, there is no alternative 
to negotiating. A Kosovo-like military intervention, as 
demanded by some Darfur advocates, is unlikely to 
materialise and even if it did would probably make 
matters worse in the long run. Sustainable peace in 
Darfur has to be the result of a legitimate political 
process, built on a compromise that takes into account 
the needs of all stakeholders, particularly IDPs. The 
AU-UN mediators appear to have learned from the 
failure of the DPA, and their effort to reach out to 
IDPs is encouraging. However, the involvement of 
IDPs needs to be broadened and their participation 
acknowledged as an intrinsic part of the peace process. 
Otherwise, a chance for peace may be squandered.
David Lanz (david.lanz@swisspeace.ch) was a 
researcher with the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 
and currently works for swisspeace in Bern, 
Switzerland (www.swisspeace.ch). This article is 
written in a personal capacity and does not represent 
the views of either UNMIS or swisspeace.
1. www.unmis.org/english/dpa.htm
2. www.brookings.edu/reports/2007/09peaceprocesses.aspx   
3. Donald Steinberg, ‘A Seat at the Table: The Role of Displaced Persons in Peace Talks 
and Peacebuilding’, www.crisisgroup.org/home/index.cfm?id=5263&l=1 
IDPs in 
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In some countries the sheer scale of displacement 
is so significant that it is unrealistic to plan for a 
peaceful future without incorporating IDPs’ needs 
and ensuring their active participation. Unfortunately, 
however, IDPs are often ignored in peace processes.
Helping displaced populations to return and reintegrate 
can both address the root causes of a conflict and 
help prevent further displacement. The return of 
displaced populations can be an important signifier 
of peace and help validate the post-conflict order. 
IDPs can be active in local politics and can also make 
an important contribution to the recovery of local 
economies. In some countries the displaced have 
become parties to the conflict, and their inclusion 
is therefore necessary for conflict resolution.
All this is also true of refugees but IDPs often have 
additional needs that require specific attention during 
peace processes. IDPs often remain close to the zone of 
conflict and more vulnerable to violence. Provision of 
humanitarian assistance to IDPs is often more difficult. 
Unlike refugees, they are not singled out for specific 
protection in international law. Furthermore, IDPs need 
shelter, may be unable to replace official documents and 
often encounter problems recovering land and property. 
As the previous article by David Lanz noted, there are 
significant obstacles to ensuring IDPs’ participation 
in high-level Track One negotiations. They often lack 
sufficient education, political skills and legitimate 
leaders. There can be reprisals when IDPs organise 
themselves. To work round such constraints Track Two 
peace negotiations have gained legitimacy. Track One 
often relies on Track Two to provide local insights and 
a less formal forum for problem solving. Track Three 
– grassroots initiatives – provides the greatest scope 
for IDP participation but its impacts on national-level 
negotiations are usually limited and by itself cannot 
guarantee effective representation of IDPs’ concerns.
Where the direct participation of IDPs in peace 
negotiations is not possible, desirable or effective, an 
alternative is for international mediators to prompt 
political leaders to incorporate displacement issues 
in peace negotiations. This worked in Mozambique 
and Bosnia. It requires mediators who understand 
the specific concerns of IDPs and have time to consult 
with them. A complementary strategy is to focus on 
the legal rights of IDPs using international, regional 
and national mechanisms. UN agencies and other 
international and national actors can provide information 
on displacement issues to Track One actors.
Engaging with the concerns of the displaced in peace 
negotiations – whether directly or indirectly – is only the 
first step in ensuring that peace processes address them. It 
is critical that peace agreements clarify the political, legal 
and humanitarian obligations of governments towards 
IDPs and clarify roles and responsibilities in relation 
to durable solutions. Displacement issues also need 
mainstreaming in the peace-building phase, when it is 
especially important to provide security; solve property-
related problems; encourage reconciliation; undertake 
post-conflict reconstruction; and ensure a political 
transition to an effective and legitimate government.
IDPs have formed effective coalitions with other groups 
in Track Two/Three negotiations in several countries:
In Colombia, many IDPs feel the peace process is 
not real as violence is ongoing and IDP leaders still 
being assassinated. They have no trust in formal 
state mechanisms. Recently some IDP organisations 
have joined with non-IDPs to press for truth, justice 
and reparations. There are new initiatives to ensure 
displaced women get a seat at the negotiating table.
In Georgia, self-organising IDP groups are 
engaging in the search for durable solutions 
after years of displacement. Despite hostility 
from hardline politicians, they have forged Track 
Two diplomacy with civil society leaders in the 
breakaway regions of Abkhazia and Ossetia 
and are pushing for greater civic rights.
In Sri Lanka, Track One has failed. Numerous 
grassroots peace initiatives have not formally 
included IDPs, and women and children are 
particularly excluded. Tracks Two and Three offer 
potential to ensure greater IDP representation.
In South Sudan, people-to-people Track Three 
initiatives launched by civil society and displaced 
people helped show that negotiations can work 
and paved the way for eventual Track One success 
– the 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement which 
ended Sudan’s protracted North-South conflict.
Khalid Koser (kkoser@brookings.edu) is the Deputy 
Director of the Brookings-Bern Project on Internal 
Displacement. The Project’s publication ‘Addressing 
Internal Displacement in Peace Processes, Peace 
Agreements, and Peace-Building’ is at www.
brookings.edu/reports/2007/09peaceprocesses.aspx
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The displacement-peace nexus 
Khalid Koser
Resolving internal displacement is inextricably 
linked with achieving lasting peace.
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For many years, reproductive health 
(RH) care was rarely regarded as a 
routine component of humanitarian 
medical response. More recently, 
humanitarian agencies have begun 
adopting practices that enable the 
integration of RH care into response 
strategies but there is still much to 
be done before RH care provision 
is considered part of the standard 
response in emergencies. To facilitate 
this process, the Reproductive Health 
Access, Information and Services 
in Emergencies (RAISE) Initiative 
provides both immediate and long-
term assistance to humanitarian 
agencies working to provide RH 
services in the field. This article 
describes three situations in which 
RAISE has supported emergency 
provision of RH care at the onset 
of crises, at project sites in Kenya, 
Bangladesh and the Democratic 
Republic of the Congo (DRC).  
Kenya
In the wake of the post-election 
violence and social unrest in Kenya, 
hundreds of people have lost their 
lives and approximately 300,000 have 
been displaced. Access to RH services 
has been disrupted for many. RAISE 
is supporting Marie Stopes Kenya 
(MSK) to work with the Kenya Red 
Cross Society and other partners to 
provide vital RH services in camps in 
Nairobi and in Rift Valley province. 
Humanitarian agencies are also 
referring survivors of gender-based 
violence (GBV) to MSK’s centres 
for emergency medical treatment, 
including emergency contraception, 
post-exposure prophylaxis to 
minimise HIV transmission and 
treatment for sexually transmitted 
infections (STIs). Women are now 
visiting service sites to request 
contraceptive pills, injectable 
contraceptives, hormonal implants, 
intra-uterine devices and emergency 
contraception. MSK is also supplying 
large numbers of condoms. In 
addition, many expectant mothers 
in the camps are receiving 
antenatal care and voluntary HIV 
counselling and testing services.
Staff have faced a number of 
challenges in the delivery of these 
services. One of the main barriers has 
been the lack of consistent supplies, 
due to the violence and insecurity. In 
addition, movement between regions 
has posed difficulties for MSK 
staff because of security concerns. 
Within the camps, insecurity at 
night makes it difficult and unsafe 
to respond to emergencies and to 
ensure that women have access to 
skilled attendants during delivery. 
In some camps, the camp organisers 
are uncomfortable with, or opposed 
to, the use of certain RH services, 
such as family planning, and this 
has been an additional barrier.
Bangladesh
On 15 November 2007 Cyclone Sidr 
hit the coastal areas of Bangladesh, 
devastating homes and harvests. By 
the end of December, an estimated 
8.9 million people had been affected 
by the cyclone – with 3,347 dead 
and over 563,000 houses destroyed 
or severely damaged. Maternal 
health care in the two coastal 
districts of Borguna and Patuakhali 
was poor even before the cyclone, 
with 90% of all deliveries taking 
place at home and more than 50% 
of deliveries attended by non-
medically trained birth attendants.1
Save the Children USA used financial 
support from the RAISE Emergency 
Fund to implement components 
of the Minimum Initial Service 
Package (MISP) for Reproductive 
Health in Crisis Situations2 in the 
wake of the storm. The objectives 
of the programme are 1) to increase 
access to skilled birth attendance 
and to emergency obstetrics care, 
2) to ensure that universal health 
precautions are practised in all 
health facilities where Save the 
Children works and 3) to ensure 
continued availability of family 
planning methods. Project activities 
include identification, recruiting 
and training of Community Health 
Volunteers; ensuring availability 
of drugs and medical supplies; 
registration of pregnant and lactating 
women; supply of clean delivery 
kits (with information on how to 
use them) to women who are visibly 
pregnant; provision of newborn 
kits; and provision of transportation 
for emergency obstetric cases. 
The programme had significant 
success, reaching more than 70% 
of the target population of visibly 
pregnant women and providing 6,000 
out of a target 8,315 pregnant women 
with clean delivery kits. Medical 
supplies and drugs were provided 
for mobile clinics. In addition, Save 
the Children was able to mobilise 
more resources and funding to 
expand its emergency health 
response to cyclone-affected areas 
in Patuakhali and Borguna districts. 
Although five emergency obstetrics 
cases were successfully referred 
for care to the district hospitals, 
there is still concern that, with so 
many home deliveries, pregnant 
women in medical distress may not 
have full access to referral services 
and emergency obstetrics care.
DRC
Despite movements forward in the 
peace process for DRC, North Kivu 
province remains one of the most 
unstable and insecure areas in the 
country. The recent escalation of 
The value of rapid RH response 
Diana Barnes-Brown 
Reproductive Health Access, Information and Services in Emergencies
Despite many challenges, life-saving reproductive health care 
can be effectively mobilised at the onset of crises, even when 
conditions are far from ideal.
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fighting in the area is expected to 
uproot a large number of people. In 
response, Merlin (UK-based NGO) 
is using support from the RAISE 
Emergency Fund to provide RH 
services to people who have been 
displaced during intensification 
of the civil unrest and armed 
conflict in the region. Specifically, 
the programme supports two RH 
objectives: 1) to increase awareness 
and knowledge regarding the causes, 
consequences of and appropriate 
responses to GBV, HIV and AIDS, 
and other STIs and 2) to increase 
the technical capacity of Ministry of 
Health and community leaders in the 
prevention of and response to these. 
These activities complement Merlin’s 
ongoing efforts in the management 
and referral of women with obstetric 
complications and women in need 
of family planning services.
Merlin held a series of focus group 
discussions with men, women and 
adolescents, which highlighted 
challenges in identifying causes 
of GBV and possible support and 
services for survivors. Both men and 
women tended to view women as 
being to blame for sexual violence, 
due to provocative dress and men’s 
inability to control their sexual urges. 
Adolescent males reported that rape 
was a result of girls refusing sex, and 
some participants in the female focus 
groups indicated that there should 
be no interventions to address sexual 
violence, as drawing 
attention to the issue 
would simply result in 
further violence. The 
nearest hospital for 
treatment for survivors 
of sexual violence 
was reported as too 
far away for many 
women to reach. In 
addition, the focus 
group participants 
asked for family 
planning and HIV 
prevention services to 
be made available at 
the local health centre. 
In this case, treating 
both the causes and 
consequences of 
sexual violence has 
presented a complex 
set of factors with 
which field staff 
must contend. 
Emergency realities
None of the challenges presented 
above are unique to their settings. 
For example, insecurity can have a 
major impact on the supply chain, 
with roads closed, whole regions 
inaccessible, and raids and looting 
of hospital pharmacies and other 
places where crucial supplies are 
kept. In addition, the imposition 
of night curfews prevents women 
being attended during delivery at 
night and does not allow for referral 
to EmOC services when an obstetric 
complication occurs. Coordination 
of supplies and movement in 
convoys can help to reduce the risk 
of ruptures in the supply chain.
In times of conflict, community 
leaders often act as gatekeepers, 
with considerable control over 
which services may or may not be 
provided, and which agencies or 
organisations may or may not be 
providers. As a result, access to RH 
services may not be allowed – even 
when providers have the capacity 
and training to provide them. 
Working closely with communities 
and their leaders, as well as with 
camp organisers, can help ensure 
that all RH services are available.
Availability of trained and 
experienced staff is a major challenge 
for all agencies responding to 
humanitarian disasters. It has long 
been recognised that there is a need 
for emergency response rosters. 
However, many of the staff on these 
rosters may be neither skilled in RH 
nor aware of the need to provide 
RH services at the outset. As needs 
assessment progresses in subsequent 
stages of projects, it is necessary to 
supplement gaps in appropriately 
trained staff as soon as qualified and 
available candidates can be identified. 
Coping with challenges such as 
those described above provides 
valuable lessons to be learned. In 
spite of the difficulty experienced 
while attempting RH service 
provision, however, all three sites 
discussed have succeeded in making 
services available where they 
would otherwise have remained 
unavailable or inaccessible. The 
process of recording and responding 
to emerging challenges will help 
staff and administrators to better 
understand what is needed to address 
similar challenges in the future. 
Diana Barnes-Brown (db2472@
columbia.edu) is Technical Writer/
Editor for the RAISE Initiative. 
For more information on the 
RAISE Emergency Fund or referral 
to partner programme contacts, 
please contact George Patterson, 
Grants Manager, at the RAISE 
Initiative (gp337@columbia.edu).
1. Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 
preliminary report 2007 
2. www.rhrc.org/MISP/
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Despite the booming economy, 
Azerbaijani IDPs continue to rank 
among the most vulnerable social 
groups, largely dependent on external 
assistance. What is now required, 
however, is a gradual shift to assisting 
the IDPs on the same basis as other 
vulnerable people within broader 
social development and poverty 
reduction strategies. NRC’s decision 
to leave Azerbaijan is based on 
the acknowledgement that most 
of the assistance required now is 
beyond its mandate and expertise.
NRC’s decision to leave was 
primarily motivated by Azerbaijan’s 
economic growth and the state’s 
substantial investments in IDP-
related programmes. There is 
therefore a diminishing need for 
NRC to substitute for government 
assistance. In addition, there is limited 
potential to contribute to durable 
solutions as long as the status of 
the disputed Nagorno-Karabakh 
region and the ongoing Armenian 
occupation of the surrounding 
territories give little hope for return, 
and while resettlement is perceived 
as temporary and local integration 
is not promoted by the authorities. 
The last few years have seen 
a significant increase in the 
government’s programmes and 
in their willingness to allocate 
funds to address the needs of the 
displaced population. With the 
benefit of increased oil revenues, 
the government has been able to 
introduce an extensive legal IDP 
framework and a comprehensive 
state IDP strategy aimed at improving 
living conditions and employment. 
The government provides monthly 
allowances to over half a million 
displaced people, distributes food –  
with the World Food Programme –  
to some 270,000 people, pays for 
domestic utilities and winter fuel, and 
provides for several tax exemptions 
for IDPs. Within the housing 
programme some 70 collective centres 
have so far been rehabilitated and 
56 new settlements constructed 
with individual houses for over 
15,000 families; this programme will 
continue until 2011. The government 
has even contributed financially 
to one of NRC’s shelter projects.
These genuine positive efforts 
notwithstanding, Azerbaijan is 
still a country in transition, with 
remarkable resources but limited 
technical capacity to make best 
use of the financial and human 
potential available. Further 
assistance and guidance is needed 
in several areas, primarily in:
reducing the dependence of IDPs 
on external assistance through 
more emphasis on enhancing 
their economic opportunities 
and including them more 
fully in national social and 
economic development plans 
ensuring that IDP wishes are taken 
into account when programmes 
on their behalf are being 
n
n
developed and implemented, 
especially programmes that 
involve their relocation 
removing practical and 
institutional barriers and 
practices that may be perceived as 
discriminatory, in order to further 
enhance the rights of IDPs to 
become fully-fledged members of 
Azerbaijani society. Among these 
barriers are: the inflexible system 
of registration of IDPs based on 
their place of origin instead of their 
actual residence, having separate 
schools and the construction of 
new settlements in remote areas.
Azerbaijan has already done much 
to address the needs of IDPs but still 
has a long way to go. While a lasting 
and peaceful solution to the Nagorno-
Karabakh conflict may still remain 
elusive, all displaced people need 
to be given the opportunity to enjoy 
decent and dignified lives, and to 
develop their skills in preparation for 
eventual return. The human potential 
of IDPs in Azerbaijan is enormous. 
It is up to the authorities to channel 
it in directions that will be beneficial 
for the overall growth of the country.
Petr Kostohryz (petrk@nrc-
az.org) is Country Director for 
NRC’s Azerbaijan office (www.
nrc.no/?did=9168609). 
 
The Norwegian Refugee Council (NRC) 
works to provide assistance and 
protection to refugees and displaced 
people in Africa, Asia, Europe and the 
Americas. www.nrc.no/engindex.htm
The Internal Displacement Monitoring 
Centre (IDMC) is part of NRC 
and is an international non-profit 
organisation that monitors internal 
displacement caused by conflicts. 
www.internal-displacement.org 
Contact : IDMC, 7-9 Chemin de 
Balexert, 1219 Chatelaine, Geneva, 
Switzerland. Email: idmc@nrc.ch
n
Although the number of iDps in Azerbaijan continues to be 
among the highest per capita in the world, the Norwegian 
refugee Council (nrC) is leaving Azerbaijan in 2008, after  
13 years of operations there. 
Azerbaijan: internally 
displaced amidst a  
booming economy
Armenia and Azerbaijan are technically still in a state of war. Their conflict over 
Nagorno-Karabakh halted with a 1994 ceasefire with the province and surrounding 
districts fully or partially remaining under Armenian control. There are 686,586 
IDPs from Nagorno-Karabakh and surrounding occupied territories in Azerbaijan. 
Petr Kostohryz
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Tens of thousands of internally 
displaced people (IDPs) from 
Georgia’s secessionist territories of 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia have 
been waiting more than a decade 
for a solution to their displacement 
following conflicts which broke out 
in the early 1990s. Over 240,000 IDPs 
found refuge in the region bordering 
Abkhazia and in the Georgian capital, 
Tbilisi. Many of them still live in 
precarious conditions in former hotels 
and public buildings, dependent on 
meagre state benefits. During the 
past few years, some 45,000 people 
have returned to the Gali district in 
eastern Abkhazia, despite the poor 
conditions and economic prospects.
A Heavy Burden, Internally Displaced 
in Georgia brings the reality behind 
these facts to life.1 Published at the 
end of April 2008, it brings together 
13 individual accounts from Georgia, 
Abkhazia and South Ossetia. The 
stories address universal human 
experiences and responses rather 
than specific political issues. By 
reading what the displaced people 
themselves want to tell us, we may 
learn what is important to them and 
what issues particularly concern 
them. The interviews allowed the 
displaced individuals to direct the 
course of the narrative and have 
allowed unexpected facts and 
ideas to emerge which challenge 
generalised notions of displacement.2
The stories in A Heavy Burden reveal 
issues that go beyond typical assis-
tance and protection needs and touch 
on values, identity, feelings and 
emotions. Most narrators said they 
felt relieved or even privileged to be 
able to tell their story to an attentive 
and sensitive listener; however, some 
acknowledged that it was also difficult 
to recount painful experiences. Some 
narrators stated that they were afraid 
to talk much about these experiences 
but found it to be of great value. 
The title A Heavy Burden comes from 
the great weight of trauma that 
most narrators reveal. After years 
of displacement, narrators still need 
to share their sense of loss and their 
continuing grief that they could 
not carry out traditional mourning 
ceremonies and processes. How can 
you come to terms with your loss if 
your loved ones cannot be buried 
next to their ancestors on their 
own land, as tradition requires? In 
these stories we also meet strong 
women and men who have found 
their own coping mechanisms and 
strategies to move forward. 
The interviewers were selected 
from NGOs working with IDPs and 
communities affected by conflict and 
forcible displacement. The project gave 
them the opportunity to develop oral 
testimony skills to collect and compile 
the life stories. Together they identified 
themes, ethical guidelines and 
appropriate security policies to protect 
everyone involved in the project. 
They were also trained to manage the 
psychological impact of the process 
on the narrator and themselves. 
One of the narrators described the 
interview process. “Only after talking 
about our own tragedies did we truly 
learn about each other... It took time 
to trust each other. It was when we 
believed that we understood each 
other’s pain, when this moment 
came, that we could sit down and talk 
openly – without aggression, without 
accusations.” Creating space for this 
dialogue is of the utmost importance 
in the process of healing the wounds 
of the displaced people themselves 
and of the peoples of the region.  
It is our hope that that this book will 
be widely circulated and used by 
governments, regional organisations, 
the UN and other international 
agencies, NGOs, civil society actors, 
researchers, students and, last but 
not least, IDPs themselves, to give 
them a deeper understanding of the 
concerns of the people displaced in 
Georgia. Without really listening to 
people affected and engaging them 
in the development of programmes, 
there is little chance that realistic 
durable solutions will be developed. 
Anne-Sophie Lois (anne-sophie. lois@
nrc.ch) is Director of the IDP Voices 
Project, IDMC (www.idpvoices.org 
and www.internal-displacement.org).
1. A Heavy Burden,Internally Displaced in Georgia: Stories of 
People from Abkhazia and South Ossetia is being published in 
Georgian, Russian and English jointly by IDMC in Geneva, 
the Norwegian Refugee Council in Georgia and Panos 
London’s Oral Testimony Programme. Its stories join those 
of displaced Colombians at www.idpvoices.org.
2. 59 interviews were completed, 29 of which were selected 
and edited for the website and 13 for the book.
 
Internal Displacement: 
Global Overview of Trends 
and Developments in 2007
In 2007, the number of people 
displaced within their countries by 
armed conflicts and violence passed the 
26 million mark, according to IDMC’s 
annual overview 
launched on 17 
April. IDPs in over 
50 countries faced 
continuing attacks 
as well as hunger, 
disease and the 
effects of inadequate 
shelter. Millions fled 
their homes in 2007 to 
escape long-standing 
internal conflicts, 
while millions 
more continued to 
endure protracted 
displacement 
with few prospects of return or 
resettlement. The report is online at: 
www.internal-displacement.org.
The IDP voices Project tries to give some idea of the personal 
reality of the loss of close family members in conflict, the loss 
of all your belongings and being uprooted.
Anne-Sophie Lois
Bearing witness  
to displacement  
in Georgia
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In April 2001, UNHCR published 
a research paper on the local 
integration of refugees in developing 
countries. Its title was The Forgotten 
Solution. A year later, an NGO 
statement to the Global Consultations 
on International Protection made a 
very similar assertion: “Although 
local integration is always listed 
among the three durable solutions, 
in fact it is rarely used in cases of 
mass influx and has, in that context, 
almost become a ‘non-solution’.”1
As these statements suggest, the 
potential of local integration as a 
solution to refugee situations has 
received relatively little attention in 
recent years. Indeed, from the early 
1980s onwards, states and UNHCR 
alike progressively adopted the 
position – perhaps even a dogma 
– that repatriation constituted the 
only viable solution for the vast 
majority of the world’s refugees. 
Thus, in 1996, UNHCR’s Executive 
Committee adopted a Conclusion 
that stated very clearly – if somewhat 
ungrammatically – that voluntary 
repatriation was “the most preferred 
solution” to refugee situations. 
A forthcoming study from UNHCR’s 
Policy Development and Evaluation 
Service (PDES) puts such statements 
in a new perspective.2 For a start, the 
study points out that local integration 
has never been quite as forgotten as 
many analysts have assumed it to be. 
While the number of refugees who 
have benefited from this solution may 
be modest in comparison with those 
who have been able to return to their 
country of origin, different forms 
of local integration have provided 
a solution for exiled populations 
throughout the world. These include, 
for example, groups of Guatemalan 
and Salvadorean refugees in Belize, 
Costa Rica and Mexico; Tajik refugees 
in Kyrgyzstan and Turkmenistan; 
Vietnamese refugees in China; 
Afghan refugees in India; Irian Jayan 
refugees in Papua New Guinea; and 
refugees from former Yugoslavia 
in Serbia and Montenegro. 
The PDES study also draws attention 
to the fact that there is no real logic 
in confining the discourse on local 
integration to refugees in developing 
countries. While detailed statistics 
are difficult to establish, it is evident 
that many of the asylum seekers who 
have been granted refugee status in 
the industrialised states of Europe, 
North America and the Asia-Pacific 
region have become naturalised 
citizens of their asylum countries. 
According to information received 
from the Canadian government, 
for example, “about 50% of cases 
of asylum seekers are approved 
and over 90% of these go on to 
become permanent residents.” 
An even more striking finding of 
the study is the extent to which 
local integration is beginning 
to find its way back onto the 
international refugee policy agenda. 
In 2005, for example, the UNHCR 
Executive Committee agreed upon 
a Conclusion on Local Integration 
which underlined the need for 
comprehensive approaches to refugee 
problems, and which emphasised 
“the important place which local 
integration can have in such 
comprehensive arrangements.” The 
same Conclusion also “urges states 
and UNHCR to continue working 
proactively on local integration where 
appropriate and feasible and in a 
manner that takes into account the 
needs and views of both refugees 
and their hosting communities.” 
Since that Conclusion was established, 
some significant developments have 
taken place in the implementation 
of this approach, especially but not 
exclusively in Africa. By far the most 
significant example in this respect is 
to be found in Tanzania, where the 
government has recently reversed a 
longstanding policy. This had insisted 
that refugees and their descendants 
who arrived from Burundi in the 
early 1970s would eventually have 
to repatriate, even if they had been 
born in Tanzania, had spent the 
whole of their life in that country and 
had achieved a high level of social 
and economic integration there. 
With the introduction of a new and 
radically different policy, initiated 
by Home Affairs Minister Joseph 
Mungai, the ‘1972 Burundians’ have 
now been offered the opportunity 
to acquire Tanzanian citizenship. 
According to UNHCR, which 
has undertaken a general census 
of the refugee population and a 
comprehensive individual registration 
exercise, some 170,000 refugees, 
around 80% of the population, 
seem likely to avail themselves of 
this opportunity. A key factor in the 
implementation of this initiative 
will be the response of donors 
to a UNHCR appeal requesting 
some $16 million for activities in 
support of the local integration and 
naturalisation of the refugees.
According to the research undertaken 
by PDES, Tanzania is not alone in its 
readiness to reconsider the solution 
of local integration. In Angola, 
for example, the authorities have 
indicated their willingness to give 
permanent residence rights to some 
14,000 refugees from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, while local 
integration opportunities appear 
to be opening up for Congolese 
and Chadian refugees in Gabon. 
In Namibia the government has 
suggested the establishment of 
a pilot local integration project 
A combination of historical trends, the changing policies of 
governments and renewed efforts by UNHCR have all begun 
to strengthen the potential of local integration as a lasting 
solution for refugees.
local integration:  
reviving a  
forgotten solution Alexandra Fielden and Jeff Crisp
for an initial 500 of the Angolan 
refugees in the country. And in West 
Africa, host countries such as Côte 
d’Ivoire, Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone have all recently expressed 
a readiness to consider the local 
integration of refugees originating 
from within the ECOWAS region.    
While these initiatives are all in 
their early stages, the solution 
of local integration appears to 
be finding its way back onto the 
international agenda. A number 
of different factors appear to have 
prompted this development. 
Global refugee numbers have gone 
down in recent years, creating a 
more positive environment for 
solutions than existed in the 1990s, 
when the world experienced a spate 
of massive armed conflicts and 
cross-border population movements 
which were perceived as a serious 
threat to local and regional security. 
Now that many of those conflicts 
have been brought to an end and 
large numbers of refugees have 
been able to return to their countries 
of origin, governments of refugee-
hosting states have perhaps been 
able to adopt a more positive attitude 
towards the continued presence 
and local integration of the much 
smaller ‘residual refugee caseloads’ 
that remain in their territory. 
At a time of rapid globalisation 
and mass international migration, 
there also appears to be an 
emerging consensus concerning the 
ineffectiveness of policies which 
insist that everyone should live in 
their country of origin and, if they 
have been forced into exile, return 
to that country. This is especially 
the case when the people concerned 
are young people who have never 
lived in their putative ‘homeland’. 
Finally, there is reason to believe that 
UNHCR itself has recently played a 
valuable role in drawing international 
attention to the problem of protracted 
refugee situations and underlining 
the need for them to be addressed in 
a vigorous and innovative manner.3  
That has not always been the case. In 
1995, for example, the organisation 
published a book entitled The State 
of the World’s Refugees: In Search of 
Solutions, which remarkably failed 
to make a single substantive or 
positive reference to local integration. 
Now that this issue has attained 
a more prominent place on the 
organisation’s list of priorities, it 
is to be hoped and expected that 
this solution will no longer be as 
‘forgotten’ as it was in previous years.  
Alexandra Fielden (fielden@unhcr.
org) and Jeff Crisp (crisp@unhcr.
org) work in UNHCR’s Policy 
Development and Evaluation Service 
1. NGO Statement on local integration, Global 
Consultations on International Protection, 22-24 May 
2002. Available at www.icva.ch/doc00000865.html
2. Local integration: capitalizing on the potential of a solution 
to protracted refugee situations, by Alexandra Fielden, 
Policy Development and Evaluation Service, UNHCR.
3. For a compilation of the studies that UNHCR has 
undertaken on this issue since 1999, see www.unhcr.
org/research/46adfe822.html.
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CAMP MANAGEMENT 
TOOLKIT 2008 
Available in May
The inter-agency Camp 
Management Toolkit has been 
revised, and its 2008 version 
will be available in hardcopy, 
including Toolkit CD (contact 
camp@nrc.no), and online (www.
nrc.no/camp) at the end of May 
2008. Taking a comprehensive 
and holistic look at camp 
management as a recognised 
and vital humanitarian sector, 
the Camp Management Toolkit 
incorporates a wide range 
of relevant information on 
various aspects of camp 
operations, particularly the 
roles and responsibilities of a 
camp management agency. 
Published by the inter-agency 
Camp Management Project 
2008 (NRC, UNHCR, DRC, 
IRC, OCHA, IOM) through the 
Norwegian Refugee Council.
MCRG Course on 
Forced Migration
1-15 December 2008 
Kolkata, India: Mahanirban 
Calcutta Research Group
This annual short course 
is intended for younger 
academics, refugee activists and 
others working in the field of 
human rights and humanitarian 
assistance for victims of 
forced displacement. It will be 
preceded by a two-and-a-half-
month-long programme of 
distance education. Full details 
of curriculum and application 
requirements/procedures are at 
www.mcrg.ac.in.
Applications/enquiries to 
forcedmigrationdesk@mcrg.ac.in 
or Mahanirban Calcutta 
Research Group, GC-45, First 
Floor, Sector-III, Salt Lake City, 
Kolkata 700 106, West Bengal, 
India. Applications must be 
received by 31 May 2008.
Clowns in Damascus
Sybella Wilkes
UNHCR 
registration 
centre in 
Douma.
UNHCR community centre in Saida Zeinab.  
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UNHCR first learned about the 
positive benefits of clowns when 
a local troupe was hired for World 
Refugee Day 2007 to perform in the 
tense and unhappy waiting room at 
the main refugee registration centre 
in Damascus. UNHCR staff noticed 
that the children were more relaxed 
during the registration appointment. 
When UNHCR put out a message that 
it was looking for clowns to perform 
a regular show at the registration 
centre, as luck would have it, three 
Iraqi actors who had worked in a 
clown troop in Iraq came forward.
UNHCR asked the independent 
international group, Clowns Without 
Borders,1 to review the first show, 
which focused on informing parents 
and children that all Iraqi children 
have the right to attend school. 
Clowns Without Borders then 
returned in November to offer further 
training to the clowns. Their leader, 
Christina Aguirre, 
spent time getting to 
know Iraqi children in 
order to help design 
the shows. “When 
you see a child in the 
street here, all you see 
are a lot of problems 
and no happiness,” 
said Aguirre. “But 
when we put on our 
red noses and play 
with them, they 
forget their problems 
for a little while.”
At a community centre 
in Seida Zeinab, one of 
the main Iraqi refugee 
areas in Damascus, 
a crowd of children 
burst out laughing as 
two clowns squirted 
each other with water 
and made flowers 
out of balloons. “It 
was beautiful,” said 
Rodeen, a young Iraqi girl with 
a beaming smile on her face. 
Sybella Wilkes (wilkes@unhcr.org) 
is UNHCR’s Public Information 
Officer based in Damascus.
1. www.clownswithoutborders.org
Refugee registration 
in Syria 
UNHCR has registered close to 
250,000 Iraqi refugees throughout 
the region, including 165,000 in 
Syria out of an estimated Iraqi 
population there of between 
1.2 and 1.4 million people. The 
number of applicants in Syria 
continues to increase and, 
in order to expand outreach, 
UNHCR has established mobile 
registration and assistance teams. 
The waiting period for non-
urgent registration interviews 
in Syria has been cut to two 
months, while applicants with 
specific needs – requiring early 
registration – are fast-tracked. 
But while the waiting period 
for registration of new asylum 
seekers has been significantly 
reduced, concern is growing in 
Syria over the re-registration 
of Iraqis. The approaching 
expiry date of vast numbers of 
certificates issued during the 
massive influx which began in 
March 2007, and the backlog 
which will result from it, will put 
considerable pressure on interview 
capacities in the coming months.
There has been a notable rise 
in the number of applications by 
people recently arrived in Syria. 
Many of them, however, are not 
arriving for the first time but are 
back after a tentative return 
to Iraq – where they found the 
situation less safe than expected.
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